Quantitative easing (QE) and investing in financial asset markets by Shogbuyi, Abiodun
  
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions. 
If you have discovered material in Aston Research Explorer which is unlawful e.g. breaches 
copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to 
those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, 
libel, then please read our Takedown policy and contact the service immediately 
(openaccess@aston.ac.uk) 
1 
  
                      
            QUANTITATIVE EASING (QE) AND INVESTING IN FINANCIAL 
                                                           ASSET MARKETS 
 
 
                                               ABIODUN KAZEEM SHOGBUYI 
                                                         Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
                                                       ASTON UNIVERSITY 
                                                                 June 2017 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
                                               © Abiodun Kazeem Shogbuyi, 2017 
Abiodun Kazeem Shogbuyi asserts his moral right to be identified as the author of this thesis. 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood 
to recognise that its copyright belongs to its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no 
information derived from it may be published without appropriate acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
                                                     ASTON UNIVERSITY 
               QUANTITATIVE EASING (QE) AND INVESTING IN FINANCIAL 
                                                         ASSET MARKETS 
  
                                                      Abiodun Kazeem Shogbuyi 
                                                         Doctor of Philosophy 
                                                                        2017 
 
                                                         THESIS SUMMARY 
This study is an empirical investigation into the effects of the Quantitative easing (QE) 
operations implemented in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 by the BoE and the Fed 
on the broader financial markets in the UK and US. It avoids a major pitfall of earlier studies that 
just focused on the impact of QE on government bond yields. Considering the channels of the 
QE policy, it assess the effects of QE operations on bond yields and equity market returns in the 
US and UK using an event study before using a GARCH specification augmented with QE 
intensity and period variables to model the returns and volatility dynamics for the US and UK 
equity markets primarily, as well as others that did not implement the QE policy at the time. It 
also examines the effects of QE on the covariance between the inter-financial (i.e. the UK and 
US equity markets) and intra-financial (i.e. the equity and bond markets in the UK and US) using 
the DVECH model. An investigation of the long-run relationship of the US, the UK, France and 
Germany equity markets, following the QE operations using the multivariate cointegration and 
VECM techniques is made. We report significant effects on equity and bond market yields 
following the QE announcements and the actual bond purchases. Though there is evidence of 
increased (positive) co-variance between the UK and US equity markets following the actual QE 
purchases, this appeared to have been induced by the BoE and not the Fed QE operations. 
Conversely, the intra-financial markets analyses of the effect of QE on the covariance between 
the equity and bond markets in the UK and US respectively revealed significant (negative) 
covariance between the bond and equity markets following the QE operations. No evidence is 
found of an increasing convergence amongst the US and the UK equity markets, following the 
QE actions. As the toolkit of monetary policy in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis has 
been expanded to now include a hitherto unconventional tool in the mode of QE, the findings of 
this study provide the monetary authorities with an understanding of the broader financial market 
especially the equity market reaction function to the QE policy and thereby fills this gap in the 
literature. This thesis adds to several existing literatures on equity market volatility, equity-bond 
market covariation and equity market cointegration from a QE perspective. As well as adding to 
a growing body of literature that has examined the broader effects of QE.  
Keywords: QE, LSAPs, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Equity Markets, Bond Markets, 
Variance, Covariance, GARCH, DVECH, Unit-roots, Cointegration, VECM.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In responding to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, central banks such as the US Federal Reserve 
(Fed) and the Bank of England (BoE) reduced significantly the short-term nominal interest or the 
policy rates close to their zero lower bound. However, as the crisis intensified, with deteriorating 
economic situations in these economies and with short-term interest rates already close to zero1, 
further interest rate cuts became harder, thereby limiting the effectiveness of conventional 
monetary policy.  
In meeting the challenges posed by reaching the effective zero lower bound on the short-term 
nominal interest rate, the aforementioned central banks including others like the European 
Central Bank (ECB) resorted to unconventional or less-conventional monetary policy measures 
in order to provide further stimulus in the aftermath of the significant deterioration of economic 
conditions and mounting deflationary risks following the financial crisis. Prominent among the 
unconventional monetary policy measures is the policy of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) or 
quantitative easing (QE) as conducted by the Fed and BoE commencing from late 2008 and early 
2009.  
QE operations are those that unusually increase the monetary base through large scale asset 
purchases. These operations especially2 as implemented by the Fed and the BoE involved the 
withdrawal of large quantities of longer term Treasury and gilt-edged securities from the private 
and non-bank sector through purchases in the secondary market, thereby altering their relative 
supplies available to the public. The broad objective of these QE operations was to bring about a 
reduction in long-term interest rates, thereby reducing the cost of capital to businesses and 
                                                          
1 Although zero is a reasonable approximation on the lower bound for interest rates, the costs of storing and protecting large 
amounts of currency would imply that short-term rates can become slightly negative in some instances. 
2 While the Fed and BoE injected reserves into the US and UK economies by buying bonds, the ECB generously lent money to 
banks to inject reserves into their ‘bank-centric’ economies. (Fawley and Neely, 2013).  
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households, so as to increase aggregate demand and real economic activity. The principal 
distinguishing feature of QE from the conventional open market operations (OMO) is that with 
QE, the central bank seeks directly to influence asset prices such as longer-term bond yields 
rather than a short-term rate, and such influencing of long-term yields can have an effect on 
other imperfect substitutes to long-term bonds such as equities, through a portfolio rebalance 
mechanism which may further boost the economy as will be explained below.  
The rapidly expanding body of literature on QE reviewed in the second chapter of this thesis, has 
explored a number of issues connected to the use of QE ranging from theoretical and empirical 
studies of how effective the large scale asset purchases has been in lowering long-term yields and 
helping the wider or real economy recover from the financial crisis. This literature has broadly 
concluded that QE led to reductions in yields and long-term interest rates which have had 
positive economic effect by raising the level of real GDP and CPI inflation, and thereby 
prevented the global or world economy from drifting into another great depression as 
experienced in the 1930s. 
Despite this increasing body of research on the efficacy or effectiveness of the QE policy, 
however justified, given the unprecedented nature of the QE operations in the US and the UK, 
there has been little attempt or relatively less attention in the academic literature to this point, 
devoted to the possible effects on the broader aspects of the financial markets of the QE policy. 
This dearth in scholarly literature on these potential effects of the QE is in contrast to the 
acknowledgement by policymakers as the QE operations continued of its potential risks or 
unintended consequences. For example, on August 2010, former chairman of the Fed, Ben 
Bernanke alluded to potential risks of the Fed’s balance sheet expansion which pointed to the 
‘difficulty of calibrating and communicating policy responses,’ and ‘reduced public confidence in 
the Fed’s ability to execute a smooth exit from its accommodative policies… leading to an 
15 
  
undesired increase in inflation expectations,’ (Bernanke, 2010).  In public discussion the 
possibility of inflation spiralling out of control due to the unprecedented increase in the money 
supply associated with a policy of QE has also been raised. Apart from the risk of inflation, 
another point that has been made is that if the government were to issue debt just to meet the 
demands of QE, then this will entail a risk to central bank balance sheets and the level of 
government debt which might become unmanageable.  
As germane or relevant as the aforementioned risks to the wider economy, are also effects to the 
broader financial market. One aspect of QE albeit having not being given much consideration if 
any at all, is the effect on the other aspects of the financial markets, other than the bond markets, 
such as the equity markets that might result from the portfolio balance transmission mechanism 
of QE. Some of the existing analysis or literature of the impact of QE has identified the portfolio 
balance mechanism as a veritable channel through which the QE policy has been effective.  
The thrust of the portfolio balance transmission mechanism is that with the central bank bond 
purchases, the money holdings of the sellers are increased and unless money is a perfect 
substitute for the assets sold, the sellers would rebalance their portfolios by buying other 
imperfectly substitutable assets. This shifts the excess money balances to the sellers of those 
assets who may, in turn, attempt to rebalance their portfolios also by buying further assets and as 
this goes on, the prices of assets rise until the point where investors, in aggregate, are willing to 
hold the overall supplies of asset and money. Higher asset prices mean lower yields and lower 
cost of capital for firms and households, which act to stimulate aggregate spending or demand.  
However, as QE portfolio balance effects due to the negative supply shocks to the bond markets 
cause investors to switch from bonds to other imperfect substitutes like equities, increased 
variance in the equity markets, changing covariance structures between different financial 
assets/markets returns may result from investors seeking an attractive return away from the bond 
16 
  
markets to other aspect of the financial market such as the stock markets for example. Whether 
or not large scale government bond purchases or QE provide unambiguously positive net 
benefits to the broader financial markets such as markets for stocks, and other imperfect 
substitutes to Treasury bonds like corporate bonds is ultimately an empirical matter, which has 
received little to no attention at all in the QE literature.  
This study fills this gap in the literature by investigating the effect of the QE or LSAPs by the 
BoE and the Fed on majorly the UK, the US and on other financial markets. Using data on the 
Fed and BoE’s QE operations, equity and bond market returns and equity price indices, the study 
test the effect of the QE operations on several measures of financial market stability including 
equity market volatility, equity and bond markets covariance, and equity market cointegration 
against the background of the unconventional monetary policy of QE or LSAPs. 
 
1.2: CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY 
Quantitative monetary targets were the fulcrum of monetary policy in the early 1980s. In the late 
1980s however, most central banks jettisoned this approach, due to its perceived failure. This 
failure was largely due to the perceived instability of velocity and the money demand function in 
many countries since the 1980s (Werner 2012). Since then central banks have emphasised interest 
rate policies in their official statements and the conventional way for monetary authorities to 
conduct monetary policy has focused on interest rate decisions by setting the policy rate. 
Monetary authorities starting with the BOJ on 19th March 2001 and more recently the Fed and 
BoE resorted again to quantitative monetary targets- QE or large scale asset purchases- once the 
hitherto conventional or traditional instrument of monetary policy (the short-term nominal 
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interest rate) was encumbered due hitting the effective zero3 bound. The zero bound can be a 
significant impediment  for the monetary authority in combating deflation or hitting any higher 
inflation target, as further interest-rate cuts becomes harder as policy rates approximates zero. 
The lower bound could be removed by allowing interest rates to go negative. Such a negative 
interest rate (NIR) would apply not only to the reserves at the central bank, but also to bank 
deposits and other savings accounts. In the circumstance of a NIR, money becomes the so called 
‘hot potato’ which the banking populace should want to get rid of. Although, NIR do not alter 
the balance sheet of the central bank, they can have adverse effects on savers, if the banks for 
instance decide to recover the cost of the rate by levying charges on their customers.  
The introduction of quantitative easing or asset purchases as the policy tool or action in the event 
of the effective zero bound being reached, thus shifted the hitherto focus of monetary policy 
from ‘price’ (i.e. rate) setting to quantitative monetary targets. However, with the primarily 
objective of the central bank still maintaining price stability amongst other objectives which may 
include maintaining full employment, economic growth, and at the highest level financial stability. 
The QE or LSAPs provides an additional tool to help the central bank meet its objectives. 
 
1.2.1 Conventional monetary policy (interest rate) 
The financial crisis and its aftermath of what is now known as the great recession posed a 
number of genuine challenges for the conduct of monetary policy by central banks. Pre-crisis, the 
aim of monetary policy was to achieve low and stable inflation, the policy framework was 
inflation targeting, and the principal tool was the policy rate which the central bank provided 
funds to commercial banks. As proposed, among others, by Woodford (2003), within this 
                                                          
3 The BoE considered a negative bank rate in February 2013, but decided against it. The rationale behind imposing 
negative interest rates is to discourage people or organisations from certain investments. For instance the imposition 
of negative interest rates by the ECB was to discourage banks from depositing money with it, and instead lend to 
Eurozone businesses. 
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framework, optimal monetary policy essentially boils down to setting a short-term nominal 
interest rate using a wide variety of macroeconomic signals but in a manner akin to Taylor rule4, 
whereby interest rates responded more than proportionately to changes in inflation and also 
responded to the gap between actual and full employment. However, it has been argued and 
pointed out by others like Benhabib et.al. (2001)  that the inability of the much touted policy rule 
to prevent the economy from entering a deflationary spiral is a critical shortcoming  of the Taylor 
rule as a guide to policy.  In a separate vein, Arestis et.al. (2016)  estimated the monetary policy 
preferences of the EMU and of the UK, showing that policy preferences changed across 
different regimes including where monetary policy violates the Taylor principle by 
accommodating inflationary pressures.      
Starting August 2007, the US FOMC eased monetary policy aggressively in the aftermath of the 
worst financial crisis experienced since the Great Depression, lowering the federal funds rate 
target from 51/4% in September 2007 to 0 to ¼% in December 2008. In the UK, very similar size 
cuts in the Bank rate was undertaken by the UK’s MPC with cuts of 3 percentage points in the 
Bank Rate during 2008 Q4 and a further 11/2 percentage points in early 2009. In early March 2009, 
Bank Rate was reduced to ½%,5 deemed to be a lower bound.  
Other Central banks in the ECB, Canada, China and Switzerland also undertook interest cuts. 
Despite the substantial cuts in the nominal interest rates, the cost of credit to both households 
and businesses rose sharply and substantial credit spreads i.e. wedges between short-term 
nominal interest rates and the rates facing firms and households emerged.  
The failure of the cost of finance to households and businesses to fall despite the sharp easing of 
monetary policy brought to the fore once again the question about what can be done to boost the 
                                                          
4A Taylor rule is a rule for setting of the short-term interest rates in order to achieve a target rate of inflation. The required short-
term interest rate depends on the rate of inflation for the previous period, the extent to which the past inflation rate deviated 
from the target rate of inflation, the extent of the deviation of output from its natural rate and the equilibrium real rate of interest.  
5 The Bank rate was further reduced by the BoE to ¼ % after the Brexit referendum in June 2016. 
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economy when interest rates have fallen to a level below which they cannot be driven by further 
monetary expansion, and of course whether monetary policy (conventional) can be effective at all 
under such circumstance (Krugman, 2008). This view about the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy during a financial crisis dates back to Keynes (1936). However, a few like Mishkin (2008) 
argued that the view that monetary policy is ineffective during a financial crisis is simply wrong, 
but rather it may be necessary to pursue more aggressive monetary policy easing during a crisis 
than normal. 
The question of how policy should be conducted when the zero bound is reached or when the 
likelihood of reaching it can no longer be ignored – raised a number of fundamental issues for 
the conduct of monetary policy. In fact it has been argued that awareness of the possibility of 
hitting the zero bound calls for fundamental changes in the way that policy is conducted even 
when the bound has not yet been reached (Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson and Woodword, 2003). 
With the zero lower bound being reached in the US and UK, the usual official rate could not be 
changed in terms of the appropriate adjustment of an operating target for overnight interest rates. 
The result was that conventional monetary policy had become inadequate in attaining monetary 
policy objective. 
 
1.2.2 Unconventional monetary policy (QE)   
The extent, to which the zero bound represents a genuine constraint on attainable equilibrium 
trajectories for real activity and inflation, is what gives unconventional monetary policy or QE 
traction. The objective of the various LSAP programmes also referred to as QE is to spur 
aggregate economic activity once the possibility of further interest rate cut had been exhausted. 
QE involve the open-market purchases of various kinds of assets especially longer-term assets by 
the central banks which cause an expansion of the monetary base and broad money thus 
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increasing the quantity of money supply. To illustrate the mechanisms of how LSAP works a 
simple balance sheet of all parties involved is depicted. 
 
                                        Figure 1:  Central bank             
 
 
 
                                         
                                       Figure 2 : Commercial bank 
                                  
 
       
 
 
 
                                         
                                   Figure 3: Non-bank private sector 
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Given that the central bank succeeds in its aim of by-passing the banking sector and purchases 
assets solely from the non-bank private sector like the insurance companies and pension funds as 
intended6, as it is believed that these institutions were more likely to use the proceeds of the sales 
to invest in other imperfect substitutes.  
 
By buying assets from the non-bank private sector, the central bank pays for the asset purchased 
by crediting the accounts of the sellers of the assets with their commercial banks through the 
electronic creation of excess reserves for commercial banks. Thus, the central bank expands its 
own balance sheet, with the holdings of gilts marched by reserves (Fig. 1).  The banking sector’s 
balance sheet also expands as the increased holdings of deposits by the non-bank private sector 
are matched against the newly created central bank reserves (Fig.2) The non-bank private sector 
holdings of gilts falls, however, in paying for the gilts or bonds purchased, the central bank 
credits the accounts of the sellers of the asset. QE hence increases their holdings of bank 
deposits, and by implication broad money (Fig.3). It is this set of actions to balance sheets 
engendered by the central bank asset purchases that produces a portfolio rebalancing and so 
begins the monetary transmission process of QE to asset prices and aggregate spending in the 
wider economy. 
 
Seen this way, the QE is remarkably similar to the central bank open-market operations (OMO). 
The distinguish features being the circumstances under which the LSAPs are taking place and 
their scale (Bean, 2009; Sinclair and Ellis (2012). In fact, the policy of purchasing short-term 
treasury bills and expanding the monetary base is exactly what happens when the monetary 
authority conducts an OMO. The main difference is that QE involves a direct injection of a 
                                                          
6 The BoE and Fed asset purchases were aimed at non-banks by being directed at long-term assets mainly Treasuries or gilts with 
maturities initially ranging between 10 and 25 years typically held by financial institutions like pension funds and insurance 
companies. 
22 
  
specified quantity of broad money, rather than influencing its price through variations in the price 
of base money and the purchase of longer-term bonds instead of short-term treasury bills. 
However, both the use of direct (quantity of money supply) and indirect (interest rate) controls of 
monetary policy have their advantages and disadvantages. Direct controls are relatively easily to 
implement and the direct fiscal cost are relatively low. Their appeal derives from circumstances 
where the monetary authorities wish to channel liquidity or credit to meet specific objectives such 
as witnessed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. To the extent that they are effective, direct 
controls may lead to financial repression and disintermediation. If they lead to disintermediation, 
the share of financial holdings over which the monetary authorities can apply monetary control 
decreases, as funds may flow into informal financial markets. By contrast, indirect controls 
encourage intermediation through the formal financial sector. They also permit the monetary 
authorities room for more flexibility in policy implementation. Small, frequent changes in 
instrument settings, enables the monetary authorities respond quickly to correcting policy errors 
or shocks. The main disadvantage of the interest rate control of monetary policy is their 
ineffectiveness or encumbrance at the ZLB. 
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1.3: Motivation for the Research 
The benefits of QE are in general well understood by practitioners and academics. Through QE 
monetary authorities hope to stimulate depressed economies LSAPs, thereby lowering their yields, 
thus diminishing the cost of capital for firms and households and through this, it is expected that 
consumption and investment spending would also increase.  
However, not much has been said about other likely effects of the QE policy. This much was  
acknowledged at the conference on QE and unconventional monetary policy organised in the 
winter of 2011 by the BoE: ‘‘…The second area of concern, and one not covered  in the 
conference, is what might be the costs of unconventional monetary policy… The use of 
unconventional monetary policy may have a number of unintended consequences. This include, 
for example, financial market distortions, exit problems, and the potential loss of central bank 
independence and credibility…These are all contentious issues… For now, while the problems of 
recovery dominate, these issues receive less attention, but as future events unfold the debate is 
likely to shift into these areas.’’ (BoE Quarterly Bulletin 2012Q1:54).  
It suffices from the above, to say that this study is apposite or timely, not only because the QE 
operations have now been tapered or wound up, but also because a comprehensive analysis of 
the potential impact of the LSAPs is necessary, given the possibility of the tool being retained by 
monetary authorities to achieve their objectives, before interest rates rise to levels normally seen 
during an economic boom or recovery. This study is also motivated by the need to empirically 
establish the financial markets, particularly, the equity market reaction function to the QE actions 
and operations. Hence it evaluates the first of three potential consequences or effects of the QE 
policy identified above i.e. financial market distortions. 
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1.4: Research Objectives  
This study is an empirical investigation of the effects of QE on the financial markets. Specifically 
it focuses on the QE operations implemented in the the US and UK and the effects of these on 
the equity and bond markets in the US and the UK and on other equity markets in countries that 
did not implement such QE measure at the time, e.g. France and Germany; or at all e.g. Australia. 
The main objectives are: 
1. To examine the effect of QE on the equity market returns and volatility in the UK, US 
and other equity markets outside the UK and US. 
2. To investigate the impact of the actual bond purchases or QE by the BoE and Fed on the 
covariance between the US and UK equity markets on the one hand, and the covariance 
between the stock and bond markets within the US and within the UK on the other. 
3. Ascertain the implication (if any) of QE for the long-term relationship between the equity 
markets of the US, UK and the Euro-area. 
To achieve the above research objectives, several empirical analyses using econometric 
techniques and models including univariate GARCH models, multivariate DVECH models, 
vector auto-regression (VAR) estimation, multivariate cointegration and error correction models 
(ECMs), unit root tests, and causality tests are utilised.  
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 1.5: Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter two provides an exhaustive review of the empirical literature on QE. It starts with a look 
at the transmission channels or mechanisms of QE especially the portfolio balance channel 
which underpins this study. This chapter also provides a catalogue of the QE actions by the Bank 
of England and the US Federal Reserve Bank. Then follows a comprehensive review of the 
existing literature of empirical studies of the US QE operations, the UK QE operations and the 
macroeconomic impacts of the QE operations, which helps situate or position the current study 
in the gap found in this literature. Further review of empirical studies based on the segmentation 
versus the expectation views of QE was also carried out in this chapter. 
Chapter three begins the empirical chapters of this thesis by looking at the effect of QE on the 
equity markets. The chapter developed some hypotheses and discussed the empirical and the data 
used for the analyses in it. This chapter also presents some descriptive statistics of the equity 
return dataset as well as the cross-sectional distribution of the different phases of the QE 
operations in both the UK and the US before the empirical results of the analysis carried out. 
Chapter extends the analyses to a multivariate setting incorporating the bond markets in the UK 
and US thus providing the empirical results to the second research objective on the effect of QE 
on the covariance structure between and within the UK and US financial markets. 
Chapter five reports the empirical results for the third study on the implications of QE for long-
run equity market relationship or cointegration focusing on the equity markets in the US,UK, 
France and Germany.  
Chapter six concludes this thesis by providing a summary of the main findings, articulating the 
central contributions of this research to knowledge and other relevant stakeholders such as 
financial market investors and the monetary authorities before discussing the limitation of the 
thesis and suggesting an area for further research.   
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                                   Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This review chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the transmission channels 
linking QE from the financial markets to the macro economy. In particular, this section explains 
how LSAPs may reduce yields (first leg of the transmission), and how this then pass through to 
the real economy via reduced cost of capital and increased spending (second leg of the 
transmission); within this section also is a brief look at the theories of the term structure of 
interest supporting the transmission channels. Section 2.2 catalogues QE experiences and 
operations, starting with the earlier Japanese (BOJ) experience of the early 2000s and including 
the recent BoE, the Fed and the ECB QE operations. A comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature on the effects of the QE programmes on the yields in the bond markets in the U.S. and 
U.K. follows in section 2.3 while the empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of QE are 
reviewed in 2.4. Section 2.5 looks at further evidence on the segmentation vs expectation 
perspectives to quantitative easing efficacy, while section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2: Transmission Channels of QE 
 As stated previously, the aim of QE is to inject money into the economy in order to stimulate 
nominal spending. As highlighted  through the various balance sheet transactions in the 
preceding chapter, when the monetary authority buys these assets creating new base money or 
reserves for commercial banks,  it simultaneously also boost the amount of deposits (broad 
money) held by the non-bank private sector which include households and firms. This additional 
money working through a number of channels (see Figure 4 for a schematic representation of the 
QE transmission channels) should then all things being equal, affect the level of spending and 
income in the economy. The channels through which the effect of QE gets transmitted are the 
preoccupation of this section. Three channels: portfolio rebalance, policy signalling and liquidity 
are discussed. 
 
Figure 4 : Stylised transmission mechanism for QE 
 
Source:  Adapted from BoE 
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2.2.1 Portfolio balance Channel 
The nature of the portfolio balance mechanism was first articulated by Tobin (1958), in a work 
on portfolio allocation, where he stated that a range of assets, in addition to money are likely to 
be imperfect substitutes for one another. Viewed this way, an expansion of one asset’s supply 
affects both the yield on that asset and alternative assets (Tobin 1958, 1961, 1963). The insight 
offered by this argument is that by varying the relative quantities of financial claims with different 
maturity, monetary authorities could be able to influence the pattern of yields on different assets 
due to their imperfect substitutability. At the time, Tobin had long pushed the view that different 
securities should be treated differently, but macroeconomic modelling tended not to follow up 
the implications of imperfect substitution between assets, with notable exceptions including 
Brunner and Meltzer (1973) and Friedman (1976). This probably reflected the convenience of the 
perfect-substitute baseline, where all nonmonetary assets and debts are taken to be perfect 
substitutes at a common interest rate (Andre’s et.al. 2004) 
Monetary policy discussions in recent years especially following the Japanese banking crisis of the 
late 1990s to early 2000s have given the issue a prominence absent at the time the view was first 
canvassed. The possibility that short and long-term securities are imperfect substitutes 
subsequently became an issue in monetary policy discussion. For instance, in a speech on 
November 21, 2002, FOMC member Ben Bernanke considered the channels for monetary 
expansion available to the Fed beyond lowering the policy rate when he observed:  
‘One relatively straightforward extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by lowering 
rates further out along the Treasury term structure-that is, rates on government bonds at longer maturities.’’  
 
This would appear an agreement with Tobin (1969) central theme that the influence of central 
bank actions on aggregate demand cannot be summarised by a single yield, the short term interest 
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rate, but are reflected in a variety of asset yields. That assertion, in principle rests on a model 
where different securities are imperfect substitutes for one another.  
 
A notable recent work7 on the theoretical underpinnings of the portfolio rebalance channel is 
Vayanos and Villa (2009) which model the term structure of interest rates as resulting from the 
interaction between investors clienteles with preferences for specific maturities (preferred habitat) 
and risk-averse arbitrageurs. Because arbitrageurs are risk averse, shocks to clienteles’ demand for 
bonds affect the term structure and constitute an additional determinant of bond prices to 
current and expected future short rates. The position that longer term yields depend in part on 
the relative quantities outstanding of longer term assets in the hands of the private sector was the 
subject of a substantial literature in the 1950s and the 1960s (Culbertson, 1957; Modigliani and 
Sutch, 1966).   
 
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure (Lutz, 1941) however assumes that current and 
expected yields of short-term bonds determine the yields of long-term bonds, while the supplies 
of the bonds do not affect yields. This theory is based on the view that when the expected return 
of one asset is higher than that of another asset, investors will trade those assets to make a profit. 
In other words, short-term and long-term bonds are perfect substitutes for one another. With 
perfect substitution, the relative supplies of the assets do not matter because they do not affect 
the current short rate or future expectations of short rate and a reduction in the supply of the 
bonds does not affect the yield on the bond. 
 
                                                          
7 Earlier work by Andres et.al. (2004) confirm that some of the observed deviations of long-term rates from the expectations 
theory of the term structure can be traced to movements in the relative stocks of financial assets, just as claimed by Tobin (1969). 
Thus providing support for the existence of unconventional or quantitative channels of monetary policy.  
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Once a role for imperfect substitutability is accepted, the efficacy of portfolio rebalancing then 
hinges on the degree of substitutability between assets. Hence, it is likely to be greater the less 
substitutable money is for bonds and the more substitutable (relative to money) risky assets are 
for bonds. Central bank asset purchases through this channel then push up the prices of the 
assets bought as well as the prices of other assets that are imperfect substitutes. Higher asset 
prices mean lower yields and lower cost of capital for firms and households, which act to 
stimulate investment and consumption spending. Cheaper and easier access to capital not only 
helps to maintain output but also improves the prospect for full employment. 
The portfolio rebalance channel is commonly broken down into a local supply or scarcity effect 
and a duration effect. The local supply effect is anchored on segmentation in the bonds market 
and captures the impact of a shift in the quantities of specific maturities of government debt held 
by private agents. For example, for investors like pension funds, selling gilts to the central bank 
moves them away from their preferred habitat or segment in the maturity structure. Such a 
scarcity effect may be spread over time and it could be manifested in bond rates for a particular 
maturity.   
The duration effect captures how LSAP may also affect asset prices by altering the aggregate 
amount of the interest rate risk in bond markets. The prices of fixed income assets, such as 
government bonds, are affected by future movements in the interest rates, the extent of which is 
termed duration. Investors would demand a term premium to compensate them for exposure to 
this kind of risk.  With central bank purchases of long-duration assets, it reduces the aggregate 
amount of duration risk that is left in the market that needs to be borne by the private investor. 
As a result, the compensation required by investors to hold all remaining bonds carrying duration 
risk falls, putting downward pressure on longer-term interest rates. 
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2.2.2 Policy Signal Channel  
Another channel through which asset purchases may influence longer-term interest rates is 
through the information revealed about the likely trajectory of future monetary policy. The 
signalling or expectation effect as it also called captures the changes in the expected path of 
future short-term rates that arise from perceived new information that central bank asset 
purchases might convey to economic agents about the state of the economy and the monetary 
authority’s reaction function or policy objectives such as inflation targeting.  
Proponents of the policy signalling or the expectations channel such as Krugman (1998) posit 
that with nominal interest rates at the zero bound, the only way to reduce real rates further is to 
generate an increase in inflation expectations. In order to create expectations of higher inflation, 
the central bank must be deemed credible by agents to the commitment of allowing a looser 
monetary policy than would normally be the case. A looser monetary policy will lead to inflation 
being above target in the future and so the optimal policy response to the zero lower bound 
involves a commitment to overshoot the inflation target in the future in order to avoid an even 
greater undershoot today. This in turn would enhance current spending enabling the economy to 
avoid entering into a ‘black hole’ (depression).  
 
Expectations help to achieve this goal if the central bank or monetary authority signals that it 
intends policy rates to remain lower for an extended or longer period, based on its assessment of 
the economic outlook. In such situation, investors or agents may alter their expectations of the 
future path of the policy rate and by such a signalling channel, announcements of LSAPs would 
lower the expectations component of long-term yields.  
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2.2.3 Liquidity Channel 
Added to the portfolio rebalance and signalling channels is a third channel, the liquidity channel. 
This channel may operate at times of financial market stress and relates to the beneficial market 
effects that LSAPs by the central bank may have in times of significant financial market strains by 
providing market liquidity. In early phase of the financial crisis, central banks focused on 
providing liquidity through various liquidity support measures. There may also be effects on the 
prices and hence yields of longer-term assets if the presence of the central bank as a consistent 
and significant buyer in the markets improves market functioning and liquidity.  
By standing as a ready buyer for longer-term assets, LSAPs by the central bank should allay fears 
in the minds of investor, allowing them to take larger positions in these securities or make 
markets in them more functional, since they are assured of being able to sell the assets without 
incurring a discount on their prices to the central bank. Such improved trading opportunities 
engendered by the presence of the central bank could reduce the liquidity risk premiums 
embedded in asset prices, thereby lowering their yields. This liquidity channel would appear to 
have been important in the early stages of the LSAPs programme and when financial markets are 
impaired or dysfunctional, though the effect may be small in gilt markets, which are normally 
highly liquid, a view supported by the BoE: 
‘The MPC’s asset purchase programme was directed towards large-scale purchases of conventional gilts. The 
impact was expected to be seen in gilt markets, but also across a broader range of asset prices and in real activity 
and inflation. The MPC did not explicitly use these purchases to signal future intentions, emphasising its 
commitment to meeting the inflation target through the usual channels of monetary policy communications – 
including the MPC minutes and the quarterly Inflation Report. Nor were its actions focused on improving the 
functioning of gilt markets where liquidity premium, even in stressed times, were considered to be small’. (Joyce et.al. 
2010:8).  
 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that the three channels discussed in this section are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, and may in fact work simultaneously. This is especially true for 
the portfolio rebalance and policy signalling channels (Bauer and Rudebusch 2013). 
33 
  
2.3:  The QE Operations: A Review 
The phrase QE was coined and first applied to the Japanese liquidity trap. A liquidity trap can be 
described as a situation in which conventional monetary policy have become ineffective, due to 
the nominal rate of interest being near or at zero and injecting monetary base into the economy 
will have no effect, if private agents see base money and bonds as perfect substitutes. It is on this 
fundamental distinction i.e. the imperfect substitutability between financial assets that the 
portfolio balancing mechanism of QE rests.   
Following the bust of an asset price bubble in the early 1990s, the Japanese economy witnessed 
prolonged stagnation  and general prices measured by the consumer price index (CPI) steadily 
reduced in growth rate. With the bleak economic outlook, and hovering deflationary spiral, as a 
result of the bust of the global IT (dotcom) bubble, the BOJ on the 19th of March 2001, adopted 
a new monetary easing framework-the Quantitative Easing Program (QEP), with a view to 
stemming the continuous decline in the general price level and also engendering sustainable 
economic growth.  
In its announcement of 19 March 2001- universally cited by commentators as the first time a 
policy called QE was implemented by a central bank-The BOJ announced a high target of bank 
reserves held with central bank, which would be achieved by purchasing more government bonds 
(BOJ, 2001b). The QEP under the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) - a policy hitherto 
unprecedented worldwide- implemented by the BOJ from 2001 to 2006 centred on three main 
pillars: 
(i) To change the main operating target for money market operations from the 
uncollateralised overnight call rate to the outstanding current account balances (CABs) 
held by financial institutions at the BOJ, and provide ample liquidity to realise a CAB 
target substantially in excess of the required reserves. 
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(ii) To make the commitment that the ample liquidity provision would continue to stay in 
place until the core consumer price index (excluding perishables) registers stably at zero 
percent or an increase year on year. 
(iii)  To increase the amount of outright purchases of long-term Japanese government bonds 
(JGBs), up to a ceiling of the outstanding balance of banknotes issued, should the BOJ 
consider such an increase to be necessary for providing liquidity smoothly. 
 
With the transition to the QEP in March 2001, the CAB target became five trillion yen, a level 
higher than the required reserve level of four trillion yen. The target was subsequently raised in 
response to the deteriorating economic conditions to 30-35 trillion yen in January 2004, and 
remained at this level until the BOJ exited the QEP. In order to meet the targeted CABs, the 
BOJ steadily increased its purchases of long-term JGBs from an initial 400 billion yen per month 
to 1,200 billion per month starting from October 2002. As of the end of 2005, the BOJ had 
expanded the monetary base to about 117 trillion yen (Ugai, 2007).  Also from July 2003 to 
March 2006, as a limited time measure, the BOJ purchased asset-backed securities intended to 
support the development of the asset-backed securities market. 
 
The core CPI growth turned positive from November 2005, and the rate for January 2006 
announced in early March was   ½%. On March 9, 2006, the BOJ stated that the year-on-year 
growth in the core CPI is expected to remain positive, and judged that the conditions laid out in 
the commitment under the QEP had been fulfilled. Consequently, the BOJ exited the QEP and 
decided to change the operating target of money market operations back to the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate, and to encourage the rate to remain at effectively zero percent8.  
                                                          
8 See Ugai (2007) for a survey of the empirical evidence of the BOJ QEP. 
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As part of the response to the intensification of the financial crisis, towards the end of 2008, the 
Fed and the BoE also deemed it necessary to ease monetary conditions further through a 
programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves. This programme 
has been referred to as LSAPs or credit easing9 (Fed) and QE (BoE) in reference to prior BOJ 
policy. The remainder of this section catalogues the QE operations of the BoE, the Fed as part 
of their policy responses to the financial crisis. 
 
2.3.1 U.S. LSAP Operations 
In response to the great recession, the FOMC started cutting the federal funds rate on the 18th of 
September 2007, from an initial 5.25 per cent target. While it cut rates rapidly by historical 
standards, the Fed did not signal any great sense of urgency. It was not until April 30, 2008, that 
the target funds rate got down to 2 percent, where the FOMC decided to keep it while awaiting 
further developments. The Fed neither expanded its balance sheet nor did it increase bank 
reserves during this period (Blinder, 2010). The FOMC began cutting interest rates again six 
months later at its October 10th 2008 meeting following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Not 
only did the FOMC push the funds rate to its floor (zero), it also started expanding its balance 
sheet, bank reserves and lending operations (Blinder, 2010).  
 
In the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Fed’s non-standard 
measures aimed at repairing the functioning of financial markets, can be divided into three 
categories: (i) lending to financial institutions, (ii) providing liquidity to key credit markets, and (iii) 
large-scale asset purchase program (LSAP). Latterly, the second round of quantitative easing by 
the Fed, which started in the second half of 2010, focused mainly on purchases of US Treasury 
                                                          
9  Former Fed’s Chairman Bernanke tried to call the Fed’s new policies credit easing, probably to differentiate them from the 
actions taken by the BOJ earlier in the decade, but the label did not stick. He defined credit easing to encompass all Fed 
operations to extend credit or purchase securities.  
36 
  
securities, with the primary goal of stimulating the US economy by lowering yields, and pushing 
up asset prices in riskier market segments thereby inducing positive wealth effects. 
  
Unlike the third category of measures implemented by the Fed in its first round of support, the 
other two categories were intended to provide liquidity to key credit markets, and to reduce 
funding pressures. Under these measures, the Fed established the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper, Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, 
and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility. The aim of these facilities was to avoid fire-
sales of assets by providing liquidity backstop to financial institutions. These categories of the 
Fed measures can be associated with the central bank’s lender of last resort role (Bernanke, 2009). 
These policies therefore have a different impact on the economy than the Fed’s third policy tool, 
the LSAP. The overall LSAP composed of asset purchases of government sponsored enterprises 
(GSE) debts, mortgaged back securities (MBS) and, in a later stage of US Treasury bonds. While 
the MBS purchase was done with the intention of lowering mortgage interest rates and stabilizing 
the housing markets, the ultimate goal of the Treasury purchases was to stimulate economic 
activity by lowering long term rates to support investment spending, and boosting asset prices to 
stimulate demand.  
 
The decision by the Federal Reserve to purchase large volumes of asset came in November 2008, 
when the Fed announced purchases of housing agency debt and agency mortgage-back securities 
(MBS) of $600 billion. Then in March 2009, the FOMC decided to increase the purchases of 
agency-related securities and to also purchase longer-dated Treasury securities of up to $1.75 
trillion (Gagnon.et.al. 2010). The FOMC later on in 2009 committed to purchase the full 
$1.25trillion of agency MBS explaining that the phase of purchases later termed QE1 would be 
round up in March 2010.  
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While market liquidity had normalised by the end of 2010 (Kandrac, 2015), the slow pace of 
economic recovery made the FOMC to announce an additional LSAP program termed QE2-
consisting solely of  US Treasury bond purchases. In September of 2011 (three months after the 
QE2 ended), the FOMC announced additional balance sheet actions to help stimulate the US 
economy. The FOMC first decided to extend the average maturity of its Treasury securities 
holding a policy it called the maturity extension program (MEP) or also referred to as ‘operation 
twist’. After this the FOMC then decided to reinvest principal repayments from its holdings of 
agency MBS and agency debt into agency MBS, a policy aimed at supporting conditions in the 
mortgage markets, but also would help to achieve the aim of supporting a stronger economic 
recovery.  
 
In September 2012, the FOMC decided to purchase an additional $40 billion of agency MBS 
monthly and to continue with these monthly purchases if the outlook for the labour market did 
not improve substantially. Three months later, the FOMC announced additional outright 
purchases of Treasury securities at a monthly pace of $45 billion per month to continue after the 
MEP. These additional treasury purchases later became known as QE3 which continued until 
October 2014 when the QE operations were wound up in the US. The implementation of the 
Fed’s LSAPs was carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) under 
delegated authority from the FOMC. To the extent possible, the operations by the FRBNY were 
scheduled to avoid conflicting with other operations or market, and events, such as Treasury debt 
auctions, agency offerings significant planned economic news releases 10 . In general, the 
composition of purchases was skewed in favour of longer-maturity securities. A summary of the 
Fed’s QE actions is shown in Table 1  
 
                                                          
10 Summaries for agency & Treasury purchases are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo/display/index.cfm. 
Summaries for agency purchases are available  at  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo/display/index.cfm?opertype=agny. 
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Table 1: List of Federal Reserve’s LSAPs (QE) actions. 
Date                      Description of the event 
QE1                                                     
25/11/2008 
 
Initial LSAP announcement. The Fed announces purchases of $100 billion in GSE debt and up 
to$500 billion in MBS 
Creation of the Term Asset-Backed Security Loan Facility (TALF) 
01/12/2008 
 
Chairman Bernanke says that Fed could purchase substantial long-term Treasuries 
16/12/2008 The FOMC mentions possible purchases of longer-term Treasury securities. Also the Fed funds rate 
reduced to the range 0-0.25 
28/01/2009 FOMC says that it is ready to expand agency debt and MBS purchases, as well as to purchase long-
term Treasuries. 
 
 
18/03/2009 
 
FOMC says it will purchase an additional $750 billion in agency MBS, increase its purchases of 
agency debt by up to $100 billion, and buy up to $300 billion in long-term Treasuries. 
 
12/08/2009 
 
The FOMC states that  the Fed will slow the pace of the LSAP by purchasing the full amount by the 
end of  October instead of mid-September  
23/09/2009 
 
 The Fed will slow the purchases of agency MBS and agency debt, finishing the purchases by the 
end of 2010Q1. Treasury purchases will still run till October 2009. 
04/11/2009 The amount of agency debt will be halted at $175 billion, instead of $200 billion. 
QE2                                                        
 
10/08/2010 
 
The FOMC states that it will reinvest principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgaged-
backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities. Holdings of Treasury securities will be rolled 
over as they mature.  
27/08/2010 Chairman Bernanke mentions potential policy options for further easing and suggests that the 
FOMC is likely to buy longer-term securities. 
 
21/09/2010 FOMC states that the Federal Reserve will continue to roll over its holdings of Treasury securities as 
they mature. 
 
15/10/2010 
 
Chairman Bernanke states that the Fed is prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed 
to support the economic recovery. 
 
03/11/2010 
States its intention to purchase $600 billion more in longer-term Treasury securities by the end of 
second quarter of 2011, at a pace of about $75 billion per month. 
 
22/06/2011 QE2 ends with Treasury purchases to be wrapped at the end of month, as scheduled; principal 
payments will continue to be reinvested. 
Operation 
Twist 
 
21/9/2011 Maturity Extension Program i.e. operation twist announced: The Fed will purchase $400 billion of 
Treasuries with remaining maturities of 6 to 30 years and sell an equal amount with remaining 
maturities of 3 years or less 
20/06/2012 Operation Twist extended as the Fed will continue to purchase long-term securities and sell short-
term securities through the end of 2012. Purchases/sales will continue at the current pace, about 
$45 billion monthly. 
QE3  
22/8/2012 FOMC states that additional monetary accommodation likely fairly soon  
13/9/2012 QE3 announced: The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per month as long as the outlook for 
the labour market does not improve substantially in the context of price stability. 
12/12/2012 QE3 expanded: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion of long-term Treasuries per month 
but will no longer sterilize purchases through the sale of short-term Treasuries. 
15/10/2014  Announcing the decision on QE, made at its October policy meeting, Fed Chair Janet Yellen, said 
the final tranche of bonds under its QE programme would be bought this month-ending the QEP. 
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2.3.2 U.K. QE Operation  
In March 2009, the BoE MPC announced the start of its asset purchase programme at the same 
time as it reduced Bank Rate to 0.5%. Prior to this, the Asset Purchase Facility Fund was set up 
on the 29th of January 2009 as a subsidiary of the Bank of England, under a remit from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the initial objective of improving the liquidity of the corporate 
credit market by being used as a vehicle for purchases of high-quality private sector assets. The 
fund is fully indemnified by the treasury from any losses arising out of or in connection with the 
Asset Purchase Facility (APF), The APF was mandated to purchase up to £50 billion of private 
sector assets comprising corporate bonds and commercial paper –financed by the issuance of 
Treasury bills and Debt Management Office (DMO) cash management operations with the first 
purchase of commercial paper on the 13th of February 2009. 
 
The APF’s remit was further expanded ahead of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), meeting 
on March 5th 2009, to be used to purchase a range of eligible assets. In order to meet the 
Committee’s asset purchases objectives, the BoE announced it would buy private and public 
assets, but that it was likely that the majority of overall purchases would be of gilts. The 
purchases of gilts were initially restricted to conventional gilts with a residual maturity between 5 
and 25 years. Further extensions of the programme were subsequently announced at the 7th May, 
6th August and 5th November 2009 MPC meetings which resulted in the increases of £125 billion, 
£175 billion and £200 billion respectively for the (QE 1) operation. At the August MPC meeting 
the maturity range of gilts purchases was extended to three years and over. By February 2010, 
when the MPC announced that it would pause its programme of purchases, the Bank had made 
£200 billion of asset purchases, of which £198 billion were gilts spread across a wide range of 
maturities. 
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However, as the financial crisis worsened, with increasing concerns over the competitiveness and 
macroeconomic imbalances of some economies within the Euro-area, the medium-term outlook 
for the UK deteriorated and the risk of undershooting the 2% medium term CPI inflation target 
in the medium term heightened. Given these scenarios, between October 2011 and May 2012 the 
BoE purchased an additional £125 billion of gilts (QE2). After a brief halt in purchases, in July 
2012 the MPC announced a further £50 billion of gilt purchases to run till November 2012 
(QE3). In the March 2013 remit for the MPC, the chancellor confirmed that the APF, will 
remain in place for the financial year 2013-2014. Cumulatively, the £375 billion of asset 
purchases represent about 25 per cent of annual GDP and measured in terms of face-value. 
Table present a summary of the BoE APF and QE related actions. 
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Table 2: The BoE APF and QE-related actions 
Date                      Description of the event  
19/01/2009 The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces that the BoE will set up an asset purchase programme 
(initially to be financed using Treasury Bills and the DMO’s cash management operations). 
      
30/01/2009 APF Fund established.                         
5/02/2009 Bank rate reduced from 1.5 to 1 per cent. 
11/02/2009 February Inflation Report and associated press conference gives strong indication that QE asset 
purchases are likely. 
 
13/02/2009 First purchases of commercial paper begin. 
QE1  
5/03/2009 Bank Rate reduced from 1 to 0.5 per cent. The MPC announces it will purchase £75 billion of assets 
over 3 months funded by the issue of central bank money. Conventional gilts likely to constitute the 
majority of purchases. Purchases split between two auction maturity sectors for gilts with remaining 
maturities of: (a) 5–10 years (b) 10–25 years   
 
11/03/2009 First purchases of gilts begin.    
 
25/03/2009 First purchases of corporate bonds begin.    
7/05/2009 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £125 billion. 
 
3/08/2009 Secured commercial paper facility launched. 
 
6/08/2009 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £175 billion. The 
buying range is to be extended to all conventional gilts greater than 3 years. Purchases split between 
three auction maturity sectors: (a) 3–10 years (b) 10–25 years (c) Greater than 25 years. The Bank 
announces a gilt lending programme, which allows   counterparties to borrow gilts from the APF’s 
portfolio via the DMO in return for a fee and alternative gilts as collateral. 
 
5/11/2009 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended by £25 billion to £200 billion. 
 
22/11/2009 The Bank announces that it will act as a seller, as well as a buyer, of corporate bonds in the secondary 
market. 
 
8/01/2010 First sales of corporate bonds 
4/02/2010 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be maintained at £200 billion. The Chancellor 
authorizes the Bank to continue to transact in private-sector assets, with further purchases financed 
by issuance of Treasury Bills. The MPC’s press statement says that the Committee will continue to 
monitor the appropriate scale of the asset purchase programme and that further purchases will be 
made should the outlook warrant them. 
 
QE2 
 
 
6/11/2011 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended by £75 billion to £275 billion. 
 
9/02/2012 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £325 billion. The 
three auction maturity ranges are changed to gilts with remaining maturities of: (a) 3–7 years  (b) 7–15 
years (c) Greater than 15 years 
 
10/05/2012 The MPC announces that QE asset purchases will be maintained at £325 billion. 
 
QE3 
 
 
5/07/2012 The MPC announces that the QE asset purchases will be extended by £50 billion to £375 billion. 
4/08/2016  The MPC voted to reduce the Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% following the Brexit referendum. 
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2.3.3 ECB Enhanced Credit Support Program 
The ECB avoided the QE and CE (credit easing) labels, and has termed its approach which was 
anchored on ample liquidity provision to Eurozone banks-enhanced credit support (Trichet, 
2009a). With deteriorating financial conditions in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the 3-
month Euribor/overnight indexed swap (OIS) spread widened, hitting an all-time high of 198 
basis points reflecting the huge rise in perceived counterparty risk (Fowey and Neely, 2013).  The 
ECB responded to these widened spreads on the 15th of October 2008, stating that it would lend 
as much as banks wanted at a fixed-rate tender provided the banks had collateral-while it also 
expanded the list of eligible collateral. These fixed-rate tender, full-allotment (FRFA) operations 
reversed the ECB’s conventional policy of offering a fixed allotment of funds at rates determined 
by the bidding process. 
 
The ECB at the early stages of the crisis appeared relatively more sanguine about the economic 
outlook. Hence it had focused on liquidity support for struggling banks much more than on 
stimulating demand through rate cuts or QE. More importantly, the nonfinancial private sector in 
the Eurozone relies much more on the banking system for credit than on the securities markets, 
and the ECB’s efforts have appropriately focused on ensuring the banks are strong and have 
adequate resources to lend. The ECB implemented the FRFA liquidity provision through its 
usual lending procedures.  
 
The ECB’s primary policy instrument in the normal times, is refinancing operations, direct 
lending to banks against eligible collateral at two maturities. The main refinancing operations 
(MROs) with a duration of two weeks and the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with 
a duration of three months. Under the new policy, the ECB filled all MRO and LTRO loan 
requests at the ECB’s primary policy rate, i.e. the main refinancing rate. From October 2008 to 
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May 2009, the ECB cut this rate from 4.25% to 1%. Even the generous supply of FRFA loans at 
low rates by the ECB did not allay fears over counterparty risk, and this continued to plague 
European interbank markets. On May 7, 2009, after reducing its main refinancing rate to 1%, the 
ECB introduced the 12-month LTROs and the covered bond purchase program11 (CBPP). The 
ECB committed to purchase 60 billion euros in covered bonds. The president of the ECB at the 
time, Jean-Claude Trichet, insisted that the program was not QE and would not expand the 
ECB’s balance sheet. Stating that he expected automatic sterilisation as the CBPP would 
commensurately decrease the demand for the elastically supplied LTROs. 
 
However, in May 2010, following the escalating sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone, the 
ECB announced the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), allowing the ECB purchase 
government debt in the secondary market. The ECB explained that the motives for the SMP 
program was to ensure depth and liquidity in the dysfunctional segments of the market, with the 
objective of the SMP to address the malfunctioning of securities markets. 
 
Starting from March 2016, the ECB started an expanded asset purchase programme, under which 
private and public sector securities are purchased to address the risks of a too prolonged period 
of low inflation. This APP was preceded by the cutting of the interest rates i.e. the marginal 
lending facility to 0.25%; the main refinancing operations (fixed rate) to 0% and the deposit 
facility to -0.40%. Table 3 is a summary of important ECB’s actions in response to the financial 
crisis and its aftermaths.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11 In the event of a bond default, covered bond holders have recourse to the issuer of the bond, as well as the underlying collateral 
pool hence why they are called ‘covered’. 
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Table 3: A Timeline of the ECB ECS Programme 
Date Program                      Description of the event  
28/3/2008 Long-term refinancing 
operations(LTRO) 
LTRO expanded: 6-month LTROs are 
announced. 
      
15/10/2008 Fixed-rate tender full allotment (FRFA) Refinancing operations expanded: All 
operations will be conducted with fixed-rate 
tenders and full allotment; the list of assets 
eligible as collateral in credit operations with 
the bank is expanded to include lower-rated 
(with the exception of asset-backed securities) 
and non-euro-denominated assets. 
7/5/2009 Covered bond purchase 
program(CBPP)/LTRO 
CBPP announced/LTRO expanded: The ECB 
will purchase 60 billion euros in euro-
denominated covered bonds; 12-month 
LTROs are announced. 
 
ECB lowers the main refinancing rate by 
0.25% to 1% and the rate on the marginal 
lending facility by 0.50% to 1.75%. 
 
10/5/2010 Securities markets program (SMP) SMP announced: the ECB will conduct 
interventions in the euro area public and 
private debt securities markets; purchases will 
be sterilised. 
30/6/2010 CBPP CBPP finished: Purchases finish on schedule; 
bonds purchased will be held through maturity.   
 
6/10/2011 CBPP2 CBPP2 announced: The ECB will purchase 40 
billion euros in euro-denominated covered 
bonds.    
 
8/12/2011 LTRO LTRO expanded: 36-month LTROs are 
announced; eligible collateral is expanded. 
 
2/8/2012 Outright monetary transactions (OMT) The ECB President Mario Draghi indicates 
that the ECB will expand sovereign debt 
purchases.  
 
6/9/2012 OMT OMTs announced: Countries that apply to the 
European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) for 
aid and abide by the ESM’s terms and 
conditions will be eligible to have their debt 
purchased in unlimited amounts on the 
secondary markets by the ECB. 
 
16/03/2016 Expanded asset purchase programme 
(APP) 
The ECB embarked on an APP to address the 
risks of a too prolonged period of low 
inflation. The APP are intended to be carried 
out until the end of 2017 and in any case until 
the Governing Council sees a sustained 
adjustment in the part of inflation that is 
consistent with its aim of close to 2%. 
45 
  
2.4. Review of Empirical Studies of the Effects of QE Operations 
 This section reviews the empirical literature on the effects of QE operations mainly within the 
U.S. and the U.K. The empirical studies have mostly examined the immediate impact of the 
LSAPs on yields in the bond markets. While a few others have focused on the effect of QE on 
the macro-economy indicators of the GDP and CPI in the US, and the UK. 
 
2.4.1 Review of Studies of the U.S. QE Operation 
Gagnon et.al. (2011) using event studies12 based on LSAPs announcement dates regressed the 10-
year yield term premium on the supply of government bonds, unemployment gap, core consumer 
price index (CPI) inflation found that the Fed’s first round LSAPs of $600 billion reduced term 
premium on the 10-year government bond by 30-82 basis points (bps). They conclude that the 
Fed’s LSAPs led to economically meaningful and long lasting reductions in longer-term interest 
on a range of securities such as Treasuries, agency mortgage-backed securities, and even securities 
not included in the LSAPs, which they believed was due to lower risk premiums including term 
premiums, rather than expectations of future short term interest rates. 
 
Investigating the local supply effect using the 2009 Federal Reserve’s $300 billion purchase of 
nominal Treasury coupon securities, D’Amico and King (2010) estimated a significant local 
supply effect in the Treasury term structure: the yield on a given security fell in response to 
purchases of that security as well as securities of similar maturities. Their results indicate that the 
local-supply effects of the LSAP as a whole shifted the yield curve down by about 30bp. They 
also argued that on the days when a security was eligible to be brought, purchases of securities 
with similar maturities had almost as large effects on its yield as did purchases of the security 
                                                          
12 Event study assumes that all changes in the variable of interest that occur within a short time period are due to the event under 
consideration. The event study literature largely follows Cook and Hahn (1989). Their work has been followed by a large number 
of papers applying a similar approach to various asset prices, including Bomﬁm (2003), Bomﬁm and Reinhart (2000), Cochrane 
and Piazzesi (2002), Kuttner (2001), Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), Roley and Sellon (1996, 1998), Thorbecke (1997),and 
Thornton (1998). 
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itself. This supports the view that Treasuries of similar maturities are close substitutes but that 
substitutability diminishes as maturities get farther apart which is consistent with the imperfect 
substitutability principle of the portfolio rebalance channel and the preferred habitat-theory of 
term structure.  
 
Also providing additional empirical evidence in support of the preferred-habitat theory and 
portfolio rebalancing channel is Doh (2010), who tried to unravel the quick reversion of the 10-
year Treasury yield to its pre-announcement level in only five weeks. His regression results 
suggest that the Fed’s LSAPs reduced the 10-year Treasury yield via the reduction in term 
premium, as implied by the preferred-habitat theory. Other important contributions on the 
effects of the Fed’s LSAPs in support of portfolio rebalancing and preferred habitat assumption 
include Hamilton and Wu (2011), Swanson (2011), and Neely (2012) who investigated the impact 
of the U.S. QE1 on foreign 10-year government bond rates. He submitted that the U.S. asset 
purchase announcements had significant impacts on the international long-term rates with falls of 
78, 65, 54, 50, and 19bps in Australia, U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan, respectively while also 
reducing the spot value of the dollar.  
 
However, a few others presented a different picture, emphasizing the importance of the signalling 
channel or the expectation hypothesis in the Fed LSAPs. For example, Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), using an event study methodology to evaluate the effect of the Fed’s 
LSAPs between 2008-2009 (QE1) and 2010-2011 (QE2) on interest rates found significant 
evidence for the signalling channel which drove down the yields (with larger effects on 
intermediate than long-term bond) for both the QE1 and QE2. This led them to question 
whether the Fed could have achieved the economic recovery without the Fed taking on 
additional balance sheet risk.  
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Providing evidence in support of both the signalling and portfolio rebalancing channels for the 
Fed’s first LSAPs program (QE1), are Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) who used an estimated 
dynamic term structure model (DTSM) to decompose the fall in long term (the 5-year and 10-
year) Treasury yields into changes in expected future policy rates, and changes in term premium 
components. They found that cumulatively, the 10-year yield decreased by 89bps, while the 5-
year yield decreased even more strongly by 97bps. For the 5-year yield, the relative contributions 
of expectations and term premium components are 32 percent and 68 percent, respectively. For 
the 10-year yield, the contributions are 35 and 65 percent, respectively for the expectations and 
term premium components.  
 
Other notable contributions on the impacts of the Fed LSAPs include Christensen and 
Rudebusch (2012) who also substantiate an important role from the signalling channel for the 
Fed’s LSAPs, Wright (2011), and Glick and Leduc (2012), who estimated the total effect on the 
10-year U.S. Treasury yield over all LSAPs announcements declined by approximately 100bp. 
 
Lo Duca et.al. (2016) analysed the link between global corporate bond issuance and the US QE 
using a panel setting. They find that purchases and holdings of MBS and Treasuries by the Fed 
have a strong impact on gross corporate bond issuance across advanced and emerging economies. 
Specifically, asset holdings and purchases crowded out investors from markets where the Fed 
intervened and accelerated portfolio rebalancing across assets and countries leading to stronger 
corporate bond issuance across the globe. A counterfactual analysis shows that bond issuance in 
emerging markets since 2009 would have been halved without QE. 
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2.4.2 Review of Studies of the U.K. QE Operation 
Early empirical study of the U.K. QE programme by Meier (2009) using event study, found that 
that the first round of BoE asset purchases (QE1) impacted gilt yields, reducing the 10-year yield 
on U.K government gilts by at least 35-60bps. Subsequent studies such as Joyce.et.al. (2011) 
investigating the effects of the BoE QE1 and QE2 operations using an event study based on a 2-
day window length, also found that the first phase of LSAPs of £200 billion of gilts depressed 
yields by around 100bps. However, Meaning and Zhu (2011) also using the event study technique 
with a one-day window found a reduction of close to 50bps in gilt yields. One obvious difference 
in their study compared to the study by Joyce et.al. (2011), is the choice of window length used in 
the event study methodology. While Joyce et.al, using a two-day window suggested a depression 
in gilt yields of about a 100bps, Meaning and Zhu (2011) using a one-day window reported a 
50bp reduction.  
 
Evidence in support of a statistically significant portfolio rebalancing effects from the BoE QE 
operations is provided by Joyce.et.al. (2011). They estimated a counterfactual scenario, based on 
QE1 employing VAR a model incorporating monthly historical data from 1991-2007 anchored 
with returns on and portfolio comprising gilts, investment-grade corporate bonds, and money as 
the endogenous variables, and industrial production, inflation and the slope of the yield curve as 
exogenous variables, they mimic the effects of QE by assuming a shock that reduces the 
quantum of gilts in private-sector portfolios. Their results show that the assumed shock reduces 
yields on gilts by 85bps, even though; the impacts unwind quickly reducing to 32bps after a 6 
month period. In terms of the effect on gilt yields and other asset prices, the effect was smaller.  
 
Breedon et.al. (2012) measure the impact of the U.K.’s initial QE1 operation on bonds using a 
macro-finance model of the U.K. government liability curve with which they constructed a 
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counterfactual estimate of the term structure over the QE period, in order to simulate the impact 
of QE on the yield curve directly. They found that QE indeed was effective in terms of lowering 
longer term bond yields with an impact of around 50bps at the ten year maturity concluding, that 
QE had a significant and economically important impact on the bond market.  
 
Goodhart and Ashworth (2012), reported significant diminishing returns following the BoE QE2. 
Going by their analysis, gilt yields actually rose on average by around 9 bps over the seven events, 
the yield curve steepened by 13 bps. While the FTSE 100 declined by around 5 per cent. Their 
conclusion was that the impact of QE2 was at best very modest and significantly less than QE1 
arguing further that if policy makers fail to improve the bank lending or liquidity channel, further 
rounds of QE could potentially have negative returns and may contribute to keeping the 
economy trapped in a low growth equilibrium. 
 
Other notable contributions on the effects of the BoE QE operations include Glick and Leduc 
(2012), and Martin and Milas (2012) who did a brief event study of the BoE latter QE purchases 
of £50 billion, using the 20-, 10-, and 5-year (zero-coupon) U.K. government bond rates. They 
reported very marginal decline in bond yields following the latter QE purchases by the BoE. 
  
In summary, the empirical studies of the effects of the Fed and BoE’s QE operations on their 
bond market reveal that the LSAPs (mainly QE1) did have significant effects in reducing the 10 
year yields ( see Table 4), although with the precise estimates varying across studies and 
methodologies. One major critique aside the obvious focus on the bond market by some of the 
studies is that the choice of the window length used in event studies to track the reaction of asset 
yields and prices is crucial, as a 2-day window tend to find larger effects, while a 1-day window 
and econometric models based on high frequency data tend to find relatively smaller effects that 
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die out or unwind rapidly. This would suggest a little caution in interpreting evidence on the 
effects of QE from the event studies, as they may have overestimated the effects because of the 
possibly exaggerated impact due to using a larger event window. 
 
Table 4: Estimated effects of LSAP/QE on 10 year bond/gilt yield from the literature 
Studies Total Impact (US) Total Impact (UK) 
Meier (2009)  -35bp to -60bp 
Doh (2010) -39bp  
Hamilton & Wu (2011) -13bp  
D’ Amico and King (2010) -30bp to -45bp  
Gagnon et.al. (2011) -30bp to -82bp  
Neely (2011) -107bp  
Wright (2011) -25bps  
Joyce et.al. (2011)  85bp to -100bp 
Meaning  & Zhu (2011)  -50bp to -75bp 
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) 
-33bp   
Glick and Leduc (2011) -50bp to -60bp -50bp 
Breedon et.al. (2012)  -50bp 
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2.4.3 Review of Empirical Studies on the Macro-economic Effects of QE 
This section reviews the literature on the impact of QE on real activity i.e. the GDP (output) and 
the price level (inflation). Evidence comes from econometric modelling based on policy and no-
policy counterfactual scenarios using data drawn largely from before 2008 implicitly assuming 
that key macroeconomic relationships in the data are unaffected by the unusual circumstances of 
the financial crisis. 
 
Baumeister and Benati (2010) using a time-varying parameter structural VAR (TVP-VAR) model 
for the U.S. and the U.K. economies which allows the capturing of the macroeconomic structure 
in the context of the Great Recession of the 2007-200913 found that a compression in the long-
term yield spread exerts a powerful positive effect on both output growth and inflation when 
interest rates are at the effective zero lower bound. In their counterfactual simulation14 for the 
U.S. they showed that without the large-scale asset purchase program the U.S. economy would 
have been in deflation for two quarters with annualized inflation being as low -1% in 2009Q2, 
annualised real GDP growth would have shrunk by 10% in 2009Q1, and that the unemployment 
rate would have been consistently above its actual value throughout 2009 reaching 10.6% at the 
end of 2009. A similar picture also emerged for the U.K. in their counterfactual simulation with 
findings that inflation would have fallen to minus 4 percent and output growth would have 
dropped by 12 percent at annual rates in the absence of the BoE asset purchases. They concluded 
that the QE policy actions in the U.S. and the U.K. prevented economic catastrophe and averted 
significant risks of deflation and output collapses. 
 
                                                          
13 In their analysis, they define a pure spread shock as a disturbance that leaves the short-term policy rate unchanged, which allows 
a characterisation of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to a decline in long-term yield spreads induced by central banks’ 
bond purchase programs under circumstances where the short rate cannot move, which is exactly the situation encountered at the 
zero lower bound. 
14 Their counterfactual simulation for the U.S. was conditional on the estimates from Gagnon et.al. (2011) estimated impact of the 
Fed’s asset purchases on U.S. long-term yield spreads-specifically the average between their lower and upper estimates of the 
impact on the 10-year government bond yield spread, which is 60bps. In their counterfactual simulation for the U.K. they relied 
on the BoE Deputy Governor, Charlie Bean (2009) broad estimate of the impact of the BoE’s gilt purchases on long term yield 
spreads of around ½ percentage point fall in the spreads on commercial paper. 
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Chung et.al. (2012) used a different approach based on the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US 
large-scale macroeconomic model, to investigate the impact of the Fed’s QE programme on the 
U.S. macro-economy. Their counterfactual simulations incorporating a simple model of the 
portfolio rebalance channel calibrated to mimic the first round of QE operation reduction of 
long-term interest rates by 50bps suggest that the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet by the 
QE1 and QE2 operations boosted the GDP by 3% or 300bps and that inflation climbed 1% 
higher than would have prevailed in the absence of asset purchases by the Federal Reserve, 
implying that the QE operation averted a deflationary spiral and kept unemployment from 
escalating in the U.S. The effect of the Fed’s LSAPs, they argued is similar to a 300bps reduction 
in the policy or federal fund rate from 2009Q1 to 2012.  
 
Chen et.al. (2012) in investigating the macroeconomic effects of the Fed’s $600 billion LSAP2, in 
an estimated DSGE model, with quarterly data for the US from 1987:Q3 to 2009:Q3 for the 
seven series of real GDP per capita, hours worked, real wages, core personal consumption 
expenditures deflator, nominal effective Federal Funds rate, the 10-year Treasury constant 
maturity yield, and the ratio between long-term and short-term US Treasury debt; concluded that 
the effects of the Fed’s LSAPs on macroeconomic variables, such as the GDP growth and 
inflation, were likely to be modest, although with a lasting impact on the level of GDP.  
 
Bridges and Thomas (2012) estimated the impact of QE in the U.K. using a money demand and 
supply framework. They assumed that the U.K. QE1 operation of £200 billion increased the 
money supply (M4) by around £120 billion or 8 percent. They then analyse the impact of the 
increase in the M4 for the aggregate economy using an eight variable structural non-stationary I 
(1) VAR model estimated using quarterly data running from 1964Q1-2007Q3 on the level of real 
GDP, annualised CPI inflation, the real exchange rate, the broad money supply, the deposit rates, 
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and short term interest rates. Their results showed a peak positive impact on the level of real 
GDP of around 150bps or 1.5 percent at the start of 2010 before declining and becoming 
negligible by mid-2011. The impact on inflation was a little larger than the GDP at a peak of 
around 2 percentage points which occurred in 2011 before declining thereafter.  
 
Lyonnet and Werner (2012) also investigated the effectiveness of the QE policy as implemented 
by the BoE since March 2009. Using the general-to-specific econometric modelling 
methodology 15capturing the final policy target of nominal GDP regressed on a number of 
explanatory variables including bank reserves and the maturity structure of central bank bond 
holdings found no empirical evidence that the QE had any apparent effect on the UK economy. 
They also highlighted that despite the BoE’s policies, bank credit growth contracted by record 
amounts in late 2011 while the UK economy entered into a double-dip recession in the first half 
of 2012.  
 
Lenza et.al. (2010) using a Bayesian VAR model of the euro area economy with monthly data 
from 1991M1-2009M8, capturing variables, covering various aspects of real activity, nominal 
variables and monetary aggregates, computed a policy scenario conditional on actual money 
market rates and a no-policy scenario conditional on a path for money market rates that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the ECB’s policy intervention. One aspect of the authors’ 
empirical findings that stand out is that the ECB’s policy response appears to have had adverse 
effect on short-term loans to non-financial institutions. Suggesting that the unconventional 
monetary or QE policy interventions by central banks may not be without unintended outcomes. 
 
                                                          
15 The general-to-specific methodology allows all competing monetary policy tools, intermediary instruments and differing 
interpretations of QE to be equally represented in the first general model. Afterwards, a sequential downward reduction to the 
parsimonious form is implemented by dropping the less significant variables, which amounts to a horse-race between the 
variables in the first general model which enables an assessment of the relative performance of the competing policy models.  
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In a counterfactual policy evaluation with an empirical application to the UK QE using an ARDL 
(1, 1) model, Pesaran and Smith (2014) reported that the QE had an immediate positive effect of 
growth, but that this effect tends to disappear quite quickly, certainly within a year. Applying their 
proposed policy ineffectiveness test statistic, their null hypothesis of policy ineffectiveness is not 
rejected i.e. QE did not have a significant effect on UK growth. 
 
In summary, the consensus of the literature (excluding a few) on the effects of QE on the real 
economy is that QE does work- having a positive impact on the macro-economy. The results of 
the studies on the effects of the QE operations on real GDP or output and inflation have 
concluded that QE increased the level of GDP between the range of 1-3 percentage points with a 
similar size effect on the general price level or inflation, implying that QE has averted 
deflationary pressure in the wake of the last global financial turmoil.  
 
A critique of these studies or empirical analyses of the macro-economic effects of QE, is the 
implicit assumption that the historically observed or underlying relationships in the data used to 
decipher counterfactual and non-counterfactual scenarios have not been affected by the recent 
financial crisis i.e. (the Lucas critique). There is reason to doubt that the underlying behavioural 
relationships have remained unaffected given the severe economic dislocations in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis especially the zero lower bound on policy rates.  
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2.5 SEGMENTATION VS EXPECTATION: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE   
Early evidence in support of the price impacts of supply shifts have come from a few historical 
episodes such as the Federal Reserves’ Operation Twist’ (OT) of the early 1960s. Although the 
early finding at the time was that the OT attempt at twisting the yield curve i.e., influencing the 
long end of the yield curve by selling short term bills and simultaneously using the proceeds to 
buy the long term bonds in the open market, was mainly unsuccessful (Modigliani and Sutch, 
1966).  Kuttner (2006) attributed the inability of OT in flattening the yield curve as intended at 
the time, to the insufficient or small purchase of bond securities by the Fed.  
 
More evidence in support of the price impacts of supply shifts came from Bernanke, Reinhart 
and Sack (2004), in the case of LSAPs of US long-term Treasury bonds by the Japanese 
government at the height of the Asian currency crisis and the Japanese financial crisis of the 
1990s and 2000s. Their findings were that LSAPs of the US Treasury bonds during this period 
lowered the yields of the five-year and 10-year bonds by an average of 50 to 100 bps. Garbade 
and Rutherford (2007) also provide evidence in support of supply shifts, using the episode of the 
US Treasury buyback program of 2000-2001, where the US Treasury conducted 40 buybacks, 
with a total value of $63.5 billion. Their findings were that the Treasury buybacks narrowed the 
spread of the 20-year rate and the one-year by 0.75%. 
 
In contrast, Woodford (2012) attributes most of the effect of asset purchases to some form of 
signalling. Similarly, Farmer (2012), with a core monetary model of inflation, augmented by a 
complete set of financial markets showed that LSAPs of MBS and long-term bonds by the Fed 
signalled the Fed’s intent to achieve the inflation target and therefore condition financial market 
expectations, thus helping in preventing deflation at the zero lower bound. While Steeley (2013) 
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argued that the QE by the BoE led to an increased yield curve dimensionality providing support 
for the expectations channel by suggesting that the BoE gilt purchase auctions may have in fact 
resulted in a change in inflation expectations. 
 
2.6 Conclusion   
One obvious aspect that has not been really investigated or covered in the literature on the 
effects of QE, specifically from the financial market perspective is the interactions in the broader 
financial markets and broader asset categories i.e. in the link from the LSAPs or bond purchases 
to the broader aspects of the financial market.  This is where the current study fills the gap in the 
QE literature and the subsequent empirical chapters after this review chapter are devoted to the 
investigation of the effects of the QE operations on the broader financial markets beyond the 
effects on yields in the bond markets as focused on by earlier studies.  
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Chapter 3.The Effect of the Fed and BoE QE on the UK, US and other Equity Markets 
 3.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirically examines the impact on equity markets of the QE operations 
implemented by the Bank of England (BoE) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) in the aftermath of 
the recent financial crisis. It focusses on the effect of these QE operations on the return and 
volatility of the equity markets an area overlooked by previous studies (see the QE literature 
review in chapter 2) on the effects of QE. Earlier studies on the QE operations have majorly 
focused on the impacts on yields in bond markets and the macroeconomic aggregates of GDP 
(output) and CPI (inflation) arising from the large scale bond purchases by the aforementioned 
monetary authorities.  
 
Although the QE operations have largely involved bond purchases, the portfolio balance channel 
as espoused in Tobin (1958 and 1963), which is anchored on the doctrine of imperfect 
substitutability between different types of financial assets, holds that central bank asset purchases 
of the QE kind not only push up the prices of the assets bought while also lowering the yields on 
these assets, but also the prices of other assets that are imperfect substitutes to the ones bought. 
This provides the theoretical grounding and motivation for this study focussing on the effects of 
QE on the stock or equity markets. 
 
The literature on the effects of macroeconomic policy news/announcements on returns in stock 
markets and volatility in stock markets has an extensive history. Officer (1973) investigated the 
effects of volatility in the business cycle variable of industrial production on the variability of the 
market factor defined as the returns to all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) for the three sub-periods from February 1919 to January 1929, from February 1929 to 
January 1944, and from February 1944 to June 1969. He found a strong relationship between the 
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two variables concluding that economy wide factors are mainly responsible for the pattern of 
market-factor variability.   
 
Campbell (1987) argued generally that the state of the term structure of interest rates predicts 
stock returns. He found that when realised excess returns on assets including bills, bonds and 
stocks, are regressed on information variables which measure the state of the term structure, the 
fitted values are far from constant. Instead, they vary for the period studied (1959-1978) with a 
standard deviation on an annualised basis of almost ¼% per month for bills, 6% for bonds and 
17% for stocks. Over the same period, average bond returns were 1½% a year less than bill 
returns and 5% less than stock returns. He concluded that higher short term interest rates led to 
higher stock market volatility.  
 
Schwert (1989) investigated a number of factors that could influence stock volatility. He analysed 
the relation of stock volatility with real and nominal macroeconomic volatility, economic activity, 
financial leverage, and stock trading activity using monthly data from 1857 to 1987. He noted 
that stock return variability was abnormally high during the 1929-1939 Great depression and 
although agreeing with Black (1976) with the findings that aggregate leverage is significantly 
correlated with volatility, he noted that this explained a relatively small part of the movements in 
stock volatility.  
 
Antoniou and Holmes (1995), investigated the impact of trading in the FTSE-100 stock index 
futures on the volatility of the underlying spot market for the period November 1980 to October 
1991 using the GARCH framework. Their results for the impact of trading in the FTSE-100 
index futures suggested that futures trading had led to increased spot price volatility. In particular, 
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the variance of price changes pre-futures was integrated, implying shocks had a permanent effect 
on price changes, whereas their post-future sample was found to be stationary.  
 
Becker et.al. (1995) investigated the equity market linkage between the US and UK focusing on 
intraday price movements of stock index futures contracts for the FTSE100 and the S&P500 
from July 1, 1986 to December 28, 1990. They reported a heightened UK return volatility at 
11.30am and 1.30pm GMT, which tallied with regular macroeconomic releases in the UK and US 
respectively. In addition, it was found that FTSE prices respond to UK news while the US 
market ignores this information. Thus concluding that their finding was consistent with the view 
that documented equity market linkages are attributable to news emanating from the US. Such 
that international markets respond alike to US news while the US generally ignores foreign news, 
resulting in an international correlation pattern in which US prices lead foreign returns.  
 
In an attempt to provide  an answer as to why the US stock market is much more volatile at 
some times than others,  Hamilton and Lin (1996) arrived at a similar conclusion as did  Schwert 
(1989a, 1989b)  that economic recessions are the single largest factor, accounting for over 60% of 
the variance of stock returns.16  
 
Bekaert et.al. (2013) documented a strong co-movement between the VIX, the stock market 
option-based implied volatility, and monetary policy measured as the real interest rate, i.e. the Fed 
funds end-of-the-month target rate minus the CPI inflation rate. They decomposed the VIX into 
a proxy for risk aversion and expected stock market volatility. Characterising the dynamic links 
                                                          
16 This is a very small selection from a vast literature that to review would encompass an entire chapter in itself. other studies that 
have examined the effects of monetary policy surprises and other macroeconomic news on stock market volatility include Rozeff 
(1974), Ederington & Lee (1993), Bomfim (2003), Graham, Nikkinen, & Sahlstrom (2003), Nikkinen & Sahlstrom (2001, 2004a, 
2004b), Kearney & Lombra, (2004),  Steeley (2004), Nikkinen et.al.(2006), Brenner et al (2009). There are also parallel literatures 
examining the effects of news on bond market returns and on volatility, for example, Jones et al (1998), Balduzzi et al., (2001), De 
Goeij and Marquering (2006), Brenner et al (2009), Nowak (2011) and Abad and Chulia (2013).  
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between stock market volatility, and monetary policy in a simple vector-autogressive (VAR) 
system using monthly data for the US from January 1990 to July 2007, They found that stock 
market volatility which they also referred to as uncertainty appear to be unaffected by monetary 
policy. However, periods of high uncertainty were followed by a looser monetary policy stance. 
 
Kim and Nelson (2014) investigates the impact of business cycle-related market volatility on 
expected stock returns. Using data on excess stock returns on a market portfolio, constructed 
from the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, the 30-day US Treasury bill rate and the Conference 
Board Coincident Economic Index over the period January 1959 to June 2012 in a bivariate 
regime-shift model of stock returns and output growth they found that business cycle-related 
market volatility is priced in the stock market by higher expected return, whereas the unrelated 
component is not.  
 
Tan and Kohli (2011) examine the volatility of the US stock market over the period 2008 to 
2011, which encompasses the early phase of the US QE. They examine an AR (1) process and a 
modified constant elasticity of variance model, both applied to the VIX measure of implied 
volatility for the S&P500 index. They found a significant drop in the VIX implied volatility that 
then reverted to previous levels following the ending of the early phase of QE. Joyce et.al. (2011) 
also examine the behaviour of the option-implied volatility of the FTSE100 index using monthly 
data between January 2009 and June 2010, a period encompassing the UK QE1 phase. They 
found that the twelve-month implied volatility fell during 2009.  
 
Koijen et.al (2016) use data on security-level portfolio holdings of institutional investors in the 
euro area to investigate the impact of the ongoing asset purchase programme of the ECB on 
sovereign bond yields. Their results suggest that the programme lowered bond yields and the 
61 
  
purchases by the ECB are absorbed differently across institutions with banks and mutual funds 
most elastic than insurance companies and pension funds. 
 
This study investigates the impact on the equity markets of the US and UK QE operations 
implemented in the aftermath of the great recession. It specifically adds to a small number of 
studies of the effects of QE, by including all the phases of QE in the UK and the US (including 
the MEP in the US), isolating their separate effects, using daily data, measuring the intensity of 
QE activity on specific purchase days and calibrating this directly into the data modelling process 
and also broadening the analysis to more than a single country. Which enables an assessment of 
whether the QE activity affects not only the equity market of the country within which the QE 
activity took place but ascertain if there were spill-overs effects on other equity markets. In 
summary, this chapter examines the impact of the unconventional monetary policy actions or QE 
operations on the return, volatility, cross correlation and trade volume in the equity markets of 
the UK and the US.  
 
Following this introductory section, the next section presents the data and summary statistics. 
Section 3.3 develops a number of hypotheses vis-à-vis the transmission channels of QE. The 
empirical methodology implemented in this chapter to test the effects of QE on the equity 
market returns, volatility and trade volume is discussed in section 3.4. The result from the event 
study of the effects of the US and UK QE operations on bond and equity market yields is 
presented in section 3.5. The empirical results from the estimated GARCH models showing the 
impact of the QE operations on the US and UK equity markets are presented in section 3.6. The 
results of the QE liquidity channel test are presented in section 3.7. Section 3.8 looks at the 
impact of the US and UK QE operations on other equity markets, while section 3.9 concludes 
this chapter. 
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3.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
To examine the effect of QE on the equity markets, the study employ daily data on equity indices 
(as a measure of returns), the ratio of the relative to total amount of the market value of bond 
purchases by the BoE and the Fed (as a measure of QE intensity), the QE intensity measure 
captures the actual size of QE activity on each particular day of the QE purchases, to determine 
whether this has an effect beyond a general effect of the markets being within a period of QE. In 
addition, indicator variables capturing the different phases of the QE operations and other 
market events, which may have had an impact on the financial markets, such as the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, and the Northern Rock incidents in the UK also feature in the data 
modelling process. 
 
Daily closing observations adjusted for dividends of the FTSE100 and S&P500, and subsequently 
the CAC40, the DAX30 and the ASX price indices were taken from DataStream. These price 
indices (p) are converted to returns (r) by the standard method of calculating the log-difference, 
𝑟𝑡= log (𝑝𝑡/𝑝𝑡−1). These observations start from 2004:01 and run to 2014:10. Although the QE 
(bond/gilt) operations commenced in March 2009, the choice of the relatively longer sample 
starting period from 2004, is to enable a basis for comparison for pre and during QE episodes 
especially for the US and UK equity markets.  
 
QE purchases data were obtained from the BoE and Fed websites respectively for the UK and 
the US and were calculated such that the market value of bonds purchased on any given day t 
since the start of QE in March 2009, was divided over the total value of bond purchases in the 
entire QE period ending October 2014 . The indicator variable(s) is assigned the value of 1s 
during its period and 0s elsewhere. For example the indicator variable capturing the Lehman 
Brothers collapse takes the value of 1 from September 15th 2008 and zero before this date. 
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Similarly designed indicator variables were used to capture the effects of the various QE phases 
or periods in the US and UK. 
 
Before going further, the study at this juncture show descriptive statistics and the cross section 
distribution of the QE operations in the UK and the US and the descriptive statistics of the 
equity returns used in the study. Summary statistics of the QE operations and the daily equity 
returns information for the UK and the US are presented in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.  
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of the UK and US QE operations. 
UK (Billions of £s) 
 Frequency Mean S.D. 
QEI 92 1936.404 696.9535 
QEII 78 1374.283 104.9464 
QEIII 74 944.9270 237.1380 
US (Billions of $s) 
QEI 60 5000.000 2306.007 
QEII 176 4945.727 2720.339 
MEP 160 3174.700 1601.354 
QEIII 421 2331.808 1384.799 
 
 
Table 5 shows the mean (average) in billions of £ and $ respectively for the QE operations for 
the UK and US. The upper panel shows the statistics for the UK QE operations in phases of 
QE1, QE2 and QE3, while the lower panel shows the statistics for the US QE operations as 
executed in phases of QE1, QE2, and the maturity extension program (MEP) and QE3. For the 
UK QE1, the mean value is £1,936,404,000 totalling £178,149,168,000 (i.e. mean value multiplied 
by the frequency); for the UK QE2, the mean value is £1,374,283,000 totalling £107,194,074,000; 
while for the UK QE3, the mean value is £944,927,000 totalling £69,924,598,000. Summing 
across these phases of the QE operations for the UK, amounted to a value of £355, 267,840,000.  
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Similarly for the US QE1, the mean value is $5,000,000,000 totalling $300,000,000,000; for the 
US QE2, the mean value is $4,945,727,000 totalling $870,447,952,000; whereas the mean value 
for the MEP is $3,174,700,000 totalling $507,952,000,000; while the mean value for the US QE3 
is $2,331,808,000 totalling $981,691,168,000. Summing across the various operations for the US 
gives a market value of $2, 660,091,120,000. Figures 5 and 6 show the cross-sectional distribution 
of asset purchase during the individual phases of the QE operations as a proportion of the total 
value of the QE operations or bond purchases, for the UK and the US respectively. 
Table 6: Summary statistics of the daily equity returns Jan 2004-Oct 2014. 
 USA UK 
Mean% 0.020 0.013 
Standard Deviation% 1.230 1.166 
Skewness -0.313 -0.154 
Kurtosis 15.092 12.370 
Jarque-Bera 
(p-value) 
15042 
(0.000)*** 
10477 
(0.000)*** 
Num. of Observation 2713 2803 
*** indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 7: Daily equity market correlations for the US and UK 
Period 02/01/2004-
10/03/2009 
11/03/2009 - 9/10/2014 02/01/2004- 
9/10/2014 
       N 1306 1406 2713 
𝜌 0.541 0.671 0.593 
Prob.(F-
stat) 
0 0 0 
Note: N is number of observations, 𝜌 is the correlation coefficient, Prob. (F-stat) is the P-value of the F-
statistic of the corresponding two-variable regression. 
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            Figure 5: Cross-Section Distribution of QE Purchase Activity: UK 
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                                                                Figure 6: Cross-Section Distribution of QE Purchase Activity: US 
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The summary statistics for the returns series, in Table 6, show that the daily mean returns for the 
US and UK equity markets for the sample period are 0.020 and 0.013 per cent per trading day or 
about 5.04 and 3.34 percent per year, respectively. While the US and UK markets were both 
negatively skewed implying a negative distribution of daily equity returns over the sample period, 
overall both skewness are small. However, both return series are leptokurtic, reflecting the fat-
tailed nature of the distribution of asset returns. 
 
In addition to the summary statistics computed for the daily returns, the study also computed the 
correlation coefficient between the daily equity market returns, dividing the sample into three 
sub-periods thus providing comparative statistics for periods before and during QE, and a period 
encompassing both periods. Table 7 shows the daily equity market correlation between the US 
and UK equity market returns for each of the three periods. The correlation coefficients were 
verified for significance, by regressing the UK equity market returns on the US equity market 
returns and using the P-values of the F-statistic from the regression outputs, which were all 
highly significant. The correlation between the markets increased from 54 percent prior to the 
start of QE to 67 percent afterwards.  
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3.3 Hypothesis Development 
In the portfolio balance channel, it is the quantity of asset purchases that affects prices and yields. 
Specifically, QE bond purchases by the monetary authorities reduce the supply of the asset 
available to the private sector, increasing the prices while lowering the yields on the asset bought 
as well as those of other imperfect substitutes like equities. To test the QE portfolio balance 
channel, the quantum of LSAPs by the BoE and Fed are directly measured and calibrated into 
the empirical models (mean equations) specified in the thesis and the hypothesis tested is: 
 
Ho1: the actual LSAPs do not generate significant reduction in equity market yields. 
Hi1: the actual LSAPs do generate significant reduction in equity market yields. 
 
Forward-looking investors may however react to news of future asset purchases even before the 
actual purchases occur. Because these reactions to news of future asset purchases are priced 
immediately, credible announcement of future bond purchases can have the immediate impact of 
affecting the prices and yields of the assets involved and those of other imperfect substitutes 
outside of the bond markets such as the equity markets which are focus of the analysis in this 
chapter. It is worth re-emphasis, that the LSAPs by the monetary authorities in both the UK and 
US were not used to signal that the future path of short-term interest rate would remain low. In 
fact, the Fed while expanding its balance sheet through LSAPs was simultaneously informing the 
investing public that it would still be able to raise short-term interest rates at the appropriate time. 
While the MPC of the BoE explicitly stated that: 
The MPC’s asset purchase programme was directed towards large-scale purchases of conventional gilts. The impact 
was expected to be seen in gilt markets, but also across a broader range of asset prices and in real activity and 
inflation. The MPC did not explicitly use these purchases to signal future intentions, emphasising its commitment 
to meeting the inflation target through the usual channels of monetary policy communications – including the MPC 
minutes and the quarterly Inflation Report. Nor were its actions focused on improving the functioning of gilt 
markets where liquidity premium, even in stressed times, were considered to be small’. (Joyce et.al. 2010:8).  
 
69 
  
Nevertheless, it behoves, that the signalling is tested. A plausible approach to testing the 
signalling channel of QE is to carry out an event study analysis of the Fed and BoE official 
communications relating to their major QE announcements. In particular, the thesis examine the 
immediate reaction or changes in the equity market returns and the 10 year Treasury bond yield 
in the US, and the 10 year gilt yield in the UK to the major announcements relating to the QE 
purchases of the Fed and BoE respectively, and taking the cumulative changes as a measure of 
the impact of the signalling channel. This is in line with the approach used by Bernanke, 
Reinhart, and Sack (2004) examining specific news events concerning future Treasury issuance or 
purchases of longer-term securities which reported that yields dropped on days in which the 
financial markets heard of future declines in the net-supply of longer-term Treasury securities. 
 
The hypothesis for the signalling channel tests the announcement impact of QE on equity 
returns and bond yields as follows 
Ho2: QE announcements have no impact on equity and bond market yields. 
Hi2: QE announcements have an impact on equity and bond market yields. 
 
To test the QE liquidity channel, the thesis examined the direct impact of the actual LSAPs on 
trade volumes in the equity market. As mentioned in the discussion of the liquidity channel in the 
previous chapter, this channel may operate at times of financial market stress and relates to the 
beneficial market effects that LSAPs by the central bank may have in times of significant financial 
market strains or immediately following a financial crisis or market freeze, by providing liquidity 
which may encourage market participants to trade more actively thus improving volume. 
 
Moreover, trading volume is frequently used as a liquidity measure, and can proxy for both 
market depth and trade immediacy, with lower volumes indicating adverse liquidity conditions 
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(Fleming, 2003). If the QE actions affects the equity markets in ways that increase the volume of 
trade, then these would be clear evidence of the QE liquidity effects which should be seen as 
beneficial. By contrast, if the monetary authorities QE actions engender a decrease or lower trade 
volumes, this would be seen as a cost of the QE liquidity channel. Thus the hypothesis tested for 
the QE liquidity channel is: 
 
Ho3: actual QE purchases have no significant impact on equity market trade volume. 
Hi3: actual QE purchases have a significant impact on equity market trade volume. 
 
This is achieved by regressing daily changes in the trade volumes of the each of the UK and US 
equity market on respectively, the BoE and Fed QE purchases by period or phase. 
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3.4 Methodology 
The generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) family of statistical 
processes (Engle, 1982 and Bollerslev, 1986) is used to model the variance processes of the 
returns in the US and UK equity markets.17 The model for the US equation is 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,2EFFR𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,3Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 
     +𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑1𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
 
  ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2EFFR𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,3Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡     
+𝜃𝑖,,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                              (3.2)       
(3.1) 
 
While for the UK equation, the model is 
       
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,2MPC𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,3Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡          (3.3)      
+𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡    
   where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
 
 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,3Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡         (3.4)          
+𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
                                                          
17. See also the survey paper by Bollerslev et al. (1992). Pre-testing of the returns series strongly rejected the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH effects. 
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The above empirical methodology implements a modification to and extends the approach of 
Steeley (2015). In the above,  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, 𝑖 ∈ US, UK. The 
information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖, 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖+< 1.  Pre-testing of the model indicated the presence of residual autocorrelation in the 
returns equation for the US equity market. So, in line with the approach of Bollerslev (1987) and 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), who had similar findings, the study include a first order 
moving average MA(1) in the returns equation in the US model to remove any serial correlation. 
No residual autocorrelation was found for the UK stock market returns, during the sample 
period, consistent with the recent findings of Steeley (2015). As first observed by Fisher (1966), 
index returns will be characterized by autocorrelation where the component asset returns respond 
with different speed to new information.  
 
The variable Lehman𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes the value one during the period starting 
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. For the UK market, the study also 
included initially an indicator variable that takes the value 1 from the day of the Northern Rock 
rescue on September 14th, 2007 until the day before the Lehman collapse, but excluded this from 
the final model as it was not statistically significant. 
 
The variables 𝐷1𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑡 and 𝐷3𝑡 are also indicator variables capturing the effects of the different 
phases of QE activity. Thus, for the UK, the variables take the value of one during the following 
periods, and are zero otherwise:  𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 (QE1) from 11
th March 2009 to 26th January 2010, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 
(QE2) from 10th October 2011 to 2nd May 2012, and 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  (QE3) from 9
th July 2012 to 1st 
November 2012. Similarly, the corresponding periods for which these variables take the value of 
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one for the US phases of QE are: 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 from 25
th March 2009 to 29th October 2009, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 from 
3rd November 2010 to 30th June 2011 and the 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 from 13
th Sep. 2012 to 31st Oct. 2014. The 
variable 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡 , which is only used in the US market equations, is an indicator variable for the 
maturity extension programme conducted between 21st September 2011 and 30th Jun. 2012, prior 
to the US QE3 phase. The intensity (actual bond purchases) of QE activity on a particular day is 
measured by the variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑡 , 𝑄𝐸2𝑡 , 𝑄𝐸3𝑡  and 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑡  (in the US equations only) and are 
similarly separated by the phases of QE. The value of this variable on a given day t is the actual 
value of purchases on that day relative to the total value of purchases over the entire QE period. 
 
Although the focus of the thesis is the unconventional monetary policy of QE or LSAPs 
implemented by the BoE and the Fed in response to the great recession, to incorporate the 
monetary policy stance, during or within the estimation period when QE bond purchases were 
not underway, the study include the policy rates i.e. the effective Federal Fund Rate (EFFR) in 
the US and the MPC Bank Rate in the UK in the relevant model specification. 
 
The form of the variance equations in (3.2 & 3.4)) is a standard GARCH(1,1) specification, where 
the conditional variance is a function of its immediate past values and past squared residuals, 
augmented with the same QE exogenous variables and indicators as in the returns equation. 
Using this model as the null hypothesis, likelihood ratio tests could not reject this model in 
favour of more complex alternative specifications involving asymmetries, variance-in-mean 
terms, or higher order ARCH terms. In the variance equation, the coefficient b measures the 
tendency of the conditional variance to cluster, while the coefficient c (in combination with b) 
measures the degree of persistence in the conditional variance process.  
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Furthermore, to test  the QE liquidity channel of the BoE and Fed QE purchases, the actual 
bond purchases as implemented by the monetary authorities are expressed in relation to daily 
trading volume by estimating the following regression 3.5 and 3.6 for the US and UK 
respectively: 
 
∆ln (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 +(𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 
+(𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡) D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                           (3.5) 
 
∆ln (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 +(𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                             (3.6) 
 
 
In this first chapter of the empirical analysis, each of the equity market i.e. in the UK and the US 
is modelled separately or individually for an assessment of the impact of the QE operations on 
the equity markets within these countries. Also in order to enable an assessment of whether the 
QE operations had any spill-over effects beyond the equity markets in the US and UK where the 
QE operations took place, or in other to distinguish between the impact of QE on the equity 
markets in other economies that did not implement such a measure at the time, two equity 
markets within the Eurozone i.e. France and Germany and the Australian equity market are 
modelled incorporating either the UK or the US QE variables.   
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3.5 Event-study results 
It is not unlikely that some of the impact of QE or LSAPs on the bond and equity markets 
occurs not when the actual purchases are made by the monetary authorities but when the 
purchase announcement is made or when expectations of such future purchases are formed. To 
examine this announcement impact, this study carried out an event study looking at the 
immediate reaction of the bond and equity market yields in the UK and US to announcements 
relating to major QE purchases by the relevant monetary authority.  
 
Important for the LSAPs or QE event study is that the event phase captures all announcements 
that have impacted LSAPs or QE expectations, and with the implicit assumption that the LSAP 
expectations were not affected by anything else other than the announcements. This obviously is 
a very strong assumption particularly factoring into consideration the prevailing financial and 
economic circumstances that warranted the QE in the first place, and other political events 
including the impending presidential elections in US at the time, all of which may have played 
some impacts on the financial market expectations of future policy trajectory. Needless to say 
that a major difficulty in isolating the signalling effect of the QE is that asset prices or yields 
could also have reacted to other non-LSAP or QE information around the period such as 
updates on the MPC and FOMC’s economic outlook and other major political events other than 
announcement of QE policies. In the light of this glaring limitation of the event study approach 
and to mitigate the risk of contamination a one day window period is used for the event study.  
 
The one day window(s) is constructed as starting from the closing level of the day prior to the 
announcement to the closing level on the day of the announcement. The focus here are on the 
dates of official communications or releases by the Fed and BoE, which contained new 
information concerning potential LSAPs. For the Fed’s QE1 for example, these are November 
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25, 2008, December 1, 2008, December 16, 2008, January 28, 2009, March 18, 2009, August 12, 
2009, September 23, 2009 and the November 11, 2009 (see Table 1 for the descriptions). While 
for the BoE’s QE1, these are the February 11, 2009, March 5, 2009, May 7, 2009, August 6, 2009, 
November 5, 2009 and February 2, 2010 (see Table 2 for the descriptions). 
 
Starting with the US, Table 8 shows the cumulative changes in the equity and bond yields 
following the US QE1, QE2, MEP and QE3 operations. Across the eight announcements 
contained in the event set for the QE1, both the US equity (S&P500) and the US Treasury 10 
year bond yields declined significantly, with the equity and bond yields declining by 72 and 75 
basis points, respectively. Perhaps not surprising, the decline in both the US equity and bond 
yields were greater following the QE1 announcements in comparison to the subsequent 
announcements of QE2, the MEP and US QE3 operations which to a very large extent were 
widely envisaged by the financial markets and thus contained little to no news or surprises for 
prices and yields in the financial markets. Specifically, equity and bond yields declined by 6 basis 
points following the US QE2 announcements, 3 basis points and 5 basis points respectively 
following the maturity extension programme or operation twist and by 4 basis points following 
the QE3 announcements. 
 
The event study results of the US QE1 announcements appear consistent with earlier event 
studies from the literature of the impact of the US QE1 announcements on bond yields decline, 
totalling around 80bps. Furthermore, by considering the impact beyond the bond markets of the 
QE announcements, this study is able to broaden or generalise the findings to an imperfectly 
substitutable asset to bonds i.e. equity. The change in the equity and bond yields especially 
following the QE1 announcements may be considered as evidence of a significant signalling 
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channel or mechanism for the US QE operations. Suggesting in fact that some of the impact of 
QE or LSAPs on the financial markets may occur not when the actual purchases are made by the 
monetary authorities but when the purchase announcement is made or when expectations of 
such future purchases are formed. 
 
For the BoE QE announcements, again the decline in equity (FTSE100) and the UK 10 year gilt 
yields were highest following the QE1. The cumulative decline in the 10 year gilt yields was 44 
basis point. Compared to some of the earlier event study in the literature for the UK QE1 
announcements, finding of a cumulative 85 to 100 basis points decline in bond yields (using a 
two-day window) seems to suggest that doubling the event window appears to double the 
amount by which the yields decline. This assertion is further corroborated by other studies of the 
impact of the UK QE1 announcements on gilt yields using a one-day window, like Meaning and 
Zhu (2011) and Glick and Leduc (2012) who like this study found smaller effects closer to 50 
basis points. For the UK equity (FTSE100), the cumulative decline following the BoE QE1 
announcements was 35 basis points. This study also considered the UK BoE QE2 and QE3 
announcements impacts on the UK equity and bond yields. Generally, the effects of these later 
announcements were much smaller in size compared to the QE1, with yields falling by only -
5bps-7bps following the QE2 announcements and for the UK QE3 announcement by 1-3bps.  
 
In summary, the event study of the announcement impact of the QE bond purchases reject the 
null hypothesis (Ho2) as they show that the LSAPs announcements had impacted yields even 
before the actual purchases of the bonds were executed by the monetary authorities. Thus 
confirming the existence of a signalling effect. But to the extent the yields on equity also declined 
following these QE announcements as expected given the imperfect substitutability doctrine or 
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portfolio balance mechanism strongly suggest that the signalling and portfolio balance channels 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may in fact work in tandem. 
 
Table 8: Event Study Results for the US and UK QE announcements 
                                                         US Event Study Results 
Event Phase US Equity (S&P500) US Bond (10-year maturity) 
QE1 -72bp -75bp 
QE2 -6bp -6bp 
MEP -3bp -5bp 
QE3 -4bp -4bp 
                                                      UK Event Study Results 
 UK Equity (FTSE100) UK Gilt(10-year maturity) 
QE1 -35bp -44bp 
QE2 -7bp -5bp 
QE3  -1bp -3bp 
Table 8 shows the event study results of the impact of the QE announcements on the US and UK equity and bond markets. The 
expected returns on each of the event day are deducted from the actual return to get the abnormal return i.e.  A𝑅𝑖𝑡 =𝑅𝑖𝑡 - 𝑅𝑖⃑⃑  ⃑ on 
each day in the event window. The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) are then added up to get the aggregate or cumulative abnormal return 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑇1, 𝑇2 ) = ∑ 𝑇1
𝑇2
𝑡= A𝑅𝑖𝑡 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
In this section, maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the specified GARCH models 
are reported. This is preceded however by performing tests for structural breaks in the sample 
data (01:2004-10:2014) using the Quandt-Andrews (1993) and Andrews-Ploberger (1994) 
structural break tests. These tests are used to test for structural break at an unknown point within 
the sample.  
 
For the US data, both structural break tests detect a significant break on the 01:21:2009 (p-
value<0.01). While for the UK, both tests detect a significant break on the 13:08:2008 (p-
value<0.01) (see appendix). Consequently, the specified models for the US and UK are estimated 
in sub-samples taking into account these break dates and with the relevant variables per the sub-
samples i.e. the monetary policy stance variable(s) prior to the start of QE, and the QE variables.  
 
 Table 9 shows the coefficients of the parameters of the estimated model (i.e. before the date of 
the structural break) for the UK. The upper panel (Panel A) of the table shows the estimates 
from the mean equation, while the estimates from the variance equation are shown on the lower 
panel (Panel B). In the mean equation, both the intercept or constant term and the coefficient of 
the variable (MPC) capturing the monetary policy stance in the UK prior to the commencement 
of the QE operations in the UK are insignificant. On the lower panel of that table showing the 
coefficients from the variance equation, the coefficients of the lag squared residual term (ARCH) 
and the lagged conditional variance (GARCH) term are highly significant and within the expected 
range, with the bulk of the effect coming from the previous conditional variance coefficient. 
Again the variable (MPC) capturing the impact of the monetary policy stance in the UK prior to 
the commencement of the QE operations on the volatility of the UK’s equity market is 
insignificant.  
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Table 9: Univariate GARCH results (UK): January 2nd 2004 – August 11th 2008 
Number of Observation: 1196 
Log-likelihood: 4055.6457 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant 0.00027 0.00024 
   MPC 0.00003 0.00052 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < -0.00001 < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1166*** 0.0208 
              (c) 0.8705*** 0.0238 
      MPC -6.47×10-7 -5.93×10-7 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1MPC𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2MPC𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week𝑡, 𝑖 = UK. The information 
set,Ω
𝑡−1
 includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 represent 
BoE or MPC Bank rate incorporating the stance of monetary policy within this estimation period when QE bond purchases were 
not underway.  *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%.  
 
Table 10 shows the results of the parameters of the estimated model (i.e. after the date of the 
structural break) for the UK and thus incorporating the QE intensity and periodic variables in the 
model. The upper panel of the table contains the estimated coefficients for the return equation. 
As can be seen from this segment of the table, the constant term in the equation is significant. 
The coefficient of the Lehman dummy variable capturing the effect of the financial crisis as 
measured in the specified model by the collapse of Lehman brothers is found to be insignificant.  
 
Moving on to the QE variables i.e. the QE intensity and periodic variables in the mean equation, 
although the UK QE1, QE2 and QE3 appear to have the expected negative signs as suggested by 
the portfolio rebalance channel effects of LSAPs, only the UK QE3 is found to be significant. 
Juxtaposed against the earlier stated hypothesis (Ho1), this imply an inability to reject the null 
hypotheses for the UK QE1 and QE2 operations but a rejection of the null hypothesis in the 
case of the QE3. In other words, for the QE1 and QE2 operations, the portfolio rebalance 
channel is not found to be significant. This may be explained by the fact that significant portfolio 
rebalancing or adjustments may have already taken place by forwarding looking investors 
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following the announcements of these earlier QE phases rather than during the actual bond 
purchases by the BoE. All three QE phase variables for the UK in the mean equations were 
insignificant.  
 
Turning to the variance equation, i.e. Panel B of Table 10, the coefficients of the lag squared 
residual and the previous conditional variance terms are once again significant and within the 
expected range for this sub-sample, with the bulk of the effect coming from the previous 
conditional variance. The Indicator variable for the financial crisis incidence is significant in the 
variance equation unlike in the mean equation and positive as expected implying that the financial 
crisis engendered an increase in the UK equity market volatility as shown in Figure 7 below.  
 
The coefficient of the QE variables in the variance equation although all significant, revealed 
mixed results. For instance, while the coefficients of the QE1 and QE2 actual purchases 
(intensity) variables in the variance are positive, the coefficient of the QE3 variable is negative. 
Conversely, while coefficients of the QE1 and QE2 phase or period variables (i.e. D1 and D2) 
are negative, the coefficient of QE3 period variable (D3) is positive. Taking as a whole, the QE 
intensity and period coefficients in the variance equations capture the effects of the BoE QE or 
LSAPs on purchases auction days and over the entire QE period on the volatility of the UK 
equity market.  
 
That the actual QE purchases particularly the QE1 and QE2 coefficients are positive in the 
variance equation in contrast to their periodic counterparts suggest that the UK equity market 
became more adept at accommodating the purchase activity as the BoE QE interventions 
progressed.  
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Table 10: Univariate GARCH results (UK): August 15th  2008 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 1508 
Log-likelihood: 4815.6649 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00060*** 0.00006 
  Lehman  -0.00005 0.00323 
  QE1 -0.2077 0.2658 
  QE2 -0.1869 0.4494 
  QE3 -0.1869*** 0.0544 
   D1  0.0013 0.0001 
   D2  0.0011 0.0012 
   D3 -0.0012 0.0001 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0910*** 0.0005 
              (c)  0.8905*** 0.0001 
   Lehman  0.0002*** 0.0001 
   QE1  0.0026** 0.0018 
   QE2  0.0049*** 0.0018 
   QE3 -0.0038*** 7.28×10-6 
    D1 -3.76×10-6* 2.17×10-6 
    D2 -9.70×10-6*** 3.36×10-6 
    D3  6.13×10-6*** 2.41×10-6 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 +
𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3 QE3𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily 
return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡,. 𝑖 = UK.  The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables  𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡   are QE phase’s dummy variables for the UK. These dummy 
variables take the value of one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡  and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 
represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the QE period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
The results of the estimated coefficients for the US model specifications are reported next 
starting with Table 11 (i.e. before the date of the structural break) in the US specification. The 
upper panel (Panel A) of the table shows the estimates from the mean equation, while the 
estimates from the variance equation are shown on the lower panel (Panel B). In the mean 
equation, and similar to the UK estimation results, both the intercept or constant term and the 
coefficient of the variable (EFFR) capturing the monetary policy stance in the US prior to the 
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commencement of the QE operations in the US are insignificant. The moving average term 
(𝜀𝑡−1),   included in the US model, is significant justifying its inclusion in the US GARCH model.  
 
On the lower panel of that table showing the coefficients from the variance equation, the ARCH 
coefficient and the GARCH coefficient are significant and within the expected range, with the 
bulk of the effect coming from the previous conditional variance or GARCH coefficient. Again 
the coefficient of the variable (EFFR) capturing the impact of the monetary policy stance in the 
US prior to the commencement of the QE operations on the US’s equity market is insignificant.  
 
As these variables i.e. the EFFR and MPC included in the relevant model specifications to 
incorporate the impact on the financial markets of the stance of monetary policy during the 
period within the estimation when QE bond purchases, are found to be insignificant in both the 
mean and variance equations, they are dropped from the model specifications going forward. 
 
Additional GARCH models for smaller samples based on the individual or specific QE purchases 
for both the US and UK QE operations are estimated. Comparing the results of the smaller 
sample re-estimations with the lager sample results, reveal no significant changes in the signs of 
the estimated coefficient. Thus the results of the smaller or individual re-estimations are shown in 
the appendix. 
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Table 11: Univariate GARCH results (US): January 2nd 2004 – January 19th 2009 
Number of Observation: 1317 
Log-likelihood: 4281.1509 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant -0.00027 0.00058 
   EFFR  0.00001 0.00014 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.09846
*** 0.03192 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001 < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0770*** 0.0123 
              (c)  0.9175*** 0.0135 
     EFFR  1.34×10-7 1.15×10-7 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1EFFR𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1, where 
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2MPC𝑖,𝑡  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is daily the return from market 𝑖  in 
week𝑡, 𝑖 = US. The information set,Ω
𝑡−1
 includes all information known at time𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 <
1. The variable 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡  represents the Effective Fed Fund Rate (the policy rate) incorporating the stance of monetary policy 
within this estimation period when QE bond purchases were not underway.  *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
Table 12 shows the estimates of the parameters of the estimated model (i.e. after the date of the 
structural break) for the US, incorporating the QE intensity and periodic variables in the model. 
The upper panel of the table contains the estimated coefficients for the return equation. Clearly 
the coefficients of the actual QE purchase variables measuring and testing the effect of the 
portfolio balance channel in the US model following the LSAPs, have the negative signs as 
envisaged by the portfolio balance channel, but only the US QE3 is significant, implying that 
while the null hypothesis (Ho1) could not be rejected for the QE1, QE2 and the MEP 
operations, it is rejected for the US QE3 LSAPs. All the QE phase or period variables and the 
financial crisis indicator variable in the mean equation are found to be insignificant. 
 
Turning to the variance equations, Panel B, the coefficients of the lag squared residual and the 
previous conditional variance terms are significant and within the expected range, with the bulk 
of the effect coming from the previous conditional variance. The financial crisis indicator variable 
is significant also in the variance equation for the US and, not surprisingly positive implying that 
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this incident engendered an increase in the volatility of the US equity market as earlier reported 
also for the UK equity market (see Figure 7 below).  
 
Of the QE intensity variables and MEP variable in the variance equations for the US, the 
coefficient of the US QE1 is found to be significant and positive. However, those for the QE2, 
QE3 and MEP are found to be insignificant. In sharp contrast, the QE period variables 
measuring the effect of the market being in the QE period as distinct from the effect of the 
actual FOMC purchases on specific purchase days (QE intensity) are found to be mostly 
significant and with negative signs implying that the period of QE did in fact alleviate some of 
the volatility in the US equity market in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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Table 12: Univariate GARCH results (US): January 23rd 2009 –October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 1393 
Log-likelihood: 4562.1190 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00123*** 0.00032 
  Lehman  -0.00005 0.00323 
  QE1 -0.7632 0.8972 
  QE2 -0.1391 0.3491 
  QE3 -0.7550* 0.3986 
  MEP -0.0649 0.5667 
   D1  0.0011 0.0013 
   D2  0.0001 0.0009 
   D3 -2.08×10-5 8.25×10-4 
   D4  2.03×10-4 9.61×10-4 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.1015
*** 0.0310 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1131*** 0.0164 
              (c)  0.8357*** 0.0242 
   Lehman  0.0002** 0.0001 
   QE1  0.0085* 0.0048 
   QE2  4.03×10-5 6.20×10-4 
   QE3 -0.0015 0.0012 
   MEP -8.56×10-4 1.48×10-3 
    D1  4.07×10-6 3.75×10-6 
    D2 -3.66×10-6* 1.89×10-6 
    D3 -5.00×10-6*** 1.93×10-6 
    D4 -3.82×10-6* 1.97×10-6 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =
𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 ,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, i=US. The information set, Ω𝑡−1, includes all 
information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡   are QE phase’s 
dummy variables for the US. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the value of one during 
their respective periods and zero otherwise. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or 
actual purchases during the respective QE period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. 
*** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Generally, the UK and US estimation results appear largely similar but one difference between 
the UK and US estimation results relates to the significance of the QE intensity coefficients, with 
mainly more positive significance of these coefficients in the variance equations in the UK 
results, relative to the US estimation results. It is pertinent to point out that perhaps one major 
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reason that may be responsible for this, could be the conscious decision made by the Fed to 
avoid QE purchase operations conflicting with other operations such as the Treasury debt 
auctions, and agency. 
 
Figure 7 plots the estimated conditional volatility for the UK and US equity market over the full 
sample period. Clearly the period depicted can be subdivided further into a pre-crisis and QE 
period. The pre-crisis period starting from 2004 recorded low equity market volatility in both the 
UK and US markets. Although there appeared to be a spike in the UK equity market volatility in 
the last quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008 following the run and subsequent state take-
over of Northern Rock, no such spike was observed for the US equity market implying that the 
US market was unaffected by the event. Not until mid-September 2008, following the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers that both equity markets simultaneously witnessed a gargantuan surge in 
volatility officially signalling the beginning of the financial crisis or the great recession.  
 
Part of the BoE and Fed’s response which came in the form of large scale bond purchases or 
QE1 around the first quarter of 2009, coincided with a lowering of equity market volatility in 
both markets. The termination of QE1 by both monetary authorities almost immediately saw a 
rise in volatility in both equity markets which was responded to by further QE operations (QE2) 
which again appeared to have calmed equity market volatility. There were noticeable spikes in the 
equity markets’ volatility particularly for the US market around the last quarter of 2011. However 
barring this spike, equity market volatility had largely returned to pre-crisis levels in both markets.  
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                                                                  Figure 7: Estimated Conditional Volatility for UK and US Equity Returns Jan.04-Oct.14 
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3.7 QE Liquidity Channel Test Results 
In this section, estimates of the effect of the Fed and BoE QE or LSAP operations on the 
liquidity conditions in the US and UK equity markets are presented. The estimates are obtained 
by regressing daily changes in the equity market trade volume as a measure or indicator of 
liquidity, on the Fed and BoE actual QE purchases or interventions. As the effect of the Fed and 
BoE QE purchases on the equity market trading volume may vary given the different QE phase 
purchase amounts, a multiple regression analysis to capture the differential effects of the Fed and 
BoE QE purchases across phases is reported.  
Table 13: The effect of Fed QE purchases on equity market trade volume 
Number of Observation: 1397 
R-squared: 0.32089 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.31894 
 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  21.95998*** 0.01424 
   QE1  0.47278*** 0.02311 
   QE2 -0.04507** 0.02081 
   QE3  0.18457*** 0.01729 
   MEP  0.01978 0.02020 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model ∆ln (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 +(𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 +(𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡) D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The dependent variable in the model is the change in the daily trade volume for the US 
equity market. (𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 )  𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 )  𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 , (𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 )  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 , and (𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡) D4𝑖,𝑡  are the Fed purchase 
representing total Fed QE purchases in each phase in $ billions multiplied by their respective dummies which take a value of 1  
for that phase in the QE programme. 
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Table 13 shows the results for the US estimation. The results indicates that the Fed QE1 LSAPs 
is associated with a statistically significant increase in the US equity market trade volume of about 
0.47 percent. Conversely the impact of the Fed QE2 LSAPs on the equity market trade volume is 
a statistically significant decline of about 0.05 percent. The Fed’s QE3 operation also appear to 
have impacted positively on the liquidity conditions in the US equity market going by the 
statistically significant increase of the equity market trade volume of 0.18 percent.  
The Fed MEP brought about a statistically insignificant increase in the US equity market trade 
volume. Taking as a whole, the result of the estimates in Table 13 suggests that the marginal 
effects of the Fed QE purchases on the equity market liquidity as measured by the volume of 
trade were most profound at the start of QE operations i.e. QE1. This is not surprising and in 
fact underscores that the Fed QE actions immediately following the financial crisis encouraged 
investors (perhaps having been crowded out of the bond market, to purchase or switch to the 
equity market and thereby improving liquidity conditions in the equity market.  
 
Table 14: The effect of BoE QE purchases on equity market trade volume 
Number of Observation: 1449 
R-squared: 0.04017 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.03818 
 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  15.10332*** 0.00899 
   QE1  0.09125*** 0.02068 
   QE2 -0.10169*** 0.02489 
   QE3 -0.12891*** 0.03210 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model ∆ln (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 +(𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 + 
(𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 +(𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡) D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The dependent variable in the model is the change in the daily trade volume for the UK 
equity market. (𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , (𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 , (𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 )  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡 , are the BoE purchase representing total BoE QE 
purchases in each phase in £ billions multiplied by their respective dummies which take a value of 1 
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The result of the UK QE channel liquidity test is presented in Table 14. The table shows that 
similar to the US estimation, the BoE QE1 had a statistically significant increase on the UK 
equity market trade volume of 0.09 percent. However, the coefficient estimates of the BoE QE2 
and QE3 operations revealed that these operations in fact engendered a statistically significant 
decline in the equity trade volume of about 0.10 and 0.13 percent respectively. Thus, for the UK, 
it appears the BoE purchases in the latter rounds had an adverse effect on the equity market 
trade volume. 
Overall, the results presented in this section relating to the hypothesis on the QE liquidity effects 
suggest that they were significant liquidity effects on the equity markets following the US and UK 
monetary authorities QE actions albeit with different impacts from the different QE phases on 
the volume of trade in the US and UK equity markets. 
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3.8 Other Equity Markets’ Response to the UK and US QE Actions 
It is evident from the preceding section that the LSAPs in the US and the UK indeed impacted 
significantly on the US and UK equity markets. This section expands or broadens the analysis 
beyond the US and UK equity markets. This not only enables an investigation of whether the 
LSAPs of the Fed and BoE had a spill-over effects on other equity markets in countries that did 
not implement the QE at the time or at all. This investigation is justified, taking into 
consideration that the financial crisis although starting in the US with the collapse of Lehman 
brothers, was characterised by increased instability across financial markets and the contagion of 
its effects across markets and countries. 
 
This section includes or considers other economies that did not implement QE at the time. To 
this end, this study looks at the equity markets in the Euro-area i.e. Germany proxy by the 
DAX30 and the equity market in France proxy by the CAC40 and the Australasian equity 
markets proxy by the ASX (Australia), the Nikkei (Japan) and the Hang Seng (Hong-Kong). 
Although the ECB in responding to the financial crisis would embark on what it called the credit 
enhancement programme (see chapter 2), LSAPs of the QE kind were not conducted by the 
ECB around this period in contrast to its counterparts in the US and UK, neither were the 
aforementioned Australasian economies hit with temerity of the financial crisis and nor, did their 
monetary authorities embark on QE operations as a result. Hence these economies provides a 
veritable platform to exam effects of QE outside of the US and UK equity markets.  
 
Similar GARCH models as earlier specified above are re-estimated for the CAC40, DAX30, the 
ASX, Nikkei and Hang-Seng indices including an additional variable, lagged return (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) in the 
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variance equation as control for any local effect within the respective equity markets. Like in the 
analysis in the preceding section, tests for structural breaks in the sample period (01:2004-
10:2014) are performed using the Quandt-Andrews (1993) and Andrews-Ploberger (1994) 
structural break tests. Unlike the results of these tests for the US and UK sample, these show no 
significant breaks in these other equity market indices (see appendix).  
 
If several regressors in a model are highly correlated, there is the issue of collinearity or 
multicollinearity. To investigate the issue of collinearity, the correlation coefficients between the 
QE regressors i.e. the QE intensity (actual purchases) and the QE period variables, are computed 
separately for both the US and UK QE variables included in these other equity market GARCH 
specifications. The coefficient of correlation is a value of +1 and -1 in the case of perfect 
multicollinearity. As can be seen from the matrices i.e. Table 15 and 16, none of the coefficients 
is anywhere the +1 or -1 value; in fact they are all way of magnitudes that may suggest a high 
correlation amongst them   
In addition, separate model estimations (i) including USQE1-QE3 and MEP, and omitting US 
D1-D4, (ii) including US D1-D4 and omitting USQE1-QE3 and MEP (iii) including UKQE1-
QE3 and omitting UK D1-D3 (iv) including UK D1-D3 and omitting UK QE1-QE3, are 
estimated and reported for the equity markets investigated in this section.  
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Table 15: US QE Regressors Correlation Matrix 
 QE1 QE2 QE3 MEP 
QE1 1.0000    
QE2 -0.0312 1.0000   
QE3 -0.0484 -0.0813 1.0000  
MEP -0.02916 -0.0489 -0.0758 1.0000 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 
D1 1.000 0.033   
D2 -0.0701 1.0000   
D3 -0.0669 -0.0527 1.0000  
D4 -0.0341 -0.0268 -0.0256 1.0000 
This table shows the correlation coefficients between the US QE1-QE3 and MEP and the US D1-D4 variables. 
 
Table 16:  UK QE Regressors Correlation Matrix 
 QE1 QE2 QE3 
QE1 1.0000   
QE2 -0.0301 1.0000  
QE3 -0.0285 -0.0278 1.0000 
 D1 D2 D3 
D1 1.0000   
D2 -0.0725 1.0000  
D3 -0.1201 -0.1459 1.0000 
This table shows the correlation coefficients between the UK QE1-QE3 and the UK D1-D3 variables. 
 
 Starting with the Germany equity market estimation result with the US QE1- QE3 and MEP 
variables, in Table 17, it is clear that these variables had no significant impact on the German 
equity market returns. Also the financial crisis/Lehman crash dummy variable in the mean 
equation is also found to be insignificant. For the variance equation (Panel b) of the same table, 
the financial crisis/Lehman impact variable is significant and positive as found also in the 
estimation results for the US and the UK earlier reported. This simply means that the financial 
crisis engendered significant increase in the German equity market volatility as well. Of the QE1-
QE3 and the MEP variables in the variance equation, only the MEP appear to have a significant 
effect (positive) on the volatility of the German equity market.  
Table 17: Univariate GARCH results (Germany): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8299.1843 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00077*** 0.00022 
  Lehman  -0.00231 0.00406 
  QE1 -0.47203 1.02062 
  QE2  0.09962 0.33396 
  QE3 -0.02258 0.47011 
  MEP  0.19617 1.07935 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0822*** 0.0085 
              (c)  0.8914*** 0.0114 
   Lehman  0.0005** 0.0001 
   QE1  0.0083 0.0055 
   QE2  0.0001 0.0005 
   QE3 -0.0009 0.0006 
   MEP  0.0064** 0.0027 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0018
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜑𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 
𝑡, i=Germany.  The information set,Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0,𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 <
1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE 
period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
For the Germany equity market estimation results including the US D1-D4, and omitting the US 
QE1-QE3 and MEP (Table 18), the results are consistent in significance with the earlier results in 
Table 17. Note that D4 is the indicator or period variable for the US MEP, and like its precursor 
in Table 17, this variable is the only significant variable among the set of the US QE and MEP 
phase or period variables in the model.  
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Table 18: Univariate GARCH results (Germany): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8299.1843 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00077*** 0.00025 
  Lehman  -0.00231 0.00409 
  D1  0.00128 0.00133 
  D2  0.00027 0.68463 
  D3 -0.00006 0.00044 
  D4  0.00064 0.00011 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0805*** 0.0086 
              (c)  0.8917*** 0.0114 
   Lehman  0.0005** 0.0001 
   D1  5.35×10-6 3.59×10-6 
   D2  1.04×10-7 8.61×10-7 
   D3 -2.94×10-7 4.566×10-7 
   D4  6.88×10-6*** 2.53×10-6 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0017
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=Germany.   The information set,Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  are QE 
period dummy variables for the US and. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the value of 
one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
 
Separate model estimation results for the German equity market with the UK QE intensity 
(actual purchases) and QE period variables are also reported. Starting with the estimation results 
incorporating the UK QE1-QE3 in Table 19 (panel A) showing the mean estimation results, only 
the UK QE3 variable appear to have a significant and negative effect on the German equity 
returns suggesting spill-over portfolio balancing effects of the UK QE3 on the German equity 
market. Neither the UK QE1 and QE2 nor the financial crisis dummy variables were significant 
in the mean equation.  
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In the variance equation result reported on the lower panel of the table, a significant and positive 
effect on volatility coming from the financial crisis is documented. Also the UK QE3 appear to 
have had a positive impact on the German equity market volatility as well. The ARCH, GARCH 
and the domestic control variable included in the model are all strongly significant. 
Table 19: Univariate GARCH results (Germany): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8302.2742 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00079*** 0.00019 
  Lehman  -0.00233 0.00406 
  QE1  0.5241 0.3694 
  QE2  0.1768 0.5070 
  QE3 -0.9017* 0.4703 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0821*** 0.0081 
              (c)  0.8934*** 0.0109 
   Lehman  0.0004** 0.0001 
   QE1  0.0018 0.0012 
   QE2  0.0019 0.0012 
   QE3  0.0024* 0.0012 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0017
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week𝑡, i=Germany.  The information set, 
Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 
and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE period by the BoE. *** ** * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
The estimation results including the UK D1-D3 are reported in Table 20, with none of the UK 
D1-D3 (UK QE period) significant neither in the mean nor variance equations. In the variance 
equation however, the financial crisis variable, the ARCH, GARCH and the domestic control 
variable are significant as earlier documented.  
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Table 20: Univariate GARCH results (Germany): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8300.0777 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00074*** 0.00020 
  Lehman  -0.00228 0.00405 
  D1  0.00077 0.00105 
  D2  0.00182 0.00147 
  D3 -0.00049 0.00102 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0826*** 0.0081 
              (c)  0.8933*** 0.0109 
   Lehman  0.0004** 0.0001 
   D1  3.70×10-6 2.66×10-6 
   D2  3.45×10-6 2.10×10-6 
   D3 -3.86×10-6 1.98×10-6 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0017
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 +𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 
+𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 𝑡. i=Germany.   The information set, Ω𝑡−1 , includes all 
information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡   are QE period 
dummy variables for the UK. These event variables take the value of one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** 
** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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The estimation results for the French equity market are reported next, starting with estimation 
results from the model including the US QE1-QE3 and MEP shown in Table 21. Of the 
included QE and MEP variables, only the MEP is significant i.e. in the variance equation with a 
positive effect. Neither the QE1-QE3, the MEP nor the financial crisis variables were significant 
in the mean equations as can be seen from the table. 
Table 21: Univariate GARCH results (France): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8236.5720 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00048** 0.00022 
  Lehman  -0.00127 0.00508 
  QE1  0.6174 0.9528 
  QE2  0.1426 0.3822 
  QE3  0.3295 0.5329 
  MEP -0.1740 0.9944 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0914*** 0.0086 
              (c)  0.8842*** 0.0114 
   Lehman  0.0006** 0.0002 
   QE1  0.0078 0.0054 
   QE2  0.0005 0.0007 
   QE3  0.0010 0.0007 
   MEP  0.0077*** 0.0028 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0018
*** 0.0005 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 
𝑡, i=France.  The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 <
1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE 
period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
The counterpart results for the French equity market equation including the US D1-D4 are 
shown in Table 22. Only the D4 i.e. the MEP period variable is significant and only in the 
variance equation. Likewise the variable capturing the impact of the financial crisis in the variance 
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equation is significant and positive implying that this period or the crisis also impacted 
significantly on the volatility of the French equity market. 
Table 22: Univariate GARCH results (France): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8237.8027 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0005** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0013 0.0051 
  D1  0.0014 0.0013 
  D2  0.0004 0.0007 
  D3  0.0001 0.0004 
  D4 -0.0004 0.0011 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0891*** 0.0085 
              (c)  0.8867*** 0.0112 
   Lehman  0.0006** 0.0002 
   D1  3.97×10-6 3.15×10-6 
   D2  1.08×10-6 1. 27 ×10-6 
   D3  6.56×10-7 5.31×10-7 
   D4  7.13×10-6*** 2.46×10-6 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0021
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=France.   The information set, Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  are QE 
period dummy variables for the US and. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the value of 
one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
 
The estimation results for the French equity market including the UK QE1-QE3 are reported in 
Table 23. In the mean equation, a significant effect on the returns in the equity market in France 
is documented for the UK QE3. In the variance equation however, two of the three included UK 
QE (intensity) variables i.e. QE2 and QE3 are found to be significant. The dummy incorporating 
the impact of the financial crisis also appear to be a significant source of increase equity market 
volatility in the French equity market.   
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Table 23: Univariate GARCH results (France): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8235.9973 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0005** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0013 0.0051 
  QE1  0.3534 0.2794 
  QE2  0.3713 0.6086 
  QE3 -0.3234* 0.6653 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0864*** 0.0079 
              (c)  0.8934*** 0.0109 
   Lehman  0.0006** 0.0002 
   QE1  0.0012 0.0011 
   QE2  0.0021*** 0.0009 
   QE3  0.0026* 0.0014 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0043
*** 0.0004 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week𝑡, i=France.  The information set,Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 
represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 24 displays the estimation results including the UK D1-D3 periods. It is clear at a glance 
that the estimation results in this table mirrors the estimation results in table 23 including the UK 
QE1-QE3 purchases. Thus, the results are robust regardless of whether the variables included in 
the model specifications are either the QE actual purchases or QE period variables. For instance, 
the variance equation results from Panel b of Table 24 confirms the earlier results obtained for 
the same section of the table from the previous table i.e. the UK QE2 and QE3 period as 
captured by D2 and D3 are significant in tandem with their actual purchase counterparts in the 
previous table.  
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Table 24: Univariate GARCH results (France): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8235.5940 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0005** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0013 0.0051 
  D1  0.0007 0.0010 
  D2  0.0007 0.0015 
  D3  0.0001 0.0017 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0854*** 0.0078 
              (c)  0.8939*** 0.0102 
   Lehman  0.0006** 0.0001 
   D1  2.96×10-6 2.40×10-6 
   D2  4.19×10-6** 2.02×10-6 
   D3  4.62×10-6** 2.10×10-6 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0024
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 +𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 
+𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 𝑡. i=France.   The information set, Ω𝑡−1 , includes all 
information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡  𝐷3𝑖,𝑡   are QE period 
dummy variables for the UK. These event variables take the value of one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** 
** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
Overall, the separate estimation results for the Germany and France markets with the US QE 
variables and the UK QE variables tend to suggest, that the UK QE operation particularly 
impacted more on these Euro-area equity markets especially the French equity market, compared 
to the US QE operations. This finding of the impact coming from the UK QE operations on the 
Euro-area markets, corroborates some earlier findings in the literature including (Chelley-Steeley 
and Steeley, 1996; Maish and Maish, 1997; Meric and Meric 1997) of strong linkages between the 
UK equity market and these European equity markets particularly following the abolition of 
exchange controls and the creation of the single market in 1992.  
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Results for the Australian equity market is reported including the US QE1-QE3 and the MEP 
Table 25). The results reveal marginal significance only in the variance equation on the lower 
panel of the table for the US QE1 variable. None of the QE1-QE3 and MEP coefficients were 
significant in the mean equation. 
 
Table 25: Univariate GARCH results (Australia): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8972.3333 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0007*** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.002 0.004 
  QE1 -0.9803 0.8487 
  QE2 -0.4000 0.2815 
  QE3  0.0369 0.3377 
  MEP  0.3625 0.5646 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0918*** 0.0082 
              (c)  0.8951*** 0.0094 
   Lehman  0.0003* 0.0002 
   QE1  0.0054* 0.0032 
   QE2  0.0003 0.0004 
   QE3  0.0004 0.0003 
   MEP  0.0007 0.0008 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0011
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 
𝑡, i=Australia.  The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 <
1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE 
period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
In the model estimation results including the US D1-D4 for the various phases or periods of the 
QE and MEP, shown on Table 26, none of the D1-D4 variables were significant in the mean or 
variance equations. The estimation results for the Australian equity market are insightful 
compared to the other equity markets estimation results. Of course this is not surprising 
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considering that the unlike the US and UK and even the Euro-area economies, the Australian 
economy was not significantly affected during the financial crisis or great recession (the economy 
actually grew during the period) and hence while the monetary authority there did not execute 
any LSAPs or QE in response. Notwithstanding, the marginal significance of the financial crisis 
and US QE1 variables on the Australian equity market perhaps is more akin to global centre 
hypothesis whereby financial markets react to event(s) happening in the US.  
Table 26: Univariate GARCH results (Australia): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8237.8027 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0007*** 0.0001 
  Lehman  -0.0017 0.0042 
  D1  0.0015 0.0010 
  D2 -0.0004 0.0005 
  D3 -0.0001 0.0003 
  D4 -0.0003 0.0006 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0908*** 0.0081 
              (c)  0.8965*** 0.0092 
   Lehman  0.0004* 0.0002 
   D1  3.35×10-6 2.20×10-6 
   D2  5.65×10-7 6.15 ×10-7 
   D3  4.02×10-7 6.55×10-7 
   D4  7.95×10-7 2.19×10-7 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0011
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=Australia.   The information set, Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  are QE 
period dummy variables for the US and. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the value of 
one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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The estimation results for the Hong-Kong and Japan equity markets including either the QE 
variables or their corresponding phase dummies are presented below in Tables 27-32. The results 
show that the UK and US QE operations had no significant effects on the Asian equity markets.  
 
Table 27: Univariate GARCH results (Japan): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 7921.8996 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0007*** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0035 0.0067 
  QE1 -0.4948 1.0185 
  QE2 -0.6971 0.4952 
  QE3  0.2809 0.6960 
  MEP  0.0289 0.6377 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1108*** 0.0094 
              (c)  0.8710*** 0.0121 
   Lehman < 0.0001 <0.0001 
   QE1  0.0021 0.0036 
   QE2  0.0010 0.0009 
   QE3  0.0038** 0.0018 
   MEP <- 0.0001 0.0017 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0018
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 
𝑡, i=Japan.  The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 <
1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE 
period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 28: Univariate GARCH results (Japan): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 7920.4169 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0005** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0033 0.0067 
  D1  0.0001 0.0011 
  D2 -0.0001 0.0008 
  D3  0.0002 0.0006 
  D4  0.0004 0.0007 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1067*** 0.0111 
              (c)  0.8500*** 0.0136 
   Lehman < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
   D1  4.56×10-6 3.22×10-6 
   D2  1.44×10-7 1.75 ×10-6 
   D3  7.12×10-6*** 1.79×10-6 
   D4  -2.21×10-7 1.30×10-7 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0017
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=Japan.  The information set, Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  are QE 
period dummy variables for the US and. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the value of 
one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 29: Univariate GARCH results (Hong-Kong): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8104.9806 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0006*** 0.0002 
  Lehman   0.0027 0.0073 
  QE1 -0.4179 1.2147 
  QE2 -0.2544 0.4632 
  QE3 -0.1167 0.4371 
  MEP  0.6911 0.6679 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0641*** 0.0070 
              (c)  0.9168*** 0.0081 
   Lehman < 0.0001 <0.0001 
   QE1  0.0042 0.0043 
   QE2  0.0001 0.0006 
   QE3 -0.0007 0.0005 
   MEP -0.0002 0.0009 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0009
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,4MEP𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖  in week 
𝑡, i=Hong-Kong.  The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 +
𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡  represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the 
respective QE period by the Fed. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the QE operation twist in the US. *** ** * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 30: Univariate GARCH results (Hong-Kong): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 8105.9875 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0006** 0.0002 
  Lehman   0.0034 0.0037 
  D1  0.0007 0.0014 
  D2 -0.0008 0.0008 
  D3 -0.0004 0.0004 
  D4  0.0002 0.0007 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0614*** 0.0061 
              (c)  0.9308*** 0.0073 
   Lehman < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
   D1  1.15×10-6 1.98×10-6 
   D2  1.29×10-6 8.71 ×10-7 
   D3  2.35×10-7 3.38×10-7 
   D4 -2.13×10-7 7.23×10-7 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0009
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,4D4𝑖,𝑡  +𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=Hong-Kong.  The information set, 
Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  
are QE period dummy variables for the US and. 𝐷4𝑖,𝑡  is the dummy variable for the US MEP. These dummy variables take the 
value of one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  
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Table 31: Univariate GARCH results (Japan): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 7920.2659 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0006*** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0034 0.0066 
  QE1 -0.3013 0.2446 
  QE2  0.2112 0.3573 
  QE3  0.6340 0.5423 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1124*** 0.0084 
              (c)  0.8717*** 0.0111 
   Lehman  < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
   QE1  0.0007 0.0008 
   QE2 -0.0002 0.0007 
   QE3 -0.0001 0.0001 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0013
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑖,2QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖,3QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week𝑡, i=Japan.  The information set,Ω𝑡−1, 
includes all information known at time𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡, 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 and𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 
represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the respective QE period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 32: Univariate GARCH results (Japan): January 2nd 2004 – October 31st 2014 
Number of Observation: 2713 
Log-likelihood: 7919.2213 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.0005** 0.0002 
  Lehman  -0.0033 0.0066 
  D1  0.0002 0.0009 
  D2 < 0.0001 0.0010 
  D3  0.0014 0.0010 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1126*** 0.0090 
              (c)  0.8718*** 0.0111 
   Lehman  < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
   D1  1.30×10-6 1.94×10-6 
   D2  9.40×10-8 1.62×10-6 
   D3  1.65×10-7** 2.20×10-7 
   𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0013
*** 0.0001 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 +
 +𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡) , and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,1𝐷1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,2D2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,3D3𝑖,𝑡 
+𝜇2𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡. i=Japan.   The information set, Ω𝑡−1, includes all information 
known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variables 𝐷1𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2𝑖,𝑡 𝐷3𝑖,𝑡  are QE period dummy variables 
for the UK. These event variables take the value of one during their respective periods and zero otherwise. *** ** * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
 3.9 Chapter Conclusion 
The objective in this chapter is to identify the effects of the QE or LSAPs on the equity markets 
within and outside of the economies within which the operations took place. Although the 
government bond markets i.e. the US Treasury bond market and the UK gilt-edged or gilts 
market were the main financial markets within which the Fed and BoE conducted their QE 
operations, however, since the pioneering work by Tobin on financial asset imperfect 
substitutability (1958, 1961, 1963), it has long been understood that changes in the supply of one 
asset class can influence the price (yield) of that and other assets.  
The direct upward pressure on bond prices that may come from the central bank’s bond 
purchases can give rise to an additional effect to increase the prices of other assets (implying 
reduction in yields) if the sellers of bonds do not regard the cash received as a perfect substitute 
for the bonds sold, and use the cash proceeds to purchase other assets, such as equity. This is the 
portfolio balance mechanism, which motivates this study of the effects of QE on the equity 
markets and the approach taken to test this channel, is to examine the equity market return and 
volatility behaviour conditioning on the QE operations. An area overlooked by previous studies.   
In meeting the above objective, this chapter of the thesis makes a number of contributions to 
knowledge or an understanding of effects of QE and especially of the equity markets reaction to 
the QE operations. While earlier studies have mostly considered the immediate bond market or 
bond yields reactions to the early phase of the QE operations, the study not also considered that 
for all the QE phases in the UK and US, but in addition also examined more broadly the equity 
market returns and volatility behaviour over the entirety of the QE periods. Also, this study is the 
first to investigate all three phases of QE and the MEP in the US, and all three phases of the QE 
operations in the UK, thus permitting comparisons to be made across the entirety of the QE 
operations not only within or between these two economies but others as well. 
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For each of the QE transmission channels, the chapter created and tested some hypothesis 
identifying the effects on equity returns and bond yields at the time policy was originally 
announced, and over the period of implementation. The most distinguishing contribution is the 
examination of the effects of QE on the US and UK equity markets conditioned on the actual 
purchases and calibration of the Fed and BoE actual LSAPs or QE actions into the modelling 
framework.  
Previous studies that have mostly relied on the event study methodology have implicitly assumed 
that the event period have not been affected or influenced by anything other than the LSAPs 
announcements. However, this is a strong assumption especially juxtaposed against the fact that 
doubling an event window ostensibly doubles the purported impact of the QE announcement on 
financial market yields. Thus a particular drawback of the event study methodology is that the 
event window may contain other non-QE announcements, or happenings that may have 
impacted on yields and returns.  
The empirical models used in the analysis remedies the event study shortcomings, as the actual 
measure of the QE actions or bond purchases are directly included in the GARCH models, thus 
permitting the examination of the QE effects on the return and volatility of the markets 
examined. Using this empirical framework accommodating the QE intensity and period variables 
in both the mean and variance equations, and controls for event such as the financial crisis, this 
chapter is able to empirically establish the equity markets’ reaction function to the QE operations 
prima facie. This chapter to the best of the author’s knowledge is the first to test for the portfolio 
balance and liquidity effects conditioning on the actual QE or LSAPs. The liquidity effects of QE, 
measured through the direct impact on the trade volume in the equity markets as result of the 
actual QE operations of the BoE and Fed. 
 
114 
 
Chapter 4. The Impact of QE on the Covariance of the Stock and Bond Markets 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the effects of the QE operations on the interactions between the bond 
and stock markets by modelling the time-varying conditional covariance between the stock and 
bond markets in the UK and the US. As the bond markets were the major vehicle through which 
the BoE and the Fed carried out their quantitative easing operations, this chapter focuses on the 
effect of quantitative easing from both the intra and international financial market perspectives 
and looks in particular at whether the variance-covariance structure between the stock markets in 
the UK and US (inter) on the one hand, and the stock and bond markets within the UK and US 
(intra) on the other were affected by the individual large scale asset purchase operations of the 
BoE and Fed.  
 
Studies of the covariation between asset markets were greatly advanced by the development of 
multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (MV-GARCH) time series 
models, as applied, for example, by Hamao et al. (1990), Koutmos and Booth (1995), Bekaert and 
Harvey (1995) and Bekaert and Wu (2000). For example, Hamao et al. (1990) discovered that 
shocks to the volatility of financial market returns in one country could influence both the 
conditional volatility and the conditional mean of the returns in another country, while Koutmos 
and Booth documented asymmetric volatility relations between the financial markets of the USA, 
the UK and Japan.  
 
Berben and Jansen (2005a) pioneered the use of time varying correlation structures within the 
MV-GARCH model to study changes in the level of international integration of equity markets.  
Capiello et al (2006) used the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002) to 
explore the asymmetries in the dynamics of global equity and bond markets. Johansson (2010) 
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examined asset markets in both the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, and found during the recent 
financial crisis, that there were increases in correlation among stocks in both regions, but also 
there were increases in markets that were relatively more insulated during these times, such as 
China. 
 
While over time, a number of studies have examined the covariance or interdependence between 
stock markets, only since the last decade have studies begun to explicitly examine the covariance 
or interactions between the stock and bond markets. For example Fleming et.al. (1998) examined 
the volatility interaction of stock, bond, and money markets using a stochastic volatility model. 
They found a strong link in volatility between all three markets, but did not consider the 
conditional covariance between the bond and stock market returns.  Bollerslev, Engle and 
Wooldridge (1988), consider time-varying conditional covariances, using a multivariate GARCH 
model, their focus was on testing the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and did not explicitly 
examine the interactions between the stock and bond markets.  
 
A few studies that have explicitly examined the interactions between the stock and bond markets 
include Marquering and De Goeij (2004), Cappiello et.al (2006), Steeley (2006), and Dean et.al. 
(2010). Marquering and De Goeij (2004) analysed the bond and stock market interactions in the 
US, modelling the asymmetric time-varying covariance between stock and bond market returns 
using daily returns on the S&P 500 index, NASDAQ composite index, and short and long 
Treasury bonds. They found that the conditional covariance change substantially over time, with 
respect to asymmetric effect, they reported that covariance between stock and bond returns tend 
to be relatively low after bad news in the stock market and good news in the bond market. 
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Steeley (2006) analysed the volatility transmission between the stock and bond markets in the UK 
using daily closing observations on the FTSE-100 share price, to represent stock returns, the 
price index of long term government bonds, to represent the return on long term bonds, he 
reported the correlation between short-term yield shocks and long term bond yield shocks to be 
relatively stable during the sample period from June 1984- June 2004.   
 
To explore the interdependence between the Australian stock and bond markets, Dean et.al 
(2010), estimates a bivariate GARCH model with asymmetric effects. They use the bivariate 
asymmetric BEKK model of Kroner and Ng (1998) to parameterise the conditional covariance 
matrix. Using daily returns from the ASX All Ordinaries Total Return Index and the All Lives 
Government Bond Total Return Index from June 1992 to November 2006, they argue that 
volatility asymmetries and spill-over effects occur in returns to the equity market but not to the 
bond market returns.  
 
Several explanations are advanced for the covariance and existent of spill-over effects in return 
and volatility within and between the stock and bond markets in the literature. Notable 
explanations include asset substitution, financial contagion and hedging demand shifts. The asset 
substitution perspective sees stocks and bonds as substitute assets. News that favours stocks 
relative to bond drives investors to buy or switch to stocks or equities, conversely news favouring 
bonds leads investors to buy bonds and sell stocks. Therefore, a positive return shock in one 
market spill-over as a negative return shock in the other market. 
 
Understanding the evolution of the covariance or the nature of linkages between financial 
markets, whether intra- or international is central to establishing the limits of diversification, to 
security pricing, and to successful asset allocation. While there is a sizeable literature examining 
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the international transmission of stock market volatility, and a few examining the intra-national 
transmission or covariance between the stock and bond markets, this chapter not only 
contributes to the literature by investigating both the intra- and inter-financial market volatility 
transmission, but distinguishes itself by specifically examining these from the prism of the QE 
operations. It assesses the impact of QE by the BoE and the Fed on the covariance structure 
between the international equity markets in the UK and US and the covariance structure within 
the UK and US intra-financial markets i.e. the domestic stock and bond markets.  
 
The model used for the empirical investigation in this chapter has threshold changes 
corresponding to the financial crisis and the subsequent QE operations by the UK and US 
monetary authorities. Within this framework, the fundamental question of how the covariance 
structure between the UK and US equity markets; and within the UK and US equity and bond 
markets are affected following the QE operations can be addressed. The organization of this 
chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the methodology and data used for the empirical 
analyses. Section 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of the data. The empirical results are presented 
in sections 4.4 and 4.5 while section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 Methodology and Data        
This chapter estimates the temporal interaction between the UK and US stock and bond markets 
following the QE operations. Specifically, a diagonal VECH (DVECH) model is used to examine 
the conditional covariance structure between the stock markets of the UK and US, and the stock 
and bond markets in the UK and US separately against the backdrop of the QE operations.  In 
the first stage of the empirical analysis, the covariation between the UK and US equity markets is 
modelled to see whether this are affected by the QE operations in the UK and the US. It is not 
parsimonious to include the individual QE intensity and phase variables, as done in univariate 
analysis in the previous chapter, into the model in a multivariate setting, as this would further 
compound the curse of dimensionality, which afflicts multivariate GARCH models.  
 
The solution adopted to enable an examination of the impact of QE and that of the financial 
crisis across the two markets, whilst still making the models relatively parsimonious is to include 
only the QE intensity variables (actual purchases), and combine these on a per country basis, into 
one single variable or index that captures daily QE intensity in that country throughout the entire 
sample period rather than on an individual or periodic basis.  Thus two new variables, QE
𝑈𝐾,𝑡
, 
and QE
𝑈𝑆,𝑡
  are created as: 
 
QE𝑢𝑠,𝑡 = [QE1𝑖,𝑡;QE2𝑖,𝑡; QE3𝑖,𝑡;MEP𝑖,𝑡]                       𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝐾,𝑈𝑆                                     (4.1) 
QE𝑢𝑘,𝑡 = [QE1𝑖,𝑡;QE2𝑖,𝑡; QE3𝑖,𝑡  ]                                                                                          (4.2) 
 
 
  
Thus including both of them in the multivariate specifications of the variances and 
covariance. In this case, the variance processes are similar but aggregated versions of the 
processes specified in the previous empirical chapter, that is      
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ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑖,𝑈𝐾QE𝑈𝐾,𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑖,𝑈𝑆QE𝑈𝑆,𝑡−1      (4.3)                                                                   
 
The variable 𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑈𝑆QE𝑈𝑆,𝑡−1 measuring the impact of the US QE operations is lagged by 
one day to address the issue of the overlap or non-synchronous trading times between the 
US and UK stock markets. While the companion inter-market (UK and US equity 
markets) covariance processes are specified as: 
 
ℎ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑚 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑚𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑚ℎ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡−1 +
𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑈𝐾QE𝑈𝐾,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑈𝑆QE𝑈𝑆,𝑡−1                                         
                                    
(4.4)              
 
 
Asymmetric effects in conditional covariance have been used by some studies in modelling the 
covariance between stock and bond returns. Kroner and Ng (1998) identify three possible forms 
of asymmetric behaviour-(i) the covariance matrix displays own variance asymmetry if hii,t (the 
conditional variance of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ) is affected by the sign of the  innovation in ri,t-1; (ii) cross variance 
asymmetry if hii,t is affected by the sign of the innovation in rm,t-1;(iii) covariance asymmetry if ℎ𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 
(the conditional covariance) is affected by the sign of the innovation in either ri,t-1 or rm,t-1.   
 
For robustness and to accommodate possible asymmetric effects, in modelling the conditional 
covariance between the stock and bond markets i.e. the second stage in the empirical analyses in 
this chapter, two alternate DVECH models i.e. a symmetric and the asymmetric DVECH 
following the approach of Glosten et.al. (1993), allowing explicitly for asymmetric conditional 
covariance terms are estimated.  
 
The choice of the DVECH for the analyses in this chapter is justified on the basis that unlike the 
BEKK model where it may be difficult to track responses in the conditional variances and 
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covariance to specific or individual parameters, due to the quadratic form of the BEKK 
specification, this is not the case with the DVECH specification. This permit with the DVECH, 
an investigation of the effect of specific variable(s) of interest on the variance-covariance matrix. 
The DVECH model used to model the intra-market (equity and bond markets) covariance is 
specified as: 
 
ℎ𝑒,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑒,𝑏 + 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑒,𝑏𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1𝜀𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑒,𝑏ℎ𝑒,𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝑒,𝑏𝐼,𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1𝐼,𝜀𝑏,𝑡−1𝜀𝑏𝑡−1 +
+ 𝑒𝑒,𝑏,𝑈𝐾QE𝑈𝐾,𝑡  𝑜𝑟  𝑒𝑒,𝑏,𝑈𝑆QE𝑈𝑆,𝑡                                                                                              (4.5)                            
 
with  ℎ𝑒,𝑏,𝑡  = covt {𝑟𝑒,𝑡−1 ,𝑟𝑏,𝑡−1} i.e. covariance respectively of the equity and bond markets 
returns. The indicator variable 𝐼𝜀𝑘,𝑡−1 is equal to one if 𝜀𝑘,𝑡−1 < 0 (and zero otherwise), k =𝑒, 𝑏. It 
permits the effect of lagged return shocks in the both equity and bond markets to depend on their signs. 
In the above equation, 𝐼,𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1𝐼,𝜀𝑏,𝑡−1𝜀𝑏,𝑡−1  is nonzero for negative pairs of 𝜀𝑒,𝑡−1 and 𝜀𝑏,𝑡−1. This 
term assigns an asymmetric covariance effect to the covariance matrix. As the sample period begins prior 
to the financial crisis, an indicator variable 𝛼𝑖,1Lehman𝑖,𝑡 starting from the period of the crisis is included 
in the model. We start this period on September 15, 2008, the date that Lehman brothers collapsed or 
declare bankruptcy. In addition, one broad indicative measure of the intensity of the QE operations in 
either the UK or US is included in the relevant model(s). 
 
The covariance equations are estimated by maximum likelihood assuming conditional normality about the 
error terms i.e. 𝜀𝑘,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0,𝐻𝑡), the log-likelihood function (for the sample 1……T) is given 
by  
 ℓ(𝜃)= - 
1
2
 TN log 2𝜋 - 
1
2
 ∑ log det 𝐻𝑡(𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡−1  - 
1
2
 ∑ 𝜀′𝑡 (𝜃)
𝑇
𝑡−1  𝐻𝑡
-1 (𝜃) 𝜀𝑡 (𝜃),                  (4.5) 
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where 𝜃 denotes the vector of unknown parameters, the N × 1 vector 𝜖𝑡 (𝜃) contains the error 
elements 𝜀𝑘,𝑡(𝜃) , and  𝐻𝑡(𝜃) contains the covariance terms ℎ𝑒,𝑏,𝑡 , as defined in equation (4.4). 
The conditions under which the maximum likelihood is consistent and asymptotically normal are 
derived in Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), and they also derived the formulae for asymptotic 
standard errors that are robust to departures from the normality assumption. These robust 
standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics of the reported estimates which are obtained 
using the Berndt et.al (1974) algorithm. 
 
The data employed for the analyses in this chapter consist of the daily closing observations, 
adjusted for dividends, of the FTSE100 and the S&P500 equity indices as proxy for the stock 
markets in the UK and US respectively, and the DataStream-constructed 10-year maturity UK 
and US government bond indices as proxy for longer-term UK and US Treasury bonds 
respectively. The DataStream 10-year Benchmark bond indices are composed of the most liquid 
government bonds and calculated using the European Federation of Financial Analysts (EFFAS) 
methodology. The benchmark indices are based on single bonds and the bond chosen for each 
series is the most representative bond available for the given maturity band at each point in time; 
consideration is also given to yield, liquidity, issue size and coupon. 
 
In addition, to the bond indices, the 10 year yields i.e. the Treasury (US) and Gilt (UK) are used 
for robustness of the empirical analysis. The daily closing data or observations are collected from 
DataStream, and are used to calculate returns as the log daily change in index level for the stock 
and bond indices excluding days when either one or both of the markets were closed. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics.       
Summary statistics for the daily returns to each of the equity and bond markets in the UK and US 
are contained in Table 33. Allowing for the differences in sample size, the mean return and 
standard deviations for the equity markets exceed their counterpart measures for the bond 
markets as expected. The skewness and kurtosis of returns show departure from a normal 
distribution, particularly for the excess kurtosis. The kurtosis is greater for the equity markets 
relative to the bond markets. 
Table 33: Descriptive Statistics UK and US Equity and Bond Markets Return  
   
 
Returns.     No. obs.          Mean           Std. Dev.       Skewness          Kurtosis                                                 
         
UK equity     2803           0.00012        0.01161         -0.15386              12.4667    
UK bond      2803           0.00010        0.00390          0.08590              5.30282   
US equity      2727           0.00022        0.01252         -0.33942              14.4908    
US bond       2727           7.52×10-5         0.00495          0.10263               6.26247     
This table contains summary statistics for daily equity and bond returns in the US and UK.  
 
 
 
Table 34 presents the correlation coefficients for equity and bond returns for both countries, for 
US and UK equity returns, and for the US and UK bond returns. The table shows that the 
correlation between equity markets’ returns is much higher than the correlation between equity 
and bond markets’ returns and slightly higher than the bond markets’ return correlations. While 
both US and UK equity market returns and the US and UK bond market returns are positively 
correlated, both the UK and US bond market returns are negatively correlated with their own 
equity market as well as the other equity market. 
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Table 34: Sample correlation coefficients for equity & bond returns for the UK and US. 
 UK equity US equity UK bond US bond 
UK equity  1.0000    
US  equity  0.5926  1.0000   
UK bond -0.0069 -0.0396 1.0000  
US  bond -0.0275 -0.0421 0.5426 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Empirical Result from the Equity Markets Variance-Covariance Estimation 
In this section, the DVECH estimation result for the variance-covariance of the UK and the US 
equity markets is presented. From the estimation output in Table 35 below, the matrix 𝜔 
captures the unconditional variance, with the element 𝜔11 measuring the unconditional variance 
for the US, with 𝜔22 capturing the unconditional variance for the UK. The off-diagonal element 
𝜔21 captures the unconditional covariance between both equity markets. The matrix  𝑏 measure 
the effects of past errors or domestic shocks on the conditional variance-covariance of the equity 
markets, with the diagonal elements measuring the effects of a domestic shock on the own 
country and the other country equity market variance and the off-diagonal element measuring the 
effects of both countries domestic shocks on the covariance of the equity markets.  
 
The lagged conditional variance effects are measured in the matrix 𝑐, with the diagonal elements 
of this matrix i.e. c11 and c22 measuring the impact of lagged domestic volatility on the conditional 
variances of the US and UK equity markets respectively. Again the off-diagonal element c12 
measures the effect of the lagged conditional covariance between the two markets on the current 
conditional covariance between the two equity markets.  
 
As can be seen from the table below, the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of both the B and C 
matrices are all very significant. This would imply that own past shocks and own past volatility 
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account very significantly for the conditional variance of the US and UK equity markets. In the 
same vein, volatility spill-overs between both equity market also accounts very significantly for 
the covariance between the UK and US equity markets. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the 
estimates of the matrix C are all closer to unity, characterising the usual high degree of volatility 
clustering or persistence as first identified by Fama (1965) and Mandelbrot (1963). 
 
In addition to these standard GARCH matrices, three additional matrices (𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆,  𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  , 𝛼 ) 
measuring the effects of the exogenous variables included in the model capturing the totality of 
the US QE operations, the UK QE operations, and the impact of the financial crisis respectively 
are reported. The elements of the 𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆 measures the effect of the US QE operations on the 
variance-covariance of the US and UK equity markets, with the diagonal elements of this matrix 
measuring the effect on the variance of the US and UK equity markets, and the off-diagonal 
measuring the effect on the covariance between the equity markets. It can be seen that all three 
elements of this matrix are insignificant.   
 
For the 𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 matrix measuring the effect of the UK QE operations on the variance-covariance 
of the US and UK equity markets, the first diagonal element 𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾(1, 1), measuring the effect of 
the UK QE operations on the variance of the US equity market is found to be insignificant. 
However, the second diagonal element 𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾(2, 2),  showing the effect of the UK QE operations 
on the variance of the UK equity market is significant.  Interestingly, the off-diagonal element 
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾(2, 1), of this matrix measuring the impact of the UK QE operations on the covariance 
between the US and UK equity market is strongly significant. Implying that the BoE QE 
operations did in fact bring about an increased or positive covariance between the US and UK 
equity markets.  
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The elements of the matrix 𝛼  measuring the impact of the financial crisis on the variance-
covariance of the US and UK equity markets are all significant. Suggesting that the financial crisis 
increased the variance in both equity markets, as well as the covariance between both equity 
markets.  
Table 35: DVECH estimation of the US and UK equity markets covariance 
   
Variables                               Estímate                                     Standard Error    
𝜔(11)                                                 2.197×10-6 ***                                                           (2.761×10-7)    
𝜔(21)                                         9.006 ×10-7***                                  (1.490×10-7)   
𝜔(22)                                                 1.716 ×10-6***                        (2.749×10-7)      
𝑏(11)                                                 0.0726***                                          (0.0062)     
𝑏(21)                                                 0.0459***                                                             (0.0046)    
𝑏(22)                                                  0.0715***                                                              (0.0063)                                            
𝑐(11)                                                 0.8983***                                                              (0.0081)     
𝑐(21)                                                 0.9242***                                                              (0.0072)                                                                                                                                                   
𝑐(22)                                                 0.9028***                                                               (0.0074)   
𝛼(11)                                                  2.148×10-4 **                                     (8.553×10-5)                                                                                                                                                     
𝛼(21)                                                1.113×10-4**                                       (4.341 ×10-5)       
𝛼(22)                                                 1.598×10-4***                                      (5.125 ×10-5)                                           
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (11)                 3.396×10
-5                                          (2.108×10-4)      
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (21)                            2.851×10
-4                                           (1.914×10-4)        
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (22)                           3.810×10
-4                                            (3.301×10-4)    
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  (11)                           4.915×10
-4                                            (3.234×10-4)       
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (21)                                             5.900×10
-4**                                           (2.501×10-4)                  
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (22)                                             6.255×10
-4*                                            (3.689×10-4) 
   
Log-Likelihood     18249.3791 
   
                                               
Multivariate Q-stats              value                     significance                               X2                  
Q (10)                              60.4514                 0.1535                                 40             
Q (12)                              65.4094                 0.1162                                 48              
Q (24)                              101.1657               0.3394                                 96             
      
This table reports estimation results of Equation (4.4) using daily data from January 2004, to October 2014. Robust Bollerslev-
Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
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The effect of the QE operations on the US and UK equity market covariation is also considered 
using an average of two days in lieu of the lag treatment used previously; and also without 
remedying for the non-synchronous timings between these financial markets18. The results of 
these re-estimations presented below in Tables 36 and 37 respectively reveal no major difference 
from the earlier estimation results above. 
Table 36: DVECH estimation of the US and UK equity markets covariance 
   
Variables                               Estímate                                     Standard Error    
𝜔(11)                                                 4.467×10-6***                                                           (5.186×10-7)    
𝜔(21)                                         6.868 ×10-5***                                  (4.292×10-6)   
𝜔(22)                                                 3.931 ×10-6***                        (4.594×10-7)      
𝑏(11)                                                 0.050***                                           (0.0052)     
𝑏(21)                                                 0.015**                                                             (0.0067)    
𝑏(22)                                                  0.0486***                                                              (0.0051)                                            
𝑐(11)                                                 0.8990***                                                              (0.0097)     
𝑐(21)                                                 0.8397***                                                              (0.0844)                                                                                                                                                   
𝑐(22)                                                 0.9014***                                                               (0.0089)   
𝛼(11)                                                  2.585×10-4 **                                     (1.020×10-4)                                                                                                                                                     
𝛼(21)                                                3.445×10-4**                                       (1.407×10-4)       
𝛼(22)                                                 1.465×10-4***                                      (4.398×10-5)                                           
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (11)                 7.062×10
-4                                          (4.108×10-4)      
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (21)                            1.731×10
-3                                           (1.841×10-4)        
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (22)                           1.258×10
-4                                            (2.490×10-4)    
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  (11)                            1.843×10
-4                                            (2.239×10-4)       
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (21)                                               2.740×10
-3***                                         (6.510×10-4)                  
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (22)                                                4.427×10
-4**                                          (1.8139×10-4) 
   
Log-Likelihood     18283.0812 
   
                                               
Multivariate Q-stats              value                     significance                               X2                  
Q (10)                              60.4514                 0.1535                                 40             
Q (12)                              65.4094                 0.1162                                 48              
Q (24)                              101.1657               0.3394                                 96             
      
This table reports estimation results of the US and UK equity market covariation using the average of two days in lieu of the lag 
used in Equation (4.4) for the daily data from January 2004, to October 2014. Robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *** ** * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics 
is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
                                                          
18 To alleviate the resulting nonsynchronous trading issues, returns at weekly frequency have also been used by some studies e.g. 
Cappiello et.al. 2006  
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Table 37: DVECH estimation of the US and UK equity markets covariance 
   
Variables                               Estímate                                     Standard Error    
𝜔(11)                                                 2.113×10-6 ***                                                           (2.748×10-7)    
𝜔(21)                                         8.328 ×10-7***                                  (1.454×10-7)   
𝜔(22)                                                 1.564×10-6***                                    (2.747×10-7)      
𝑏(11)                                                 0.0805***                                          (0.0066)     
𝑏(21)                                                 0.0509***                                                             (0.0048)    
𝑏(22)                                                  0.0778***                                                              (0.0065)                                            
𝑐(11)                                                 0.8954***                                                              (0.0083)     
𝑐(21)                                                 0.9241***                                                              (0.0072)                                                                                                                                                   
𝑐(22)                                                 0.9018***                                                               (0.0078)   
𝛼(11)                                                  2.148×10-4 **                                     (8.553×10-5)                                                                                                                                                     
𝛼(21)                                                1.113×10-4**                                       (4.341 ×10-5)       
𝛼(22)                                                 1.598×10-4***                                      (5.125 ×10-5)                                           
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (11)                 3.674×10
-5                                          (2.152×10-4)      
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (21)                            2.068×10
-4                                           (1.865×10-4)        
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (22)                           3.448×10
-4                                            (3.300×10-4)    
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  (11)                           4.303×10
-4                                            (3.264×10-4)       
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (21)                                             5.064×10
-4**                                           (2.454×10-4)                  
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (22)                                             5.285×10
-4*                                            (3.661×10-4) 
   
Log-Likelihood     18263.3512 
   
                                               
Multivariate Q-stats              value                     significance                               X2                  
Q (10)                              60.4514                 0.1535                                 40             
Q (12)                              65.4094                 0.1162                                 48              
Q (24)                              101.1657               0.3394                                 96             
      
This table reports estimation results of the US and UK equity market covariation without remedying for a synchronicity using 
daily data from January 2004, to October 2014. Robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) 
variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
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It is important that non-linear models such as the ARCH types are correctly specified to ensure 
consistency. To this end, tests to evaluate the adequacy of the models are based on the 
standardized residuals defined as ?̂?i,t =?̂?i,t?̂? t-1/2 for i = e,b. Correct specification entails that the 
distribution of the standardized residuals ?̂? t ~  iid (0,I) and that [𝑧𝑖,𝑡]   and [z
2
i,t] are serially 
uncorrelated.  
 
Table 38 reports the p-values associated with these tests. Multivariate generalisations of the 
Ljung-Box tests for rth order serial correlation are also provided on the lower panels of Table 37.  
The Ljung-Box test is a popular diagnostic for models with time-varying conditional second 
moments as it addresses whether the model has adequately captured the serial correlation in the 
second moments. As can be seen from these tables, there remains no autocorrelation in the 
models suggesting that the models provides adequate descriptions of the daily stock returns 
dataset.  
 
Table 38: Standardized residual tests 
   
 
                           E (𝑧)                                 E (z2)                                
         
  UK               0.1936    0.2984 
  US               0.1646    0.3444 
This table presents specification and diagnostics tests for the DVECH equation. The rows of the lower panel are p-values from 
tests of (𝑧) and (z2) which are the standardized residuals and squared residuals from the equations for the UK and US. 
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Table 39 is the result from the re-estimation the sample excluding the structural breaks in the UK 
and US equations. As can be seen from the table the results are robust to the exclusion or 
provision for structural breaks. An increasing number of coefficients i.e. from the UK QE 
operations is revealed following the smaller sample size estimation.  
 
Table 39: DVECH estimation of the US and UK equity markets covariance 
   
Variables                               Estímate                                     Standard Error    
𝜔(11)                                                 3.916×10-6 ***                                                           (8.486×10-7)    
𝜔(21)                                         1.680 ×10-6***                                  (5.022×10-7)   
𝜔(22)                                                 2.295 ×10-6***                        (7.043×10-7)      
𝑏(11)                                                 0.0978***                                          (0.0112)     
𝑏(21)                                                 0.0561***                                                             (0.0077)    
𝑏(22)                                                  0.0638***                                                              (0.0091)                                            
𝑐(11)                                                 0.8538***                                                              (0.0161)     
𝑐(21)                                                 0.9003***                                                              (0.0138)                                                                                                                                                   
𝑐(22)                                                 0.9019***                                                               (0.0151)   
𝛼(11)                                                 -                                                   -                                                                                                                                                   
𝛼(21)                                                -                                                          -    
𝛼(22)                                                 -                                                          -                                          
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (11)                1.202×10
-4                                          (4.369×10-4)       
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆 (21)                            1.813×10
-4                                           (3.705×10-4)        
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝑆  (22)                          2.337×10
-4                                            (5.467×10-4)    
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  (11)                           9.426×10
-4*                                           (4.981×10-4)       
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (21)                                             8.227×10
-4**                                           (3.543×10-4)                  
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾 (22)                                             7.459×10
-4*                                            (4.198×10-4)  
   
Log-Likelihood     9497.5498                                                   
   
   
Multivariate Q-stats              value                     significance                               X2                  
Q (10)                              197.6064               0.2399                                 40             
Q (12)                              205.9483               0.2118                                 48              
Q (24)                              241.63516             0.1375                                 96             
      
This table reports estimation results of Equation (4.4) using daily data from January 23rd 2009, to October 31st 2014. Robust 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
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Table 40: Standardized residual tests 
   
 
                           E (𝑧)                                 E (z2)                                
         
  UK               0.5470    0.7668 
  US               0.1604    0.4080 
This table presents specification and diagnostics tests for the DVECH equation. The rows of the lower panel are p-values from 
tests of (𝑧) and (z2) which are the standardized residuals and squared residuals from the equations for the UK and US.                                              
 
 
 
4.5 Empirical Result from the Equity and Bond Markets Covariance Estimation 
In this section the estimation results of the parameters that govern the dynamics in the variances 
and covariance from a symmetric and asymmetric DVECH models, pertaining to the equation 
4.5 (see above) are reported in Tables 41 and 42, respectively for the UK and US financial 
markets. Starting with the UK equity and bond markets, there is strong evidence in favour of 
strong effects on the covariance between the equity and bond markets, coming from the variables 
included in the models for both the symmetric and asymmetric DVECH.  
 
Most of the corresponding estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
estimates for the coefficients on the covariance of the returns’ shocks or innovation (i.e., b21) 
between the equity and bond markets in the symmetric (0.048)   and asymmetric (0.038) models 
are positive and strongly significant. This positive estimate for the ARCH term in the covariance 
equation could be interpreted that two shocks of the same sign affect the conditional covariance 
between the UK equity and bond market positively. The estimates of the lagged volatility (i.e., c21) 
on the covariance of the returns are also statistically significant in both models with values close 
to unity.  
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Moving on to the asymmetric terms in the asymmetric DVECH model, There is no evidence of 
any significant asymmetric or leverage effects on the covariance between the UK equity and bond 
markets. The coefficient for the asymmetric effect in covariance (i.e., d21) is insignificant. The 
only significant asymmetric term is the asymmetric term (d11) in the variance of the UK equity 
market returns, thus suggesting for the UK that asymmetric effects are only statistically 
significant in the stock market in line with existing evidence from the literature. [Glosten et.al. 
(1993), Engle and Ng (1993) and Dean et.al (2010)]. 
 
The exogenous variables in the model (i.e. indicator variables for the financial crisis and the QE 
operations) reveal some interesting results. We document evidence of significant covariance 
between the UK equity and bond markets following the financial crisis and the subsequent QE 
policy response or operations. The estimated coefficients for these two variables (i.e. d21 and 
QEUK21) are statistically significant and negative in both the symmetric and asymmetric models.  
 
That the QE operations engendered a negative covariance between the bond and equity markets 
sounds plausible or is compatible with the asset substitution hypothesis. If considered that that 
the QE operations represents a negative shock to the bond market which through the portfolio 
balancing mechanism and asset substitution filters into the stock market implies a negative 
covariance between the bond and equity market following such QE operations.  
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Table 41: Estimation results equity and bond market variance-covariance (UK) 
   
    Symmetric DVECH    Asymmetric DVECH 
Variables Estímate Standard Error   Estímate Standard Error                  
𝜔(11)  1.423×10-6*** (2.318×10-7)    6.356×10-7***      (1.566×10-7) 
𝜔(21)            -1. 408 ×10-7*** (4.246×10-8)   -6.210 ×10-8 (4.888 ×10-8) 
𝜔(22)  1.285 ×10-7***  (2.983×10-8)    1.090 ×10-7***    (2.789 ×10-8)   
𝑏(11)  0.088***  (7.504×10-3)    0.011*             (5.779 ×10-3) 
𝑏(21)  0.048***  (5.158×10-3)    0.038***            (4.618 ×10-3) 
𝑏(22)   0.023***  (4.178×10-3)    0.022*** (4.334 ×10-3)                                            
𝑐(11)  0.895***  (7.864 ×10-3)    0.929***  (5.936×10-3)   
𝑐(21)  0.928***  (7.377 ×10-3)    0.941***  (6.704×10-3)                                                                                                                                                  
𝑐(22)  0.962***  (5.910×10-3)    0.967***  (5.729×10-3)  
𝑑(11)   -                   -         0.114***  (0.011)                                                                                                                                                 
𝑑(21)                   -                                  -      -0.012    (0.019) 
𝑑(22)  -                                 -      -3.192×10-3  (6.265×10-3) 
𝛼(11)  3.145×10-5 (4.485×10-5)    9.732×10-7  (2.040 ×10-5) 
𝛼(21)            -6.490×10-6** (3.161×10-6)   -4.689×10-6**  (2.024×10-6)    
𝛼(22)  6.190×10-7 (4.157×10-7)    4.922×10-7  (3.846×10-7) 
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾(11) 1.249×10
-3***  (3.850×10-4)     6.582×10-4***  (2.515×10-4) 
𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾  (21) -3.548
 ×10-4***  (1.017×10-4)    - 2.907×10-4***   (8.283×10-5) 
 𝑒𝑄𝐸𝑈𝐾(22)   1.847×10
-4***    (3.839×10-5)      1.668 ×10-4***   (3.508×10-5) 
       
Log-Likelihood         21209.8795                                           21168.4073 
      
Multivariate Q-stats    value    significance      X2                 value       significance     X2 
Q (10)                   42.4251    0.3668         40             42.0925     0.3804        40 
Q (12)                   49.2367    0.4234         48             48.6600     0.2272        48 
Q (24)                  108.6988   0.1770         96            106.0316    0.2272        96 
      
This table reports estimation results of Equation (4.5) for the UK using daily data from January 2004, to October 2014. Robust 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
Table 42 shows the estimation results for the US equity and bond markets. There are a few 
compelling observations to be made concerning the estimation results from the symmetric and 
asymmetric DVECH models. For instance, the parameter matrix b which reflects the ARCH 
components in the both the symmetry and asymmetry models, has the estimate for the 
coefficient on the variance of the own return shocks to the equity market (i.e. b11) in the 
asymmetry model insignificant.  
 
Furthermore, unlike for the UK, for the US the parameter matrix d reflecting the asymmetric 
components in the asymmetric DVECH model has two (i.e. d11 and d21)   of its three components 
significant. The variable d11 shows impact of the asymmetric effect on the variance of the US 
equity market returns. The variable d21 shows the impact of the asymmetric effects on the 
covariance between the US equity and bond markets. The coefficient or estimate for this variable 
is significant implying, that for the US, the covariance between the equity and bond markets 
exhibit significant leverage effects and the covariance is negative as shocks increase when the 
signs differ.  
 
The estimates for the QE and the variable measuring the impact of the financial crisis are also 
presented. Similar to the estimated results for the UK, evidence of a significant negative 
covariance between the US equity and bond markets following the Federal Reserve QE 
operations is reported. The result is robust to both the symmetric and asymmetric models and 
thus a similar explanation as provided above for the UK is inferred here for the US also. The 
congruence or harmonization of the US and UK estimation results with regards to the exogenous 
QE variables robustly show the response of the conditional covariance between the equity and 
bond markets in the UK and US separately, to the large scale asset purchases or QE phenomena 
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and thus is presented as strong evidence of the impact of QE on the covariation between the 
equity and bond markets. 
Table 42: Estimation results equity and bond market variance-covariance (US)  
                    
Symmetric DVECH    Asymmetric DVECH 
Variables Estímate Standard Error    Estímate Standard Error                  
𝜔11  1.362×10-6*** (2.730×10-7)  5.513×10-7*** (1.601×10-7) 
𝜔21  -4. 757 ×10-8 (4.246×10-8)       5.442 ×10-8  (4.973 ×10-8) 
𝜔22   1.155 ×10-8***  (4.853×10-8)   1.125 ×10-7***  (3.619 ×10-8)   
𝑏11  0.083***  (7.139×10-3)  -1.470×10-3     (5.832 ×10-3) 
𝑏21   0.056***  (5.522×10-3)  0.045***  (4.678 ×10-3) 
𝑏22   0.042***  (4.897×10-3)  0.036***  (5.720 ×10-3)                                            
𝑐11  0.902***  (7.636 ×10-3)   0.937***  (5.465×10-3)   
𝑐21  0.926***  (6.560 ×10-3)  0.939***  (5.941×10-3)                                                                                                                                                  
𝑐22                      0.951***  (4.852×10-3)  0.953***  (5.032×10-3)  
𝑑11  -                           -                        0.136***  (0.012)                                                                                                                                                 
𝑑21                   -                                        -              -0.025*  (0.014) 
𝑑22   -                                        -     8.242×10-3 (6.271×10-3) 
𝛼(11)  -5.867×10-6 (3.882×10-5)  -4.653×10-5** (4.456 ×10-6) 
 𝛼(21)  -7.733×10-6 (6.637×10-6)  5.412×10-7 (8.985×10-7)    
𝛼(22)  6.969×10-7 (9.599×10-7)   4.922×10-7  (3.846×10-7) 
𝑒𝑈𝑆(11)  5.112×10
-4* (2.668×10-4)  2.354×10-5  (1.598×10-4) 
𝑒𝑈𝑆(21)  -3.908×10
-4*** (1.021×10-4)           - 2.386×10-4***  (7.789×10-5) 
𝑒𝑈𝑆(22)  1.194×10
-4**  (4.966×10-5)  1.108 ×10-4**  (4.762×10-5) 
       
  Log-Likelihood         19972.2008                                       21168.4073 
      
                  
Multivariate Q-stats value significance X2 value  significance X2 
Q (10)   49.0078 0.1554         40 49.0078      0.1554         40 
Q (12)   51.8776 0.3252         48 53.9937      0.2561         48 
Q (24)    107.8599 0.2413       96 108.8195    0.1750         96 
      
This table reports estimation results of Equation (4.5) for the US using daily data from January 2004, to October 2014. Robust 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on multivariate Q-stats. 
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Table 43: Standardized residual tests 
   
 
 Panel A: UK    DVECH  asymmetry DVECH                                                                    
         
E (𝑧𝑒)     0.1515    0.1295 
E (z2e)     0.0742    0.3930 
E (𝑧𝑏)     0.1490    0.1423 
E (z2b)     0.3140    0.2689 
 
Panel B:  US 
E (𝑧𝑒)     0.1080    0.1338 
E (z2e)     0.1467    0.2855 
E (𝑧𝑏)     0.1701    0.1674 
E (z2b)     0.3080     0.3742 
This table presents specification and diagnostics tests for the symmetric and asymmetric DVECH. The first four rows of Panel A 
are p-values from tests of (𝑧𝑒) and (𝑧𝑏) which are the standardized residuals from the equation for the UK equity and bond 
markets, respectively. The panel B shows the standardized residuals from the equations for the US equity and bond markets, 
respectively.                                              
 
 
As a robustness check on the results from the equity and bond market covariation, an alternate 
measure to the bond indices i.e. the 10 year Treasury yield is also used in re-estimating the equity 
and bond market covariation for both the US and UK, with results reported in Tables 44 and 45 
respectively. The results of the impact of QE on the covariance between the equity and bond 
markets, using the 10 year government bond yields is robust for both the US and UK estimation 
with no change in the sign nor significance of the parameters, earlier reported using the bond 
indices. 
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Table 44: Estimation results equity and 10 yield variance-covariance (US) 
     
Variables                                     Estímate                                   Standard Error                  
𝜔11                                                        4.792×10-5***                                                  (3.605×10-6)   
𝜔21                                             5.106 ×10-6***                              (3.132×10-6)       
𝜔22                                                         1.228 ×10-4***                                                    (5.686×10-6)   
𝑏11                                                        0.240***                                (0.0122)   
𝑏21                                                         0.238***                                                      (0.0123)   
𝑏22                                                         0.239***                                                        (0.0125)                                              
𝑐11                                                        0.766***                                                        (0.0455)     
𝑐21                                                        0.765***                                                                             (0.0451)                                                                                                                                                    
𝑐22                                                                            0.763***                                                                             (0.0448)                                                                                                                                             
𝛼(11)                                -5.867×10-6                               (3.882×10-5)  
 𝛼(21)                                                     -7.733×10-6                                                                         (6.637×10-6)     
𝛼(22)                                                       6.969×10-7                                                                         (9.599×10-7)   
𝑒𝑈𝑆(11)                                 0.0425
***                                                                          (0.0086)   
𝑒𝑈𝑆(21)                                           -0.0837
***                                                                          (0.0128)            
𝑒𝑈𝑆(22)                                                       0.0982
***                                                                           (0.0215) 
   
Log-Likelihood                            19972.2008  
   
 Multivariate Q-stats          value                          significance                          X2 
Q (10)          49.0078                             0.1554                                     40  
Q (12)          51.8776                             0.3252                                     48  
Q (24)           107.8599                           0.2413                                     96  
      
This table reports estimation results for the US equity and bond yield covariation estimation using daily data from January 2004, 
to October 2014. Robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** *, denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on 
multivariate Q-stats. 
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Table 45: Estimation results equity and 10 yield variance-covariance (UK) 
     
Variables                              Estímate                                       Standard Error                                                      
𝜔11        5.198×10-5***                                                              (3.984×10-6) 
𝜔21                      2.310×10-5***                                      (4.522 ×10-6) 
𝜔22        9.917×10-5***                                                                 (4.994×10-6)   
𝑏11      0.228***                                                (0.0132) 
𝑏21       0.223***                                              (0.0130) 
𝑏22       0.2250***                                                                   (0.0134)                                            
𝑐11       0.7237***                                                                   (0.0504)   
𝑐21      0.7267***                                                                     (0.0502)                                                                                                                                                  
𝑐22                          0.7227***                                                                      (0.0504)                                                                                                                                               
𝛼(11)    -4.653×10-5**                                                                 (4.456 ×10-6) 
 𝛼(21)                          5.412×10-7                                                                  (8.985×10-7)    
𝛼(22)       4.922×10-7                                                                    (3.846×10-7) 
𝑒𝑈𝐾 (11)      0.0314
***                                                                     (0.0079) 
𝑒𝑈𝐾 (21)                                     -
 0.0854***                                                                      (0.0126) 
𝑒𝑈𝐾 (22)                 0.1195
***                                                                      (0.0219) 
   
Log-Likelihood                   21168.4073  
   
Multivariate Q-stats               value      significance                           X2 
Q (10)    49.0078            0.1554                     40 
Q (12)    53.9937            0.2561                     48 
Q (24)     108.8195          0.1750                      96 
      
This table reports estimation results for the UK equity and bond yield covariation estimation using daily data from January 2004, 
to October 2014. Robust Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** ** *, denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Multivariate Q-statistics is the Ljung and Box (1979) variant on 
multivariate Q-stats. 
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4.6 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter an investigation of the time-varying conditional covariance between the stock 
markets in the UK and US; and the stock and bond markets within the UK and within the US 
against the backdrop of the quantitative easing operations implemented by their respective 
monetary authorities in the aftermath of the financial crisis, was carried out using the DVECH 
model. The results from the multivariate analysis of both the UK and US equity markets revealed 
that the QE operations had a positive impact on the variance-covariance structure of the UK and 
US equity markets, with the effect coming mainly from the UK QE operations.   
 
The estimation results from both the symmetric and asymmetric DVECH models used to model 
the covariance between the stock and bond markets within the UK and within the US suggests 
that the QE operations both in the US and the UK brought about substantial changes in the 
conditional covariance between the stock and bond markets. Specifically, the conditional 
covariance between the bond and stock markets in the US and UK was negatively significant 
following the QE operations by the BoE and Fed. Similarly, it is found that both bond and equity 
market variance were elevated following the QE operations in the UK irrespective of whether a 
symmetric or asymmetric model is estimated.  
 
In the US, the chapter finds that the asymmetric model provides no evidence of heighted 
variance for the equity market following the Fed QE operations even though a marginally 
significant positive variance effect was detected by the symmetric model. With respect to 
asymmetric effects, it was detected for the US, that not only variance (of the equity market), but 
also the covariance, between the stock and bond markets show significant asymmetric or leverage 
effects. No such significant asymmetric covariance effect between the UK stock and bond 
markets was found however.  
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While evidence of changing or heteroskedastic covariances across assets and financial markets 
have been reported over time, in the literature e.g. French et.al (1987), Bollerslev et.al (1988), 
Harvey (1989), Bodurtha and Mark (1991)] their sources are yet to be well identified. Moreover, 
none of the earlier or even later studies in the literature up until now, had given any consideration 
to financial markets covariation against the backdrop of a novel experience like the QE 
operations, thus not just focusing on the impact of an event such as a financial crisis or financial 
market crash. This study is thus distinguished from the other earlier studies in the literature in the 
aspect of investigating the covariation between the equity and bond market against a novel 
experience of the QE.   
 
The major contribution of this chapter investigating the covariation between financial assets and 
across financial markets against the novel QE or LSAPs experience in the UK and US, is in fact 
that, LSAPs of the QE kind is a significant source of covariation or heteroskedastic (positive) 
covariance between the stock or equity markets and negative covariation between bond and stock 
markets. This has practical implication from for financial asset market investors. 
 
From modern portfolio theory we know that investors should diversify between different 
financial assets and markets. The findings in the chapter would suggest that investors stand in 
good stead to benefit from tactical asset allocation between the bond and stock (intra-financial) 
markets, with QE operations in effect. The implication for inter-equity markets portfolio risk 
diversification however, is different when QE operations are in effect. This find becomes even 
more worthy of note especially if taken into consideration that the toolkit of monetary policy in 
aftermath of the financial crisis has been expanded to now include a hitherto unconventional tool 
in the mode of QE. 
             
140 
 
                Chapter 5. QE and Long-run Equity Market Co-movements? 
5.1: Introduction. 
In the preceding chapter it was empirically established that the QE operations engendered a 
significant increase in covariance between the UK and US equity markets. Since investors might 
hold in their portfolios assets from more than one financial market at a time, to diversify 
portfolio risk, equity markets co-movement particularly if for a long-term should concern 
investors’ vis-à-vis their portfolio risk diversification motive. Although the QE operations 
appeared to have impacted significantly on the covariance between the UK and US equity 
markets, it remains to be seen whether this QE induced significant increase in covariance has a 
long-run implication i.e. are the equity markets more converged or cointegrated as a result?   
 
Partly informed by the global nature of the October 1987 stock market crash, a voluminous 
literature investigating various aspects of international equity markets interaction now exist albeit 
with conflicting conclusions. On the one hand are studies like French and Poterba (1991) which 
investigates within a mean-variance framework, the correlations between different national equity 
markets and the potential benefits of international portfolio diversification. On the other hand 
are studies such as Harvey (1991), Engel (1994), Bekaert and Harvey (1995) which investigate the 
extent to which equity returns can be explained by international asset pricing theories. There is 
also a large number of research including for example King and Wadhwani (1990) which focuses 
on the transmission of information and shocks between national stock markets.  
 
Yet a strand of the literature starting with Taylor and Tonks (1989) and Kasa (1992) focus on 
long-horizon relationship by testing for cointegration across national stock market indices. Kasa 
(1992), using monthly and quarterly data from 1974 through August 1990  argued that the price 
(including dividends) indices for the equity markets of five major industrial countries including 
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the US, Japan, UK, Germany and Canada were all cointegrated. Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) 
examining the linkages and dynamic interactions among stock price indices in the major world 
stock exchanges for the period of January 1980 through May 1990, using the alternate Engle and 
Granger (1987) residual-based cointegration technique, reported evidence of significant 
international co-movements in stock price indices since the crash of October 1987. In their study, 
the three major European stock markets (i.e., France, Germany and the UK) were found to be 
cointegrated with the US stock market. Richards (1995) examined the statistical basis for the 
rejection by Kasa (1992) of the null hypothesis of no cointegration between different equity 
markets. He argued that the finding of a cointegrating relationship by Kasa was due to a failure to 
adjust asymptotic critical values to take account of the small number of degrees of freedom 
warranted by the small number (57) of observations.  
 
Notwithstanding, that the benefits of international portfolio diversification which depends on the 
extent of heterogeneity among different equity markets diminishes in the presence of 
cointegration, since that would mean that in the long-run, correlations amongst market become 
stronger and the return and risk profile of different equity markets would move together. Studies 
continue to find evidence of increasing interdependence and co-movements between different 
markets, which have been attributed in some cases to increasing relaxation of exchange controls 
and increasing macroeconomic integration both regionally and globally. For instance in a study 
investigating the impact that the removal of exchange controls within major European economies 
had on the interdependence of European equity markets, Chelley-Steeley and Steeley (1996) 
found that the European equity markets (UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and France) have 
become substantially more integrated after the removal of exchange controls during the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s, which heralded the creation in 1992 of the single market.  
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Providing additional evidence on cointegration for three major European stock markets (France, 
Germany and the UK), Rangvid (2001) found a decreasing number of common stochastic trend(s) 
influencing the stock markets i.e. the degree of convergence among European stock markets has 
increased during the recent two decades, corresponding to the very period after which capital 
restrictions have been lifted throughout the Euro area. However, Pascual (2003) argued that the 
Johansen cointegration test provides increasing values of the trace statistics, which a priori may 
be interpreted as an increasing support for cointegration but that if the cointegration test is fixed 
by keeping the sample size constant, no support or evidence for increasing cointegration or an 
increasing number of cointegrating vector is found. 
 
Huang et.al. (2000) examined the causality and cointegration relationships among the stock 
markets of the US, Japan and the South China Growth Triangle (SCGT) region consisting of 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Southern part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the 
period starting October1992 to 1997. They found no cointegration relationship within the 
members of the SCGT, or between SCGT and the US, or between SCGT and Japan. But an 
examination of the lead, lag or feedback relations showed a significant Granger causality between 
the US and members of the SCGT, such that the US price changes could be used to predict 
subsequent day price changes in the Hong Kong and the Taiwan stock markets. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing literature that conflicting or non-unanimous findings exist to the 
question of whether equity markets are cointegrated with each other. The financial crisis and its 
aftermath i.e. the turbulence or contagion effect (Roll, {1998}) witnessed across major financial 
markets, coupled with the monetary authorities response to the financial crisis in the form of the 
QE operations by the BoE, the Fed and lately the ECB, juxtaposed with the finding in the 
previous chapter of a significant increase in covariance between the UK and US equity markets’  
143 
 
engendered by the QE actions and spill-over effects, particularly from the UK QE operations 
into the French and German equity markets, provides a compelling reason to revisit this debate. 
Thus, this chapter investigates or test for long-run equity market co-movement against the 
backdrop of the QE operations, amongst the equity markets in the UK, US and the Euro-area 
(France and Germany).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section explains the 
methodology- including  unit root, vector auto-regressions (VARs), multivariate cointegration 
tests, Granger causality and impulse response functions as well as the data used for the empirical 
analyses. The results of the empirical analyses are presented in sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. While 
section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2: Methodology and Data 
To achieve the aims of this chapter of the thesis, several econometric tests including tests for unit 
root/stationary, multivariate cointegration tests and Granger causality tests are used. The unit 
root analyses mainly derives from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test introduced by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) in the following equation: 
  
∆𝑥𝑡= 𝛼 +  𝛽𝜏 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖∆𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (5.1) 
 
where ∆ = 1-L, 𝑥𝑡= stochastic variable at time t, 𝜏 =trend variable, and 𝜀𝑡 the white noise error 
term. The unit root null hypothesis tests  𝐻0 : 𝛿  = 1 (i.e. contains a unit root) in the above 
equation against the one-sided alternative 𝐻1  δ < 1 (i.e. stationary). The power of the ADF 
statistic however is low when there is a structural break, since structural breaks can induce 
apparent unit roots in stationary autoregressive time series (Perron, 1989). The ADF test may fail 
to reject the 𝐻0 in the presence of structural break(s). To circumvent this problem Perron and 
Vogelsang (1992) included a dummy variable in (5.1).  
 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) pointed out that the Perron’s approach is not without its own 
problem, arguing that ‘a skeptic of Perron’s approach would say that his choices of breakpoints 
are based on prior observation of the data and hence problems associated with ‘pre-testing’ are 
applicable to his methodology’ (pp. 251). Subsequently, Zivot and Andrews (1992) modify the 
ADF specification to: 
 
  ∆𝑥𝑡= 𝛼 +  𝛽𝜏 + 𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝜆) +  𝛿𝑥𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖∆𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                          (5.2)                        
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Where DUt(𝜆) =1 if t >T𝜆, (otherwise zero); 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) = 𝑇𝐵/T depicts the location or relative 
timing of the change point or structural break; T is total number of observations; 𝑇𝐵 is the time 
or date when the structural break occurred in the trend function, which is treated as  unknown, 
priori. Zivot and Andrews (1992) simulate a set of critical values for different  𝜌, upon which the 
estimation results hinges.  
 
In addition to the above specifications or tests for unit roots, the analysis in this chapter is further 
confirmed with the complimentary test of KPSS (1992) that assumes stationarity under the null 
hypothesis. The analysis shows that the null hypothesis could not be rejected under the three 
different test statistic used. This is to say that the stochastic variables or logarithmic stock price 
indices are all integrated i.e. I (1) and stationary in first differences.   
 
Next an analysis of the logarithmic stock price indices in levels is run based on the following 
VAR model of order p specified as: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ Φ𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  + Ψ𝑧𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                      (5.3) 
 
With 𝑦𝑡 an n ×1 vector of jointly determined (endogenous) variables i.e. the logarithmic stock 
prices at time t, Φ
𝑖
 is an N × N matrix, 𝑧𝑡 is a q × 1 vector of exogenous variables, and  𝑢𝑡  is an 
m × 1 vector of unobserved white noise disturbances. The choice of p is based on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). The components of the vector 𝑧𝑡 are known as exogenous variables 
and they are the UK and US (QEUK and QEUS) variables determined outside of the VAR 
system i.e. there are no equations in the VAR with any components of  𝑧𝑡 as dependent variables.  
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One potential concern regarding the analysis from the above restricted or reduced form VAR 
pertain to the endogeneity of the QE or LSAPs to the system. This potential weakness is 
mitigated by the fact that QE or the bond purchases were announced ex-ante by the BoE and 
Fed and thus are pre-determined or independent of the prevailing prices in the equity markets. 
Neither was there any indication that the BoE and Fed purchases were at any point adjusted to 
accommodate conditions in the equity markets. In other words it is the QE bond purchases that 
influence equity prices via a mechanism through which QE is theorised to operate and not the 
equity market prices or conditions determining the monetary authorities QE or bond purchases. 
 
For the cointegration analysis, the Johansen (1988 and 1991) cointegration procedure is 
employed. The Johansen cointegration technique extends the Engle and Granger (1987) 
pioneering single-equation or residual based cointegration technique to a multivariate framework. 
Following Johansen (1988), this chapter consider a general vector error-correction (VECM) 
model of the following form: 
 
 ∆𝑦𝑡= 𝜇 + 𝛤1∆𝑦𝑡−1+…. + 𝛤𝑘−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑘+1 + П𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡                                            (5.4) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑡= (p × 1) vector of logarithmic stock prices at time t; П = (p × p) parameter matrix; 𝜇 = 
(p × 1) intercept term. The parameter matrix, П, shows whether or not the (p × 1) vector of stock 
prices has a long-run or equilibrating relationship. П is composed of 𝛼𝛽′,  where both 𝛼 and 𝛽  
have dimension p × r. 𝛽 contains the r cointegration vectors and 𝛼 the loading coefficients. The 
rank (r) of П equals the number of cointegrating vectors. If the rank of П = 0, Eq. (5.4) collapses 
to a standard VAR model in first differences. If П has full rank, all the stock price series in the 
system are stationary in levels. Cointegration exist if the rank of П is between zero and the 
number of stock indices (0< 𝑟 < 𝑁).  
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The existence of a cointegrating vector is followed up with an evaluation of the sub-vector space 
to determine if any of the univariate series in the system do not belong in the cointegrating 
equation. This is done by specifying the restriction that their parameters are zero i.e. testing the 
hypothesis that a particular series do not appear in the cointegrating relationship.  The test 
statistic follow a  𝜒2 (one) degree of freedom in each case for the univariate series.  
 
The Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) states that if two or more time-
series are cointegrated, then there must be Granger causality between them- either one-way or in 
both directions. The causality tests are based on the VECM, which shows the long-run dynamics 
of the adjustment process between the equity series or indices in the system. Impulse response 
functions are presented from the VECM. The VEC IRFs indicate the strength and magnitude 
with which shocks are transmitted within the system from one equity series to another.  
 
 It is noteworthy that while the analyses in the previous empirical chapters focused on returns, 
this chapter focus more strongly on the relationship among the stock prices that were used to 
calculate returns. Sample data included in this chapter comprise the daily price indices (adjusted 
for dividends) of the stock markets in the UK (FTSE100), the US (S&P500) and the Euro area i.e. 
Germany and France (DAX30 and the CAC40). These price indices are collected from 
DataStream and converted to natural logarithms and cover the period from January 2004 to 
October 2014.  
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5.3: Empirical Results  
5.3.1: Unit root tests 
 The study implement regular unit root tests, that is, the ADF (1981) and the Phillips and Perron 
(1987); and the KPSS (1992) stationary test (Table 46). The ADF and PP tests confirm that the 
null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels of the stock price indices cannot be rejected at all 
conventional significance levels, while a unit root in the first differences of the stock prices is 
rejected at all significance levels. The results of the KPSS test, also show that the null hypothesis 
of stationarity is rejected for all four price indices, confirming the results from the ADF and PP 
tests. 
 
To incorporate the possibility of a structural change in the series examined, this study, in addition 
to the regular unit root tests also uses the Z&A sequential test for a unit root against the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity with a single structural change in the deterministic 
components (i.e. intercept and trend) at some unknown point.  The Z&A unit root test results 
are presented in (Table 47). A visual inspection of this table reveals that with the exception of the 
S&P (significant at the 0.05), the test fail to reject the null hypothesis for all the price indices at all 
conventional significance levels. In other words, the logarithmic stock prices are all I (1), 
including the S&P (i.e. at the 0.01) significance level. Worthy of note also is that the break date 
that minimizes the one-sided t statistic for testing 𝛿 = 1 for the S&P is significant and does 
actually correspond to the year and the month of the financial crisis. Precisely, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers around 2008:09. For the UK, France and Germany equity markets, the 
break points occurred for the FTSE and CAC on 2008:04 and much earlier for the DAX on 
2007:1219  
                                                          
19 The break date detected by the Z&A test for the UK, France and Germany stock price indices were all insignificant. 
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 Generally, the regular unit root tests conform to test results produced from the Z&A unit root 
tests that incorporates a structural break. Thus all four stock price indices are found to be I (1) or 
generally stationary in first differences as depicted in the graphs below.  
 
Figure 8: Graphical plot of the price indices in levels  
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Figure 9: Graphical plot of the price indices in first differences 
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Table 46: Tests for a unit root (ADF, PP, and KPSS) with drift and trend 
Series    ADF   PP   KPSS 
LCAC    -1.9513   -2.073   0.543 
∆LCAC   -33.993***  -55.921***  0.095 
 
LDAX    -2.220   -2.111   0.481 
∆LDAX   -52.733***  -52.836***            0.064 
 
LFTSE    -2.361   -2.584   0.494 
∆LFTSE   -26.837***  -55.488***  0.052 
 
LS&P    -1.335   -1.393   0.873 
∆LS&P   -41.858***  -58.804***  0.084 
      
Note: This table shows the results of the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981; ADF), Phillips and Perron (1987; PP) unit root 
tests used to test for the nonstationarity of the series. A confirmatory analysis or test using the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, 
and Shin (1992; KPSS) that assumes stationarity under the null hypothesis was also conducted. ∆ Stands for first difference of the 
respective price indices. *** denotes significance of the test of 𝛿 = 1 at the 1% level. 
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Table 47: Tests for a unit root (Z&A) with drift and trend 
Series    T            𝑇𝐵 k 𝛼 𝛽  𝛾 𝛿  𝜇 S (e) 
LCAC 2773 2008:04 7 .082 .000 -.006 -.009  -.000 .014 
                                     (3.97)(2.09)(-3.66)       (-3.93)            (-.958) 
 
LDAX 2773 2007:12   7   .085  .000 -.006 -.010  -.000 .013                                            
                                    (4.56)  (4.01) (-4.56)      (-4.55)             (-2.60) 
 
LFTSE 2773 2008:04  7  .127  .000 -.006 -.010    0.00 .012 
                                  (4.96)      (3.40)(-4.43)      (-4.94)              (-.830)      
 
LS&P 2773 2008:09   7  .164      .000 -.013 -.023  .000 .013                           
                (5.24)   (2.6) (-4.87)     (-5.21**)             (4.66) 
      
Note: This table shows the results for the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test based on the equation ∆𝑥𝑡= 𝛼 +  𝛽𝜏 + 
𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝜆) +  𝛿𝑥𝑡−1 +∑ 𝜃𝑖∆𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑘−1
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡. Where DUt(𝜆) =1 if t >T𝜆, (otherwise zero); 𝜆 ∈ (0,1) = 𝑇𝐵/T depicts the location or 
relative timing of the change point or structural break; T is total number of observations; 𝑇𝐵  is the time or date when the 
structural break occurred in the trend function. The t statistics are in parenthesis. The t statistic for 𝛿 is for testing 𝛿 = 1. K is the 
lag. ** denotes significance of the test of 𝛿 = 1 at the 5% level, using the critical values from Table 4A of Z&A (1992). 
 
 
 
5.3.2: VAR 
In order to capture the properties in the four univariate series, a VAR of the univariate series in 
log levels, including an intercept in each equation is estimated. A first step in the estimation of 
any VAR model, is to ascertain the appropriate lag length based on the relevant information 
criteria. An examination of the information criteria (see appendix) shows that while the Schwarz 
criterion (SC) suggests a maximum lag length of four, the Akaike (AIC) suggested nine as the 
maximum lag length for the VAR. Further specification test of the VAR model residuals using 
the LM test for serial correlation (see appendix), corroborates the AIC, suggesting also that the 
serial correlation is removed if the lag length is increased to nine. The VAR model estimated with 
9 lags (see appendix) appear to have stable dynamics (see appendix).  
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5.3.3: Multivariate cointegration 
Before proceeding with the cointegration test a decision need to be made on the appropriate 
specification for the cointegration test. This essentially boils down to whether an intercept, a 
trend or both are included in the potentially cointegrating relationship. A sensitivity analysis of 
the data to the type of specification (see appendix) shows the number of cointegrating vectors 
suggested by the trace and Max-Eigen statistics is one, given a linear or quadratic model with 
both an intercept and trend. The two lower panels (AIC and SIC) further provide information 
that could be used to select the appropriate model and lag length.  
 
The AIC selected a linear model with an intercept and trend with one lag, the SIC suggested two 
different models of either no intercept no trend, or an intercept and no trend without any lag. A 
visual inspection of the graphical plots (see above) of the datasets i.e. the logarithmic levels of the 
stock indices however show a consistent trend or pattern particularly around the fall of 2008. 
Hence a linear cointegration model with an intercept and trend using one lag as suggested by the 
AIC is implemented for the cointegration test.  
 
The results from the Johansen cointegration test for the full sample period from January 2004 to 
October 2014 is presented below in Table 48.The value of the trace test statistic under the null of 
r = 0 is 70.349 which is higher than the critical value of 63.876, the value of the λmax test statistic 
under the null of r = 0 is 45.707, which is higher than the critical value of 32.118. However, for 
all other values of r, the trace and λmax tests statistic are lower than the critical values allowing the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of more than one co integrating vector between the series in the 
system.  
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Table 48: Johansen cointegration test for the full sample period Jan. 2004 to Oct. 2014 
       
Null Hypothesis     Alternative       Test statistic        p-value 
 
Trace test   
r=0    r≤1   70.3497*** 0.0129 
r=1    r≤2   24.6424 0.8073 
r=2    r≤3   11.7374 0.8298 
Max.eigenvalue test 
r=0    r≤1   45.7072***  0.0006 
r=1    r≤2   12.9050 0.8108 
r=2    r≤3   7.6646  0.8504 
Note: This table shows the Johansen maximal eigenvalue and trace tests. *** denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level, 
and r denotes the number of cointegrating relationships. P-values are from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). 
 
 
As only one cointegrating vector is found amongst the four series in the system, the study 
proceeded with an evaluation of the sub-vector space to determine if any of the univariate series 
in the system does not belong in the cointegrating equation. Interesting only in the case of the US 
equity market, the (S&P500) was the p-value insignificant (p-value >0.10) implying that the 
cointegrating relationship does not include the US equity market (see appendix). A similar result 
to this, with regards to the US equity market was found by Taylor and Tonks (1989) following 
the removal of exchange control in the UK.  
 
In other to assess the impact of QE (if any) on the cointegration result, the full sample period is 
divided into a pre-QE and a QE period. An increasing number of cointegrating vectors for either 
of these sub-periods relative to the full sample could constitute evidence of the impact or non-
impact of QE on the stock markets cointegration. Starting with the pre-crisis/QE sample 
(1/1/2004-31/8/2008), the Johansen cointegration test is re-estimated and the results are 
presented below (Table 49). Unlike in the full sample results, this indicates two cointegrating 
vector for both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue (λmax). It is not implausible however, 
the increased cointegrating vector is due to decreased precision in parameter estimates as a result 
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of the reduced sample size, rather than to any fundamental change in the underlying cointegrating 
relationship between the equity markets.  
 
Table 49: Johansen cointegration test for the pre-crisis period (1/1/2004-29/8/2008) 
   
Null Hypothesis   Alternative        Test statistic      p-value 
 
Trace test   
r=0    r≤1   74.4099*** 0.0051 
r=1    r≤2   40.3763* 0.0878 
r=2    r≤3   12.2226 0.7964 
Max.eigenvalue test 
r=0    r≤1   34.0336**  0.0288 
r=1    r≤2   28.1536** 0.0242 
r=2    r≤3   6.9872  0.9016 
Note: This table shows the Johansen maximal eigenvalue and trace tests. *** ** * denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively, and r denotes the number of cointegrating relationships. P-values are from MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) 
 
The Johansen cointegration results for the QE sample period as shown in Table 50 indicates one 
cointegrating vector for the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test, which is consistent with 
the result from the full sample cointegration analysis.  
 
Table 50: Johansen cointegration test for the QE period (11/3/2009- 31/10/2014) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis  Alternative           Test statistic      p-value 
 
Trace test   
r=0    r≤1   75.0288*** 0.0044 
r=1    r≤2   32.1985 0.3778 
r=2    r≤3   12.5641 0.7715 
Max.eigenvalue test 
r=0    r≤1   42.8302***  0.0017 
r=1    r≤2   19.6344 0.2647 
r=2    r≤3   9.2424             0.6993 
Note: This table shows the Johansen maximal eigenvalue and trace tests. *** denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level, 
and r denotes the number of cointegrating relationships. P-values are from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
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5.3.4: VECM 
The evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the series suggest the use of the error 
correction model (VECM) in testing for causality. The VECM is based on the error correction 
term (ECT) from the multivariate cointegrating equation and the variables in the system include 
the lagged values of the CAC, DAX, FTSE, and S&P.  
 
The VECM result for the full sample period is presented first in Table 51. The lagged ECT from 
the cointegrating equation is found to be statistically significant only in the equation for the DAX 
(Germany) with its coefficient size of approximately -0.04 suggesting a 4% error correction or 
(daily) speed of adjustment to deviations from long-run equilibrium. The DAX can be predicted 
by its own lagged price change and by the lagged price changes of the other three equity indices 
i.e. the CAC, FTSE and S&P. For the remaining three equity indices, the error term is 
insignificant, but the lagged price changes of the CAC and the S&P are good predictors for the 
CAC or French stock prices. The lagged price changes of the CAC, the FTSE and the S&P are 
good predictors for the FTSE stock prices. While the lagged price change of the S&P appear to 
be good predictors for the other three equity stock indices, only the lagged price change of the 
S&P index is a good predictor for the S&P stocks.   
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Table 51: VECM Results for the entire sample period Jan. 2004 to Oct. 2014 
   
 
Error Correction: ∆LCAC ∆LDAX ∆LFTSE ∆LS&P                                                           
 
ECTt-1    -0.0034 -0.0434
*** .-0.0011      -0.0042 
 (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0065) 
 
∆LCACt-1  -0.2965*** 0.0692*  -0.1883*** -0.0440 
(0.0446) (0.0425) (0.0368) (0.0416) 
        
∆LDAXt-1  0.0242  -0.1755*** -0.0073  -0.0079 
(0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0178) (0.0202) 
 
∆LFTSEt-1  -0.0320  0.2107*** -0.1077*** 0.0492 
(0.0504) (0.0480) (0.0416) (0.0470) 
 
∆LS&Pt-1  0.4866*** 0.1996*** 0.4386*** -0.0947*** 
(0.0253) (0.0241) (0.0209) (0.0237) 
 
C   -3.73×10-5 0.0002  6.34×10-5 0.0002 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
Note: This table shows the VECM estimates for the entire sample period Jan. 2004 to Oct. 2014. Standard errors in parenthesis, 
*** ** * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. ECT is the error correction term from the cointegrating 
equation. ∆ is the difference operator. C is the constant term 
                        
 
As it was earlier reported that an evaluation of the sub-vector space revealed that the 
cointegrating relationship found for the entire sample did in fact not include the US equity 
market, the study also estimated a VECM excluding the US equity market (S&P).   The result of 
the re-estimated VECM is presented in Table 52. The ECT is still found to be significant only in 
the price change of the DAX equation of the ECM. However, the lagged price changes of the 
DAX index appear to now be good predictors for the CAC index, while none of the lagged price 
changes appear to be predictors for the FTSE index. 
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Table 52: VECM estimates excluding the US equity market. 
   
 
Error Correction: ∆LCAC  ∆LDAX  ∆LFTSE                                                                                 
 
ECTt-1   -0.0034   -0.0435
***  -0.0012            
(0.0073)  (0.0066)  (0.0062)        
 
∆LCACt-1  -0.1293***   0.1376***  -0.0375        
(0.0466)  (0.0422)  (0.0389)  
        
∆LDAXt-1   0.0339*  -0.1715***   0.0013               
(0.0230)  (0.0209)  (0.0192)     
 
∆LFTSEt-1   0.0773         -0.2557***  -0.0091             
(0.0533)  (0.0483)  (0.0445)             
 
C   -3.76×10-5  0.0003                0.0001             
(0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)           
 
Note: This table shows the VECM estimates excluding the S&P500, for the entire sample period Jan. 2004 to Oct. 2014. Standard 
errors in parenthesis, *** ** * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. ECT is the error correction term from 
the cointegrating equation. ∆ is the difference operator. C is the constant term.          
 
 
The VECM for the pre QE and QE periods are presented below, in Tables 53 and 54 
respectively. For the pre-QE sample period, the ECT is found to be statistically significant in the 
price change equation of the DAX. However, for the QE sample period, the ECT is statistically 
significant in the price change equations of all four equity market indices. For the sub-periods, 
the lagged price changes of some of the other equity prices also appear to be fair predictors (with 
a 0.1 significance level) for the S&P. 
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Table 53: VECM Result for the Pre-QE period Jan. 2004 to Aug. 2008 
   
 
Error Correction: ∆LCAC ∆LDAX ∆LFTSE ∆LS&P                                                           
 
ECTt-1   -0.0094  -0.0712
*** -0.0100       0.0169** 
(0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0079) (0.0079) 
 
∆LCACt-1  -0.2260*** 0.2462*** -0.1411** -0.0012 
(0.0610) (0.0619) (0.0550) (0.0550) 
        
∆LDAXt-1  0.0767*** -0.0551** 0.0158  0.0341* 
(0.0266) (0.0270) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
 
∆LFTSEt-1  -0.1200* 0.0147  -0.2024*** -0.0108 
(0.0671) (0.0681) (0.0604) (0.0605) 
 
∆LS&Pt-1  0.4997*** -0.0556* 0.4455***           -0.0769** 
(0.0368) (0.0374) (0.0332) (0.0333) 
 
C   0.0001  0.0003             0.0001  0.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
 
Note: This table shows the VECM estimates for the pre-QE period. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** ** * denotes significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. ECT is the error correction term from the cointegrating equation. ∆ is the difference 
operator. C is the constant term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
Table 54:  VECM for the QE period (11/3/2009-9/10/2014).  
   
 
Error Correction: ∆LCAC ∆LDAX ∆LFTSE ∆LS&P                                                           
 
ECTt-1   -0.0051
*** -0.0034*** -0.0047*** -0.0042*** 
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
 
∆LCACt-1  -0.2005*** -0.1507** -0.1178** -0.0334 
(0.0764) (0.0731) (0.0568) (0.0605) 
        
∆LDAXt-1  0.0283  0.0346  0.0056             0.0540 
(0.0732) (0.0700) (0.0544) (0.0579) 
 
∆LFTSEt-1  -0.0019  -0.0352  -0.0521  0.1118* 
(0.0749) (0.0716) (0.0544) (0.0593) 
 
∆LS&Pt-1  0.3119*** 0.3114*** 0.2695*** -0.1566*** 
(0.0449) (0.0430) (0.0334) (0.0356) 
 
C   0.0001  0.0003  0.0002  0.0007*** 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
 
Note: This table shows the VECM estimates for the QE period. Standard errors in parenthesis, *** ** * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. ECT is the error correction term from the cointegrating equation. ∆ is the difference 
operator. C is the constant term.  
 
 
 
5.4: Causality tests 
Next to be estimated is the Granger causality/block exogeneity test using chi-square (Wald) 
statistics for the joint significance of each of the other endogenous variable in levels. The 
reported estimates are asymptotic Wald statistics with the p-values in parentheses. The causality 
tests based on the error correction model are shown below for the full sample, the pre-QE and 
QE sample periods.  
 
For the full sample period, results indicate a unidirectional causality from the S&P to the other 
three equity markets .Unidirectional causality is also reported from the FTSE to the DAX, and 
from the CAC to FTSE (see table 55). The results for the pre-QE and QE sample periods are 
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presented in tables 56 and 57 respectively. For the Pre-QE sample, results show a unidirectional 
causality from the S&P to the CAC and FTSE. Also, a bidirectional causality between the FTSE 
and the CAC, as well as between the DAX and the CAC is detected. While for the QE sample 
period, unidirectional causality from the S&P to the CAC, DAX and FTSE; and from the CAC 
to the DAX and FTSE is detected. 
 
Table 55: VEC Granger causality for the full sample period   
    Excluded variables   
Dependent LCAC  LDAX  LFTSE   LS&P       
LCAC            1.2486        0.4034            367.5741*** 
         [0.2638]      [0.5253]           [0.0000]   
           
LDAX  2.6475    19.2542***           68.2224***      
  [0.1037]              [0.0000]            [0.0000] 
  
LFTSE  26.0946*** 0.1696                 438.9829*** 
  [0.0000]       [0.6804]                   [0.0000]  
  
LS&P  1.1155         0.1533             1.0952       
  [0.2953]       [0.6954]     [0.2953]               
   
Note:  This table shows the Granger causality/Block exogeneity test results for the joint significance of the endogenous variables. 
*** ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Significance implies that the column 
variable Granger causes the row variable. 
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Table 56: VEC Granger causality for the pre-QE sample period       
    Excluded variables   
Dependent LCAC  LDAX  LFTSE   LS&P       
LCAC            8.3053***  3.1970*            183.5575*** 
         [0.0040]      [0.0738]           [0.0000]   
           
LDAX  15.8074***   0.0467             2.2107      
  [0.0001]              [0.8288]           [0.1371] 
  
LFTSE  6.5827**   0.4339               179.6364*** 
  [0.0103]      [0.5101]                  [0.0000]  
  
LS&P  0.0005         2.0235             0.0319       
  [0.9816]       [0.1549]     [0.8581]               
   
Note:  This table shows the Granger causality/Block exogeneity test results for the joint significance of the endogenous variables. 
*** ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Significance implies that the column 
variable Granger causes the row variable. 
 
 
 
Table 57: Granger causality for the QE sample period                 
    Excluded variables   
Dependent LCAC  LDAX  LFTSE   LS&P       
LCAC            0.3368       0.0382            53.5060*** 
         [0.5617]     [0.8449]           [0.0000]   
           
LDAX  5.1988**       0.4730            57.6947***      
  [0.0226]                  [0.4916]                     [0.0000] 
  
LFTSE  5.3114**   0.0975                71.9275*** 
  [0.0212]      [0.7548]                  [0.0000]  
  
LS&P  1.0609              1.8362         2.3515       
  [0.3030]           [0.1754]        [0.1252]               
   
Note:  This table shows the Granger causality/Block exogeneity test results for the joint significance of the endogenous variables. 
*** ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Significance implies that the column 
variable Granger causes the row variable. 
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5.5: Impulse Response Functions 
The Figure below shows orthogonalised impulse response functions (IRFs) from the VECM 
estimation. Each graph plots a 10 day impulse response function of the respective variable to an 
orthogonalised one standard deviation shock to the other variables in the system. Thus, for each 
variable from each equation individually, a unit shock is applied, and the effects upon the system 
are graphically depicted. The graphs show that a one standard deviation shock to the S&P 
generates a contemporaneous effect of around 0.04 percent in the CAC, DAX and FTSE series 
and the impacts remain significant up to the 10th lag. The observed impulse responses (ranging 
from 0.07-0.10) of the DAX, FTSE and the S&P to a one standard deviation shock to the CAC is 
more likely attributable to the ordering  with the CAC index being first in the system.  From the 
diagram, the CAC seems only responsive to its own shocks and then shocks to the S&P.  
 
A one standard deviation shock to the FTSE generates a contemporaneous effect of about 0.02 
percent in the S&P that remains significant to the 10th lag. The responses of the CAC to a one 
standard deviation shock to the FTSE although little is significantly different from zero, up to the 
10th lag.  The DAX appears a little responsive to shocks to the FTSE with the effect significant to 
the 10th lag as well. The individual stock indices or price series response to their own one standard 
deviation shock(s) are more profound and significant compared to the impulse response 
functions of the series to the others in the system. 
Figure 10: VECM Impulse Réponse Functions         
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5.6: Chapter Conclusion 
Against the background of the findings from the previous chapter to the effect that the period of 
the QE operations resulted in a significant increase in covariance between the UK and US equity 
markets, this chapter sought to unravel or ascertain if this QE induced increase in covariance 
means increasing cointegration between the equity markets. To this end, the daily logarithmic 
stock price indices of the US, UK, France and Germany equity markets were analysed. These 
price indices were all found to be integrated i.e. I (1).  
 
The Johansen’s multivariate cointegration test was conducted on the daily stock price indices of 
the aforementioned national equity markets. Only one cointegrating vector as indicated by both 
trace statistic and maximum Eigen value was found among the univariate price series in the full 
sample analysis. A further perusal of the sub-vector space of the cointegrating relationship for the 
period (full sample) indicates that while the three European national equity markets belong to the 
cointegrating vector, the US equity market did not. 
 
The VECM estimated was used to disentangle two effects.  First, to show the dynamic 
interactions between the series or price indices in the system, and more importantly, to ascertain 
if the QE operations have had any significant impact on the dynamic interaction between the 
equity markets. While the pre-QE sub sample analysis showed an increase in the number of 
cointegrating vectors relative to the full sample analysis, the QE sub-sample analysis show no 
increasing number of cointegrating vectors.  
 
These results from the equity market analysis taken as a whole suggest no evidence of increasing 
long-run or cointegrating relationship against the backdrop of the QE operations especially 
between the US equity market and the other equity markets in the system. While this particular 
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finding is in contrast with the findings of Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993), it is however more in 
line with the findings of Taylor and Tonks (1989). What is more unique to the current study 
however, is that the findings of no long-run comovements is against the backdrop of the novel 
LSAPs following the QE operations implemented by the monetary authorities in the UK and US. 
This appears to suggest that the estimated QE effects on the equity markets were generally short-
lived or transient. Notwithstanding the similar and near simultaneous nature of these QE 
implementation by the BoE and the Fed. 
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                                                 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1: Introduction 
This thesis examined the impacts of the QE operations as implemented by the BoE and the Fed 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, on the broader financial market particularly the 
equity markets. As evident in the comprehensive literature review on the effects of the QE, 
carried out it the second chapter of this thesis, this aspect of the effects of the QE has not been 
given much consideration in the literature. The comprehensive analyses of the impacts of the QE 
or large-scale asset purchases on the broader financial market are necessary if monetary 
authorities are to depend on the QEP to achieve their objectives and also to prevent unintended 
consequences such as financial markets distortions. This thesis provide empirical investigations 
of the impacts or effects of QE on financial market stability including equity market volatility, 
equity-equity, and equity-bond markets covariance as well as equity market cointegration.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of the study with reference to the research 
objectives of the study set out at beginning, highlights the main contributions of this thesis to 
knowledge/the existing QE literature and then address the limitation of the study before 
suggesting an area for further research on the topic.   
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6.2: Summary of Findings 
Quantitative easing (QE) is an unconventional monetary policy, and the probable impacts of this 
policy on the broader aspects of the financial markets were unknown. This thesis has examined 
these aspects of the possible impacts of QE on the returns and volatility of the equity markets, 
the covariance between equity markets, and the covariance between equity and bond markets, 
and the effect on equity market cointegration. Even though the bond markets were the main 
vehicles through which the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve as the monetary authorities 
in the UK and US respectively, conducted the QE operations, however, since the pioneering 
work by Tobin (1958, 1961, 1963), it has long been understood that changes in the supply of one 
asset class can influence the price of other assets, if the assets are imperfect substitutes. This 
portfolio balancing mechanism anchored on the doctrine of imperfect substitution between 
financial assets provides a nexus to the broader aspects of the financial market beyond the bond 
markets and hence the theoretical grounding and motivation for this research. 
 
Modelling the conditional volatility of the individual equity market returns in the UK and the US,  
using a GARCH model augmented with the QE intensity, period, and the financial crisis 
indicator variables, the study finds that, the actual QE purchases brought  about significant 
reduction in the returns of the US and UK following their respective QE3 operations. The 
insignificant decline in returns of the other actual QE phases both in the UK and US are 
attributed to the yields or returns have adjusted already to the earlier QE announcements that 
heralded the actual purchases as revealed in the event study analysis.   
 
For the measure of the QE liquidity effects, the results show that both the QE operations by the 
Fed and the BoE QE improved liquidity as measured by the impact of the QE operations on the 
equity market trade volume trade in aftermath of the market strains or stress following the crisis. 
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Although volatility in the US and UK equity markets fell overall during the period of the QE, on 
specific days of actual QE activity in the UK, the volatility of equities increased in proportion to 
the amount of assets being purchased under the QE programmes. However, this impact on the 
UK equity market volatility was only observed during the early phase of the BoE QE operations, 
with the subsequent phases and duration of the QE actions leading to a reduction in the equity 
market volatility. This finding suggests that the equity market in the UK progressively adapted to 
the QE actions as the BoE interventions continued. The Fed and especially the BoE QE 
operations also appear to have had some modest impacts on the equity market in France and 
Germany. While the Australian equity market reacted marginally to the Fed QE1, as revealed by 
the empirical estimates of these equity markets against the backdrop of the UK and US LSAPs. 
 
In the light of the simultaneous and almost similar nature of the QE operations in the UK and 
US, an investigation of whether the BoE and the Fed QE actions had an impact on the 
covariance structure between the equity markets in the UK and US, and the equity and bond 
markets within the US and UK was carried out. A DVECH specification was used to model the 
variance-covariance conditioning on threshold changes that depend on the transition through 
certain time periods corresponding to the financial crisis and the entirety of the quantitative 
easing operations. For the variance-covariance structure of the US and UK equity market, the 
results reveal that the BoE but not the Fed QE operations impacted on the variance-covariance 
structure of the US and the UK equity markets. Specifically, the covariance between the two 
markets increased significantly following the BoE QE operations. For the variance-covariance 
structure of the bond and equity markets within the UK and the US, the results from both the 
symmetric and asymmetric models used indicate that the QE operations had a significantly 
negative impact on the covariance structure of the bond and equity markets in both the UK and 
US.  
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Informed by the finding of the significantly increased covariance between the UK and US equity 
markets following the QE operations, the thesis, in order to establish if this increased covariance 
imply increasing cointegration for the equity markets, examined the long-run relationship in a 
framework incorporating cointegration tests, VECM and Granger causality tests. The results 
coming from the long-run evaluations of the effects of the BoE and Fed QE purchases on the 
equity markets examined, ultimately show that the effects appear to be without an increased long-
run or equity market cointegration relationship. 
 
6.3: Contributions of the Research 
This research major contribution to the empirical literature is examining the impact of the 
unconventional monetary policy actions or the QE operations of the BoE and Fed on the 
returns, volatility, cross-correlations, covariance and cointegration of the broader financial 
markets particularly in the US and UK. Thereby avoiding a major pitfall of earlier studies in the 
literature just focusing on the impact of the QE operations on government bonds yields.  To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis represents the first thorough analyses of the effects 
from the signalling, portfolio rebalancing and liquidity channels of QE. Thus, a major 
contribution to the theoretical literature, of the thesis is providing a way of separating and testing 
the effects from the signalling and portfolio balance channels of QE.  
 
Hitherto, the literature on central bank LSAPs has mostly used event studies focusing on the 
response of yields in the bond market to QE announcement to analyse these channels. In 
addition to carrying out an event study of the QE announcements, this thesis goes further by 
quantifying the actual QE purchases themselves in both the US and UK and capturing the effects 
of both on the equity and bond markets directly in the empirical  modelling or methodology 
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used.  This way, the thesis is able to isolate the relative effects of the QE theoretical channels in 
addition to providing an international or cross country comparisons of the QE operations which 
is a major contribution to the literature, as prior studies have only focused on a single country. 
By broadening the analyses of the impacts of QE on the financial markets to more than a single 
country, an added contribution of this research to the literature is in providing a comparative 
study allowing us see if QE activity affects not only the equity market of the country within 
which the QE activity took place but if also they had any effect in another country that may not 
be engaging in QE at all or at the same time.  
 
Most of the studies of the effects of QE hitherto had focused on a single country either the US 
or the UK and also on only the earlier phase of the QE operations, using monthly data. By 
incorporating all the phases of QE in the UK and US, this research provides an extension to the 
existing literature not just by including all the phases of QE in the UK and the US, but also by 
isolating their separate effects, using daily data, measuring the intensity of QE activity on a 
particular day and calibrating this into the data generating and modelling processes. The QE 
intensity measure captures the actual size of QE activity on a particular day, to determine whether 
this has an effect beyond a general effect of the markets being within a phase of QE.  
 
From the academic standpoint, overall, this research offers substantial contributions to several 
parallel literatures on equity market volatility, equity-bond market covariation and equity market 
cointegration, as well as adding to the overall body of research that has examined the effects of 
QE generally. This thesis also has practical implications both from an investor’s angle and the 
monetary authority perspective. From an investor angle, the contributions offered from the 
results of this thesis particularly on the covariation between the equity and bond markets, is that 
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effective portfolio risk diversification or tactical asset allocations between the bond and stock 
markets are particularly beneficial when monetary authorities engage in QE actions or operations.   
Furthermore, as the toolkit of monetary policy in aftermath of the recent financial crisis has been 
expanded to now include an hitherto unconventional tool in the mode of QE, an added 
contribution of this research from a policy maker’s perspective would be to have a better 
appreciation of the financial market reaction function to a QE policy, thereby standing them in 
good stead to minimize unintended consequences or distortions to financial market or asset 
prices from the use of QE should the need arises in subsequent or future periods. The insight to 
be gleaned by the monetary authorities, from the empirical analyses from this thesis is that the 
effect of the QE on the financial asset market appear quite short-lived or transient to warrant any 
long-term financial market distortion. 
 
6.4: Limitations of the Study and Suggested Area for Further Research 
One potential limitation of the study is that it could not measure nor calibrate into the modelling 
process, the data on the ECB QE purchases. This was because the ECB QE only started much 
later and the ECB QE data were inaccessible at the time of writing up this research. 
Consequently and in the light of this limitation of the study, it would be insightful to empirically 
evaluate the effect of the ECB’s on-going QE purchases on the financial markets of the countries 
directly or within the Euro-area or ECB’s jurisdiction, for more generalizable results and possibly 
for a direct comparison with the results of this research on the BoE and Fed QE programs. 
Future work could be strengthened by including this apparent limitation of the current study.                                 
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                                            Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Univariate residual autocorrelation test (US equity) 
         
         Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*   
         
                 |      |         |      | 1 -0.061 -0.061 10.222 0.001   
        |      |         |      | 2 -0.015 -0.019 10.873 0.004   
        |      |         |      | 3 -0.006 -0.008 10.979 0.012   
        |      |         |      | 4 -0.009 -0.010 11.209 0.024   
        |      |         |      | 5 -0.039 -0.041 15.446 0.009   
        |      |         |      | 6 -0.016 -0.021 16.112 0.013   
        |      |         |      | 7 0.006 0.002 16.216 0.023   
        |      |         |      | 8 -0.008 -0.009 16.412 0.037   
        |      |         |      | 9 -0.023 -0.026 17.871 0.037   
        |      |         |      | 10 0.031 0.026 20.573 0.024   
        |      |         |      | 11 -0.004 -0.003 20.611 0.038   
        |      |         |      | 12 0.007 0.008 20.764 0.054   
        |      |         |      | 13 -0.002 -0.002 20.775 0.077   
        |      |         |      | 14 -0.027 -0.029 22.719 0.065   
        |      |         |      | 15 -0.031 -0.034 25.412 0.045   
        |      |         |      | 16 0.032 0.028 28.129 0.031   
        |      |         |      | 17 0.001 0.003 28.132 0.043   
        |      |         |      | 18 -0.022 -0.022 29.488 0.043   
        |      |         |      | 19 0.004 -0.000 29.534 0.058   
        |      |         |      | 20 -0.009 -0.013 29.739 0.074   
        |      |         |      | 21 -0.005 -0.005 29.805 0.096   
        |      |         |      | 22 -0.001 -0.002 29.806 0.123   
        |      |         |      | 23 0.013 0.009 30.303 0.141   
        |      |         |      | 24 -0.020 -0.020 31.435 0.142   
        |      |         |      | 25 -0.036 -0.036 35.003 0.088   
        |      |         |      | 26 -0.012 -0.020 35.375 0.104   
        |      |         |      | 27 0.002 -0.003 35.381 0.129   
        |      |         |      | 28 0.018 0.017 36.291 0.135   
        |      |         |      | 29 -0.001 -0.004 36.295 0.165   
        |      |         |      | 30 -0.032 -0.035 39.127 0.123   
        |      |         |      | 31 0.010 0.006 39.403 0.143   
        |      |         |      | 32 -0.038 -0.040 43.284 0.088   
        |      |         |      | 33 0.007 -0.001 43.402 0.106   
        |      |         |      | 34 -0.020 -0.021 44.458 0.108   
        |      |         |      | 35 0.020 0.014 45.524 0.110   
        |      |         |      | 36 -0.004 -0.003 45.564 0.132   
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Appendix 2 
Univariate residual autocorrelation test (US equity) adjusted for 1 ARMA term 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
       
               |      |         |      | 1 0.001 0.001 0.0017  
        |      |         |      | 2 -0.016 -0.016 0.6863 0.407 
        |      |         |      | 3 -0.008 -0.008 0.8816 0.644 
        |      |         |      | 4 -0.013 -0.013 1.3401 0.720 
        |      |         |      | 5 -0.042 -0.042 6.1574 0.188 
        |      |         |      | 6 -0.018 -0.019 7.0516 0.217 
        |      |         |      | 7 0.004 0.002 7.0887 0.313 
        |      |         |      | 8 -0.010 -0.011 7.3392 0.394 
        |      |         |      | 9 -0.022 -0.023 8.6408 0.373 
        |      |         |      | 10 0.031 0.028 11.225 0.261 
        |      |         |      | 11 -0.002 -0.004 11.235 0.340 
        |      |         |      | 12 0.008 0.008 11.389 0.411 
        |      |         |      | 13 -0.004 -0.004 11.423 0.493 
        |      |         |      | 14 -0.029 -0.030 13.706 0.395 
        |      |         |      | 15 -0.032 -0.030 16.424 0.288 
        |      |         |      | 16 0.030 0.030 18.852 0.221 
        |      |         |      | 17 0.001 -0.000 18.857 0.276 
        |      |         |      | 18 -0.022 -0.023 20.190 0.265 
        |      |         |      | 19 0.002 0.000 20.200 0.322 
        |      |         |      | 20 -0.009 -0.014 20.430 0.369 
        |      |         |      | 21 -0.005 -0.004 20.509 0.427 
        |      |         |      | 22 0.000 -0.001 20.509 0.489 
        |      |         |      | 23 0.012 0.008 20.885 0.528 
        |      |         |      | 24 -0.022 -0.023 22.217 0.507 
        |      |         |      | 25 -0.038 -0.036 26.134 0.346 
        |      |         |      | 26 -0.014 -0.018 26.676 0.372 
        |      |         |      | 27 0.002 -0.001 26.683 0.426 
        |      |         |      | 28 0.018 0.016 27.554 0.434 
        |      |         |      | 29 -0.002 -0.007 27.562 0.488 
        |      |         |      | 30 -0.032 -0.035 30.374 0.395 
        |      |         |      | 31 0.006 0.006 30.477 0.441 
        |      |         |      | 32 -0.037 -0.040 34.166 0.318 
        |      |         |      | 33 0.003 0.000 34.191 0.363 
        |      |         |      | 34 -0.018 -0.020 35.130 0.368 
        |      |         |      | 35 0.019 0.015 36.076 0.372 
        |      |         |      | 36 -0.001 -0.002 36.077 0.418 
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Appendix 3 
Univariate residual autocorrelation test (UK equity) 
        
        Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob*  
        
                |      |         |      | 1 -0.029 -0.029 2.3156 0.128  
        |      |         |      | 2 -0.008 -0.009 2.5022 0.286  
        |      |         |      | 3 -0.022 -0.023 3.8704 0.276  
        |      |         |      | 4 0.008 0.006 4.0393 0.401  
        |      |         |      | 5 -0.007 -0.007 4.1713 0.525  
        |      |         |      | 6 0.005 0.004 4.2347 0.645  
        |      |         |      | 7 0.001 0.001 4.2356 0.752  
        |      |         |      | 8 -0.025 -0.025 6.0103 0.646  
        |      |         |      | 9 0.001 -0.000 6.0124 0.739  
        |      |         |      | 10 0.004 0.004 6.0645 0.810  
        |      |         |      | 11 0.009 0.008 6.2762 0.854  
        |      |         |      | 12 -0.022 -0.021 7.6412 0.813  
        |      |         |      | 13 -0.001 -0.002 7.6420 0.866  
        |      |         |      | 14 -0.038 -0.038 11.648 0.635  
        |      |         |      | 15 -0.017 -0.020 12.431 0.646  
        |      |         |      | 16 0.007 0.005 12.587 0.703  
        |      |         |      | 17 0.009 0.007 12.818 0.748  
        |      |         |      | 18 -0.040 -0.039 17.226 0.508  
        |      |         |      | 19 -0.017 -0.018 18.003 0.522  
        |      |         |      | 20 0.004 0.001 18.040 0.585  
        |      |         |      | 21 -0.010 -0.012 18.319 0.629  
        |      |         |      | 22 -0.019 -0.021 19.292 0.627  
        |      |         |      | 23 -0.005 -0.007 19.352 0.681  
        |      |         |      | 24 -0.029 -0.030 21.684 0.598  
        |      |         |      | 25 0.016 0.014 22.381 0.614  
        |      |         |      | 26 0.000 -0.003 22.381 0.668  
        |      |         |      | 27 -0.015 -0.019 23.048 0.682  
        |      |         |      | 28 -0.006 -0.007 23.141 0.726  
        |      |         |      | 29 0.023 0.021 24.676 0.695  
        |      |         |      | 30 0.008 0.007 24.873 0.731  
        |      |         |      | 31 -0.044 -0.045 30.445 0.494  
        |      |         |      | 32 -0.003 -0.008 30.463 0.544  
        |      |         |      | 33 -0.004 -0.007 30.500 0.592  
        |      |         |      | 34 -0.029 -0.032 32.858 0.523  
        |      |         |      | 35 0.012 0.010 33.278 0.551  
        |      |         |      | 36 0.015 0.009 33.893 0.569  
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Appendix 4 
Structural Break Tests. 
US: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant     1.01428    0.998                 2006:03:23                 0.1847       0.824 
 Returns      29.4002     0***                     2009:01:21                 10.9282     0*** 
All Coeffs.   29.4194     0***                     2009:01:21                 10.9902     0***                                                                                                                                                                      
      
 
US: 2009:01:25-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                   Test         P-Value                     Date                       Test         P-Value                 
 Constant     1.2913    0.954                 2014:01:06                 0.1847       0.824 
 Returns       1.0869    0.989                 2013:07:25                 0.1459       0.905 
All Coeffs.    1.6125    1.000                 2013:09:12                 0.3322       0.980                                                                                                                                                                      
      
UK: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant     3.6045    0.439                   2009:01:01                 0.4333       0.498 
 Returns      57.2490     0***                     2008:08:13                 21.6006     0*** 
All Coeffs.   58.2387     0***                     2008:08:13                 21.9560     0***                                                                                                                                                                      
      
UK: 2008:08:16-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    0.4582    1.000                   2012:07:26                 0.0315       1.000 
 Returns      1.3780    0.935                   2012:10:11                 0.1285       0.949 
All Coeffs.   1.4811    1.000                   2012:10:12                 0.1646       1.000                                                                                                                                                                     
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France: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    0.5714    1.000                   2009:01:01                 0.0319       1.000 
 Returns      4.5678    0.297                   2008:08:25                 0.8701       0.239 
All Coeffs.   4.5733    0.629                   2008:08:12                 0.8989       0.585                                                                                                                                                                     
      
 
 
Germany: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    1.0696    0.992                   2009:01:01                 0.0598       1.000 
 Returns      1.4190    0.926                   2008:08:27                 0.1881       0.817 
All Coeffs.   2.2062    0.977                   2008:08:27                 0.2492       1.000                                                                                                                                                                     
      
 
 
Australia: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    5.4268    0.206                   2009:01:01                 0.4502       0.482 
 Returns      4.2289    0.341                   2008:10:02                 0.4373       0.494 
All Coeffs.   6.8892    0.306                   2008:10:02                 0.9363       0.563                                                                                                                                                                     
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Hong-Kong: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    3.1244    0.529                   2009:01:01                 0.4491       0.483 
 Returns      5.6553    0.187                   2008:08:14                 0.3280       0.608 
All Coeffs.   6.0182    0.410                   2008:08:14                 0.3852       0.946                                                                                                                                                                     
     
 
 
Japan: 2004:01:01-2014:09:30 
  Andrews-Quandt              Andrews-Ploberger 
                     Test       P-Value                     Date                        Test         P-Value                 
 Constant    1.8103    0.833                   2008:12:23                 0.1495       0.897 
 Returns      5.3859    0.210                   2008:08:05                 0.2994       0.644 
All Coeffs.   8.7494    0.155                   2008:08:05                 0.4420       0.904                                                                                                                                                                     
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Appendix 5 
VAR lag order selection criteria 
Endogenous variables: LCAC40 LDAX LFTSE100 
LSP500      
Exogenous variables: C       
      
Sample: 1/05/2004 10/09/2014      
Included observations: 2770      
        
         Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ  
        
        0  8763.698 NA   2.11e-08 -6.324692 -6.316133 -6.321601  
1  35977.25  54328.85  6.24e-17 -25.96191 -25.91912 -25.94646  
2  36696.37  1433.567  3.75e-17 -26.46958 -26.39255 -26.44176  
3  36839.94  285.7929  3.42e-17 -26.56169 -26.45043 -26.52151  
4  36921.52  162.1680  3.27e-17 -26.60904  -26.46355*  -26.55649*  
5  36940.98  38.61584  3.26e-17 -26.61154 -26.43181 -26.54663  
6  36980.49  78.31001  3.20e-17 -26.62851 -26.41455 -26.55124  
7  36990.58  19.97888  3.22e-17 -26.62425 -26.37606 -26.53461  
8  37018.04  54.25157  3.19e-17 -26.63252 -26.35009 -26.53052  
9  37037.10  37.61568   3.18e-17*  -26.63473* -26.31807 -26.52036  
10  37050.65  26.69413  3.19e-17 -26.63296 -26.28207 -26.50623  
11  37066.00   30.21431*  3.19e-17 -26.63249 -26.24737 -26.49340  
        
         * indicates lag order selected by the criterion     
 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation 
at lag order h 
Sample: 1/05/2004 10/09/2014 
Included observations: 2779 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  280.3524  0.0000 
2  348.9331  0.0000 
3  69.15253  0.0000 
4  31.33014  0.0122 
5  59.56019  0.0000 
6  27.02775  0.0412 
7  36.58120  0.0024 
8  34.68341  0.0044 
9  21.71788  0.1525 
   
   
Probabilities from  𝜒2 with 16 df. 
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Appendix 6 
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial                                   
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Appendix 7 
VAR Estimation  
Endogenous variables:CAC40 DAX30 FTSE100 SP500 
Exogenous variables : C QEUK QEUS   
 
LCAC   LDAX   LFTSE   LS&P                                                            
 
LCACt-1 0.6576
***  0.0996**             -0.2274***  0.0747* 
(14.3238)  (2.2853)  (-6.0313)  (1.7469) 
 
LCACt-2 0.1962
***  -0.0681                 0.1363***  0.0266 
(3.2302)                 (1.1821)  (2.7310)  (0.4671) 
 
LCACt-3 -0.0330   0.0691   -0.0319   -0.0612 
(0.5412)  (1.1937)  (-0.6382)  (-1.0775) 
                                                                       
LCACt-4 0.0920              -0.1186
**  0.1041**  0.0640 
(1.5106)  (-2.0517)  (2.0818)  (1.1284) 
 
 
LCACt-5 0.0116   0.0790   -0.0204   -0.0024 
(0.1910)  (1.3654)  (-0.4084)  (-0.0428) 
 
LCACt-6 0.1119
*   0.0041   0.0763   0.0237 
(1.8386)  (0.0709)  (1.5265)  (0.4178) 
 
LCACt-7 0.1225
**  0.0234   0.0761               0.1487***             
(2.0146)  (0.4069)  (1.5245)  (2.6246) 
 
LCACt-8            -0.2144
***   -0.0088    -0.1485***  -0.2497*** 
                          (-3.5217)  (-0.1533)  (-2.9696)             (-4.4014) 
 
LCACt-9  -0.0099   -0.1021   -0.0425   0.0944
* 
(-0.1642)  (-1.771)  (-0.8533)  (1.6696) 
                                                              
LDAXt-1 0.0451
*   0.7180***  0.0111               0.0399* 
(1.814)   (30.4533)  (0.5469)                        (1.7260) 
 
LDAXt-2 -0.0165   0.1003
***  0.0153   0.0822*** 
(-0.5480)  (3.5037)  (0.6197)  (2.9264) 
 
LDAXt-3 0.0441   0.0181   0.0205   -0.0569
** 
(1.4534)  (0.6306)  (0.8232)  (-2.0127) 
 
LDAXt-4  -0.0809
***  0.0867***   -0.0545**  -0.0534*  
(-2.6566)  (3.0014)  (-2.1806)  (-1.8837) 
 
LDAXt-5 0.6371
**  -0.0174   0.0287   0.0684** 
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(2.0739)  (-0.5998)  (1.1397)  (2.3925) 
 
LDAXt-6   -0.0434  0.0542
*   -0.0128   -0.0677** 
   (-1.4122)  (1.8574)  (-0.5078)  (-2.3635) 
 
                                                         
LDAXt-7  -0.0247   -0.0097              -0.0456
*  -0.02785 
(-0.8081)  (-0.3353)  (-1.8141)  (-0.9767) 
 
 
LDAXt-8 0.0032   -0.0233   0.0232   0.0276       
(0.1081)  (-0.8107)  (0.9318)  (0.9772) 
 
LDAXt-9 0.0233               0.0396   0.0460   0.0104                                    
(0.7871)  (1.4071)  (1.8885)  (0.3771)              
 
LFTSEt-1 -0.0903
*  0.1372***  0.8221***  0.1008** 
(-1.7296)  (2.7769)  (19.1516)  (2.0715) 
 
LFTSEt-2  0.0262   -0.0741   0.0482   -0.1474
** 
(0.3764)  (-1.1189)  (0.8409)  (-2.2663) 
 
LFTSEt-3 0.0653   -0.0137   0.0784   0.0928 
(0.9343)  (-0.2067)  (1.3660)  (1.4259) 
 
LFTSEt-4 0.0339   0.0196   0.0458   0.0175 
(0.4872)  (0.2964)  (0.8001)  (0.2705) 
 
LFTSEt-5 -0.0746   -0.0396   -0.0586   -0.1334
** 
 (-1.0721)  (-0.6004)  (-1.0251)  (-2.0565) 
 
LFTSEt-6 0.0119   -0.0054   0.0044   0.0792                                                      
   (0.1723)  (-0.0831)  (0.0782)  (1.2214) 
 
LFTSEt-7 -0.0631   -0.0240   0.01884  -0.0682 
(0.9118)  (-0.3680)  (0.3311)  (-1.0571) 
 
LFTSEt-8  0.1733
**  0.0182   0.0998   0.1572** 
(2.4988)  (0.2776)  (1.7532)  (2.4324) 
 
LFTSEt-9 -0.0357   0.0597   0.0041   -0.0483 
(-0.5155)  (0.9081)  (0.0731)  (-0.7484) 
                                                 
LS&Pt-1 0.5465
***  0.2968***  0.5033***  0.8792*** 
(19.2503)  (11.0150)  (21.5861)            (33.2315) 
 
LS&Pt-2 -0.3466
***  -0.0747**             -0.2864*  0.0422 
   (-10.2590)  (-2.3311)  (-10.3205)  (1.3415) 
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LS&Pt-3 -0.0889
**             -0.1845*  -0.08550***  -0.0760** 
(-2.5194)  (-5.5090)  (-2.9491)  (2.3105) 
 
 
LS&Pt-4 -0.0487   0.0349              -0.0814
***  -0.0419 
(-1.3670)  (1.0321)  (-2.7786)  (-1.2607) 
 
LS&Pt-5  -0.0090   -0.0561   0.0257   0.0220 
   (-0.2534)  (1.6569)  (0.8778)  (0.6622) 
 
 
LS&Pt-6 -0.0723
***  -0.0327              -0.0698***  0.0151*** 
   (-2.0268)  (-0.9665)  (-2.3803)                        (-2.908) 
 
 
LS&Pt-7 -0.0900
***  -0.0550   -0.0579**  -0.0970*** 
(-2.5143)  (-1.6177)  (-1.9693)                  (-2.9085) 
 
LS&Pt-8 0.0943
***  0.0392   0.0446   0.1502*** 
(2.6624)  (1.1682)  (1.5338)  (4.5488) 
 
 
LS&Pt-9 -0.0006   0.02099  0.0071   0.0851
*** 
(-0.0184)  (0.6361)  (0.2518)  (2.6285) 
    
 C  0.0214    -0.0448**  0.0427**  -0.0063 
   (0.8964)  (-1.9768)  (2.1780)  (-0.2864) 
 
LCACt-10 0.0625   0.0197   0.0771
**  0.0265 
(1.3602)  (0.4391)  (2.0424)  (0.6201) 
 
LDAXt-10  -0.0186   0.0257   -0.0325
*  0.0261        
(-0.8195)  (1.1906)  (-1.7406)  (-1.2308)                            
 
LFTSEt-10  -0.0449  -0.0597   -0.0691
*  -0.0416                                                                                                                             
   (-0.8834)  (-1.2362)  (-1.6530)  (-0.8789) 
 
LS&Pt-10  0.0195   0.0084   0.0026   0.0389        
(0.6213)  (0.2900)  (0.1057)  (1.3540) 
                  
QEFUK  -0.0003   4.35E-05  -0.0003   0.0010 
   (-0.1973)  (0.0229)  (-0.1829)                       (0.5416)     
 
QEFUS  -0.0008   0.0006   -0.0027   -0.0007 
   (0.2160)  (0.1662)  (-0.8432)  (-0.2004) 
 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Appendix 8 
Cointegration Specification Sensitivity Analysis 
Series: LCAC LDAX LFTSE LSP 
Sample: 1/05/2004 10/09/2014 
Included observations: 2778 
 
Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend:        None               None            Linear             Linear           Quadratic 
Test type         No Intercept      Intercept       Intercept          Intercept         Intercept 
                          No Trend        No Trend     No Trend           Trend               Trend 
Trace                     0                     0                    0                       1                       1 
Max-Eigen             0                     0                    0                       1                       1 
 
* Critical values based on Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
Information Criteria by Rank and Model  
Data Trend:        None               None            Linear             Linear           Quadratic 
Rank or      No Intercept      Intercept       Intercept          Intercept         Intercept 
No. of CE.s No Trend        No Trend     No Trend           Trend               Trend 
 
                    Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0  -26.56969   -26.56969     -26.56812 -26.56812 -26.56649  
1  -26.56767  -26.57078  -26.56986 -26.57834* -26.57741  
2  -26.56386   -26.56737  -26.56716 -26.57572 -26.57536  
3  -26.55915  -26.56270  -26.56262 -26.57195 -26.57187  
4  -26.55340  -26.557525  -26.55725 -26.56665  -26.56665  
 
                 Schwarz Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -26.50139*  -26.50139*    -26.56812 -26.49128 -26.48111 
1 -26.48229  -26.48327  -26.47594 -26.48229 -26.47496 
2 -26.46141   -26.46065  -26.45617 -26.46046 -26.45583 
3 -26.43962  -26.43667  -26.43455 -26.43748 -26.43527 
4 -26.41679  -26.41211  -26.41211 -26.41297  -26.41297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
Appendix 9: cointegration restriction test (LSP500) 
Sample (adjusted): 1/08/2004 10/09/2014 
 
Included observations: 2778 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: LCAC40 LDAX LFTSE100 LSP500    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  70.34972  63.87610  0.0129 
At most 1  0.004635  24.64247  42.91525  0.8073 
At most 2  0.002755  11.73745  25.87211  0.8298 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  45.70725  32.11832  0.0006 
At most 1  0.004635  12.90502  25.82321  0.8108 
At most 2  0.002755  7.664683  19.38704  0.8504 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
     
Restrictions:     
     
     B(1,4)=0    
     
          
Tests of cointegration restrictions:   
     
     Hypothesized Restricted LR Degrees of  
No. of CE(s) Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
     
     1  36959.46  0.219410 1  0.639490 
2  36966.02  NA  NA  NA 
3  36969.85  NA  NA  NA 
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Appendix 10: cointegration restriction test (LCAC)     
Sample (adjusted): 1/08/2004 10/09/2014  
Included observations: 2778 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: LCAC40 LDAX LFTSE100 LSP500    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  70.34972  63.87610  0.0129 
At most 1  0.004635  24.64247  42.91525  0.8073 
At most 2  0.002755  11.73745  25.87211  0.8298 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  45.70725  32.11832  0.0006 
At most 1  0.004635  12.90502  25.82321  0.8108 
At most 2  0.002755  7.664683  19.38704  0.8504 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
     
Restrictions:     
     
     B(1,1)=0    
     
      
Tests of cointegration restrictions:   
     
     Hypothesized Restricted LR Degrees of  
No. of CE(s) Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
     
     1  36951.07  16.98773 1  0.000038 
2  36966.02  NA  NA  NA 
3  36969.85  NA  NA  NA 
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Appendix 11: cointegration restriction test 
((LDAX) 
  
Sample (adjusted): 1/08/2004 10/09/2014  
Included observations: 2778 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: LCAC40 LDAX LFTSE100 LSP500    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  70.34972  63.87610  0.0129 
At most 1  0.004635  24.64247  42.91525  0.8073 
At most 2  0.002755  11.73745  25.87211  0.8298 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  45.70725  32.11832  0.0006 
At most 1  0.004635  12.90502  25.82321  0.8108 
At most 2  0.002755  7.664683  19.38704  0.8504 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
  
Restrictions:     
     
     B(1,2)=0    
     
     Tests of cointegration restrictions:   
     
     Hypothesized Restricted LR Degrees of  
No. of CE(s) Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
     
     1  36944.33  30.46872 1  0.000000 
2  36966.02  NA  NA  NA 
3  36969.85  NA  NA  NA 
     
     NA indicates restriction not binding.   
 
     
    
        
    
        
    
    Probability Restricted LR Degrees of  
 Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
    
    0.000   36944.33  30.46872 1  0.000000 
NA  36966.02  NA  NA  NA 
NA  36969.85  NA  NA  NA 
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Appendix 12: cointegration restriction test 
(LFTSE) 
   
Sample (adjusted): 1/08/2004 10/09/2014  
Included observations: 2778 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: LCAC40 LDAX LFTSE100 LSP500    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  70.34972  63.87610  0.0129 
At most 1  0.004635  24.64247  42.91525  0.8073 
At most 2  0.002755  11.73745  25.87211  0.8298 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None b  0.016319  45.70725  32.11832  0.0006 
At most 1  0.004635  12.90502  25.82321  0.8108 
At most 2  0.002755  7.664683  19.38704  0.8504 
At most 3  0.001465  4.072762  12.51798  0.7315 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 b denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Restrictions:     
     
     B(1,3)=0    
     
          
Tests of cointegration restrictions:   
     
     Hypothesized Restricted LR Degrees of  
No. of CE(s) Log-likehood Statistic Freedom Probability 
     
     1  36956.33  6.476729 1  0.010930 
2  36966.02  NA  NA  NA 
3  36969.85  NA  NA  NA 
    
    NA indicates restriction not binding. 
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Appendix 13: GARCH Estimation UK QE1 
 
 
Number of Observation: 230 
Log-likelihood: 694.8208 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant -0.0015* 0.0008 
   QE1  0.2774 0.3489 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < -0.00001*** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0041 0.0044 
              (c)  1.0186*** 0.0026 
      QE1 -4.53×10-5*** -1.66×10-5 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡,. 𝑖 = UK.  The information 
set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1 , and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡 ,  
represents the QE1 operations or actual purchases during the QE1 period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
 
GARCH Estimation UK QE2 
 
Number of Observation: 148 
Log-likelihood: 468.3168 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant -0.0012 0.0012 
   QE2  0.2814 0.4588 
Panel B 
              (𝜔)  0.00001 0.00001 
              (b)  0.06694 0.06944 
              (c)  0.67420*** 0.21502 
      QE2  0.00757 0.00483 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE2𝑖,𝑡where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡,. 𝑖 = UK.  The information 
set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1 , and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 ,  
represents the QE2 operations or actual purchases during the QE2 period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
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GARCH Estimation UK QE3 
 
Number of Observation: 84 
Log-likelihood: 288.4992 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant -0.00273** 0.00135 
   QE3 -1.13840* 0.65019 
Panel B 
              (𝜔)  0.00005***  0.00001 
              (b)  0.1515  0.1564 
              (c)  0.0980*  0.0026 
      QE3 -0.0029***  0.0005 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE3𝑖,𝑡where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return from market 𝑖 in week 𝑡,. 𝑖 = UK.  The information 
set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1 , and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 ,  
represents the QE3 operations or actual purchases during the QE3 period by the BoE. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
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Appendix 14: GARCH Estimation US QE1 
 
Number of Observation: 153 
Log-likelihood: 447.1681 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00261** 0.00111 
   QE1 -1.42506 0.97343 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.04811
 0.08970 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001 < 0.00001 
              (b) -0.0131*** 0.0039 
              (c)  1.0076*** 0.0004 
     QE1 -0.0037 0.0029 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0+𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE1𝑖,𝑡,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from 
market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, i=US. The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸1𝑖,𝑡 ,represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the QE1 period by the 
Fed. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
GARCH Estimation US QE2 
 
Number of Observation: 166 
Log-likelihood: 568.6869 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00060** 0.00117 
   QE2  0.00254 0.57085 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1  0.00592
 0.08922 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001 < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0918 0.0759 
              (c)  0.8092*** 0.1793 
     QE2  0.0036 0.0039 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0+𝜙𝑖,1QE2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE2𝑖,𝑡,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from 
market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, i=US. The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 ,represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the QE2 period by the 
Fed. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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GARCH Estimation US QE3 
 
Number of Observation: 521 
Log-likelihood: 1858.334 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00103** 0.00043 
   QE3 -0.54235*** 0.04518 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.04863
 0.04956 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001** < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.1740*** 0.0536 
              (c)  0.6328*** 0.1094 
     QE3  0.0033 0.0028 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0+𝜙𝑖,1QE3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1QE3𝑖,𝑡,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from 
market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, i=US. The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑄𝐸3𝑖,𝑡 ,represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the QE3 period by the 
Fed. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
GARCH Estimation US MEP 
 
Number of Observation: 209 
Log-likelihood: 642.0508 
 
Panel A 
 Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
  constant  0.00144 0.00101 
   MEP -0.74288 0.89167 
   𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.01601
 0.09382 
Panel B 
              (𝜔) < 0.00001 < 0.00001 
              (b)  0.0934* 0.0507 
              (c)  0.8860*** 0.0528 
     MEP -0.0025 0.0087 
This table contains the estimated coefficients from the model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,0+𝜙𝑖,1MEP𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −
 𝑑1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1where𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖,𝑡), and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑖𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑖,1MEP𝑖,𝑡 ,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the daily return from 
market 𝑖 in week 𝑡, i=US. The information set, Ω
𝑡−1
, includes all information known at time 𝑡 − 1, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑖 > 0, 𝑏𝑖,𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 > 0 , 
𝑏𝑖,𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑖 < 1. The variable 𝑀𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ,represents the individual QE operations or actual purchases during the MEP period by the 
Fed. *** ** * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
